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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents a unified design of protection
mechanisms for a computer utility that (1) prevent accidental
unauthorized releases of information, (2) prevent tyranny by
dividing and limiting the power of the administrators of the
utility, (3) preserve the independence of independent users of
the utility, (4) accommodate to organizations having disparate
traditional superior-subordinate relations, and (5) support
proprietary services that allow users to build on the work of
others in a context that protects the interests of lessors and
lessees of services. The design includes specifications of
both hardware and software protection mechanisms, including
walls defined by domains and capabilities, and a hardware de-
vice, the Privacy Restriction Processor, that records the copy-
ing and combining of information in the computer by propagating
privacy restrictions among restriction sets associated with
segments and processes. The propagated restrictions prevent
accidental unauthorized releases of information. But when a
secret can be encoded into the timing or occurrence of system
actions to prevent output of secrets, the encoded secret can
escape. However, such escaping secrets can be detected and
the offending computation can be arrested by the operating
system.
The dissertation includes an analysis of the social con-
cepts, systems, and conventions to which a computer utility
is necessarily connected. The emergence of a 1984-like nega-
tive-utopia is shown to be a possible consequence of the on-
going development of techniques for penetrating and taking
over computer systems.
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Chapter 1
Overview
"I think [the computer] is probably the
most powerful single tool by quite a bit
that man has ever invented. It gives us
enormous capabilities to augment our human
capacities, but therein, of course, lies
its danger, too. We have to watch it with
great care."
-- Jerome B. Wiesner [US71]
The quality of life might someday be improved by computers.
Early applications of computers to work that was already being
done before the computer arrived on the scene have not much in-
fluenced the quality of life, except for persons working in the
computer industry. But the computer makes possible new services
and new interconnections of organizations and individuals which
might have a profound impact on the quality of life in the future.
For example, centralized emergency medical records would improve
the quality of medical care received by accident victims.
Computer-aided medical diagnosis would help medical doctors
cope with the explosion of medical knowledge. As the computer
is taught to provide complex and useful knowledge-based services,
we might expect the quality of life to improve.
But the computer will also support systems that severely
degrade the quality of life. For example, many modern weapons
systems include computers. More to the point of this research,
the computer could easily provide the basis of a centralized
f
dossier system, imprisoning citizens in institutional evaluations
based on records held by unforgivingly long-memoried computers.
The development of computer and communications technology makes
the dehumanized negative-utopia of 1984 [Or49] ("Big Brother is
Watching You") a clear option for the future.
The broad goal of this thesis is to contribute to the
development of computer technology that will lead to an im-
provement in the quality of life. We recognize that computers
are increasingly important components of social systems, and
therefore we expect that the design of computers will have
subtle, and possibly profound, effects on social systems. We
hope that computerized central dossier systems will never
emerge, but we do not expect the institutional trend towards
placing personal information in computers to be completely
reversed. (*) Therefore we feel it is necessary to build
computers that can keep secrets, so that storage of personal
information in computers will not reduce individual privacy.
(When we say that a computer keeps secrets, we mean that the
computer prevents unauthorized releases of information.) A
strong technological optimism underlies this felt necessity:
we hope that negative social effects can be prevented with
sophisticated technological fixes. A simpler and sounder
approach might be to outlaw dangerous applications of tech-
11
(*) This trend must be watched and might require regulation
by government.
nology, but that approach has not been the focus of this
thesis.
Institutions decide whether, when, and how to release
information to individuals or other institutions in society,
and thus individual privacy is most affected by the institutions
that hold personal information. We expect that at least some
institutions will act to protect individual privacy, and these
institutions would be poorly served by computers that couldn't
keep secrets. Thus this work is directed towards opening
technological options for humane institutions.
We have succeeded in finding a new mechanism for preventing
unauthorized releases of information from computers. This
mechanism acts to associate authorizations with information
itself, rather than information containers, and thereby pre-
vents accidental unauthorized releases of information. It
does not appear to be possible to prevent all unauthorized
releases of information from a computer, because it is
extremely difficult to prevent a cleverly written program
from signalling information to a human who interacts with the
computer. But our mechanism detects such signalling as it
occurs, whereupon the operating system can arrest the offending
computation. These two achievements of our mechanism provide
a new capability for information protection.
Our original goal was to design a mechanism which would
absolutely prevent all unauthorized releases of information.
1L
This is evidently not possible, roughly because computer
systems are not closed systems. People embed computers in
social systems, and computer systems radiate. Cathode-ray
tube terminals radiate photons, central processors radiate
at radio frequencies, and printers inundate social systems
with information on paper. When considering that one can
snap a picture of a CRT terminal with a camera, or the ubi-
quitous use of office copying machines, it is clear that mak-
ing computers keep secrets will never be more than a part of
any information-security envelope.
The problem of providing protection for information and
information systems is toughest in the context of a computer
utility. A data bank of sensitive information maintained in
a computer utility might become the target of organized at-
tacks aimed to steal, modify, or destroy information. Since
the services of computer utilities will be available to every-
one who agrees to pay for them, the attackers can use the
facilities of the utility to mount their attack. Our infor-
mation protection mechanisms must be able to defeat attacks
raised up inside the computer utility itself by malicious
users.
Protection of information and information systems has not
been a priority requirement in the development of commercial
computer systems. Studies carried out by James Anderson and
Daniel Edwards [Bra73, An72] have uncovered several design
and implementation weaknesses in security provided by
13
commercial computer systems. They found that protection
mechanisms which are "added on" to existing operating systems
can be penetrated by seven different classes of attacks. For
a computer system to be secure, it must be designed with se-
curity as a primary objective. This thesis contains such a
design: we present a "paper computer" which can be secured
against penetration attacks, and which can keep secrets.
Computers that keep secrets must store authorizations
that specify how and to whom information is to be released.
In addition to authorizations concerning release of information,
computers will store authorizations that relate to all the
available rights of control over computing objects. These
rights of control are the handles used by people to control
computers. As computers become more and more energetic actors
in social arenas, they approach the status of supporting the
entire nervous system of society. As this occurs, people with
power over computers will have more power over society, and
therefore the design principles by which power is licensed
and limited in society must be applied to computers. The
paramount design principle is the prevention of tyranny. This
principle arises naturally in democratic societies, and its
implication for a computer utility is the necessity of dividing
and limiting the power of people and organizations over the
utility. Organizations that use the computer utility will
require independent rights of control over computing objects,
and the administrators of the computer utility must not have
1P
the power to abridge the independence of users. Furthermore,
the power of the computer utility's administrators must be
divided and limited to provide a system of checks and balances
in the administration of the computer utility.
A computer's authorization system is an interface between
the computer and established organizational authority. In
every organization that uses a computer, the question of who
controls the stored authorizations must be asked and the an-
swer must be expressed in terms of the computer's authoriza-
tion system. An inflexible computer authorization system
would probably be burdensome to an organization whose struc-
ture and style were not congruent to the organizational model
used by the computer's designers. A computer utility must be
sufficiently flexible that user organizations can distribute
rights of control over computing objects in ways that are
natural to the organizations. In other words, a computer
utility's authorization mechanism must adapt to varying styles
and modes of organizational decision-making processes.
We have designed an authorization mechanism for our
"paper computer" which satisfies the criteria enunciated in
the previous paragraphs. Our mechanism preserves the indepen-
dence of authority of the independent organizations that use
the computer utility. To allow organizations to distribute
organizational power in ways that do not excessively disturb
their traditional superior-subordinate social relations, our
mechanism includes a system of protocols, defined by the
is
organizations, whose purpose is to embody in the computer the
social rules which were formally or informally followed in the
pre-computer era. By using appropriately defined protocols,
organizations can prevent adverse effects on the quality of
organizational life due to the introduction of advanced com-
puterized information systems.
In addition to secrecy systems and authorization systems,
we have studied security problems associated with computer-
based services. Such services will probably improve the qual-
ity of life, but several factors retard their growth. First,
current computer technology is unable to protect the invest-
ment in programs and data that provide services. Under the
capitalist system, the reward expected by developers of ser-
vices is a monetary return for rental of programs or data or
for services rendered. This reward can be assured by means of
contracts between the lessor and lessees of services, but it
can be more securely protected by computer technology that
keeps the programs, data, and methods of providing services
secret. Second, current computer technology is unable to pro-
tect from theft the data which the user of a service feeds to
that service to be processed, unless the user controls the
computer that provides the service. A service implemented in
a computer utility might easily steal data, or sabotage its
users. Users of services will require protection from these
harms. The third factor is the awkwardness encountered in
using current computer technology to build on the work of
16
others in the form of programs and data. Having to "reinvent
the wheel" increases the cost of developing computer-based
services.
In our "paper computer", users can develop and lease
proprietary services in an environment that provides protec-
tion from most of the harms suggested above. Building on
the work of others is encouraged and facilitated by the
mechanisms presented.
In summary, we have designed a computer utility with hard-
ware and software mechanisms for protecting the privacy of in-
formation, mechanisms for storing authorizations and inter-
facing to a bureaucracy or other organizational form, and
mechanisms to support proprietary services in a computer
utility in a context that protects the interests of lessors
and lessees of services. The central technological contri-
bution of the thesis is the privacy restriction mechanism
described in chapters 6 and 7. The sociological contribution
of the thesis is most concentrated in the social view in
chapter 2 and the investigation of authority hierarchies in
chapter 8.
Finally, we present a plan of the thesis. Chapter 2,
"Society and Information," describes and analyses the social
environment impacted by information technology. From our
analysis of the complex social scene, we develop a set of re-
quirements which must be satisfied by a computer utility.
Chapter 2 is not crucial to the technological development that
17
follows.
Chapter 3, "Elementary Protection Mechanism," describes
early work in the realm of computer protection mechanisms and
generalizes from the examples presented to arrive at the
concept of the domain. This chapter serves as a technological
and philosophical introduction, but it is not essential;
readers who know roughly what a domain is will find the devel-
opment beginning in chapter 4 to be reasonably self-contained,
except for occasional references to "goring the ox," which is
explained in section 3.5.
Chapter 4, "Additional Protection Mechanisms," describes
how processes call and return between domains, passing argu-
ments and results between domains in a sectioned stack and in
shared segments. This chapter also describes the operating
system which supports the environment of domains, processes,
and a naming hierarchy for computing objects.
Chapter 5, "Proprietary Services," describes nine pro-
tection problems associated with the use of services encap-
sulated in domains, such as services which steal information
or sabotage their lessees, and lessees who conspire to steal
secrets from lessors. Technological solutions are presented
for some of these problems.
Chapter 6, "Privacy Restrictions," describes a mechanism
which can protect information owners from would-be copiers of
their information. The mechanism acts by propagating restric-
tions among restriction sets associated with segments and
1I
processes and by striking down output to users and input to
domains. But because the operation of the mechanism itself
can be used as a signal, the mechanism is not leakproof:
clever programs will successfully signal. A system of alarms
is developed to deter such cleverness.
Chapter 7, "Privacy Restriction Processor," describes the
hardware and software of a multiprocessing computer system which
implements privacy restrictions.
Chapter 8, "Authority Hierarchies," describes the authori-
zation mechanism of our design. Authority hierarchies are
the computing objects which represent independent users of the
computer utility. An authority hierarchy is a tree of "offices,"
each of which represents some collection of rights of control
over computing objects. Domains, especially "home domains" of
officials of organizations, are the "agents" of offices. Pro-
tocols associated with each authority hierarchy mediate some
attempts by agents of offices to exercise rights of control
over computing objects. Mechanisms for sharing authority,
delegating authority, and sharing delegated authority are
presented. Locksmithing, and the authorization system's most
powerful lock and key, are introduced.
Chapter 9, "Conclusions," summarizes the nature of pro-
tection systems, surveys the sources of complexity of compu-
ter protection systems, and speculates on robotic watchers.
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Chapter 2
Society and Information
2.1. Introduction
Institutions hold information. Governments, universities,
manufacturers, hospitals, insurance companies, credit bureaus
and the corner drug store all require, for their daily operation
and continued existence, a large amount of information. Some
of it is specialized, as when it is directly related to the
function of the institution, and only similar institutions
hold such information. Patients' histories held by hospitals
and transcripts held by universities are examples of this.
Also, institutions have some general information needs, i.e.,
information needs which are common to all (or almost all) in-
stitutions. For example, most institutions hold information
concerning inventory, accounts receivable, accounts payable,
payroll, and personnel.
Statistical information, generated from specialized or
general information, is another of the general information
needs of most institutions: managers of institutions use
statistical analyses to help them understand what their
institution is doing. For example, insurance companies do
statistical and actuarial studies to set their rates, and
the U.S. Government publishes the economic indicators that
help fill the general statistical information needs of the
business community.
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Governments maintain numerous information services,
including libraries and clearinghouses that publish tech-
nical information, market information, maps, etc. The U.S.
Government conducts a census every ten years, making statis-
tical information about the population generally available.
Also, governments maintain many large data banks and
dossier systems holding information about individuals.
We will discuss data banks and dossiers at length in section 2.4.
Individuals hold information, although neither to the
extent nor in the manner (with some exceptions) of a large
institution. Almost all persons hold financial records
and personal correspondence, and many people build libraries,
both for professional purposes and for leisure.
Society is a vast, intricate, information-dependent
system; and the purpose of this chapter is to explore some
aspects of society relating to information and to that
superfast scary information machine, the computer. We are
interested in questions of the form, "What is the social
relevance of a transfer of such-and-such a type of infor-
mation?" The first important variable is the value of the
information transferred; this is discussed in the next
section. Then we turn to defining the concepts privacy,
disclosure, and surveillance; and we review U.S. law re-
lating to privacy.
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In section 2.4, we discuss data banks and dossier
systems, and their computerization; and we review some
safeguards for the proposed National Data Center. Section
2.5 identifies the responsible actors in the process of
institutional information transfer. Section 2.6 describes
how surveillance spurs responsible action. When infor-
mation transfer is computerized, surveillance can be pro-
grammed into the computer.
Finally, section 2.7 explores criminal activity, police
surveillance, and computer penetration techniques; and
section 2.8 summarizes requirements on computer systems
which can be inferred from the considerations of this
chapter.
2.2 The Value of Information
Some information has great value to individuals and
to society. The value of information to decision-makers is a
clear example: wise decisions are not likely without know-
ledge of options and knowledge of expected outcomes. Know-
ledge can be regarded as the possession of information.
The remaining paragraphs in this section detail the value
of certain specific types of information.
Information about the exercise of power and the for-
mation of public policy is invaluable to the life of a
democracy. It is well known that the wisdom of a policy
22
is improved by public debate of its merits. For instance,
no public debate was held in 1964 and 1965 when the U.S.
Government escalated the covert war against North Vietnam
through the commitment of U.S. ground forces authorized
to take offensive action [DoD71]; and our escalation is
considered a mistake by most Americans today (in 1971).
Secret voting by representatives hampers the democratic
process. But when constituents know how their represen-
tatives are voting, legislators will be more responsive
to the public will. Thus we expect the elimination of
secret voting in the U.S. House of Representatives to
improve the quality of democracy here. [Hu70a,Hu70b]
Freedom of the press is essential to the operation of
representative democracy, because the press is the trans-
mission channel for information about public policy and
the exercise of power. The response of organized groups
in society to such information provides feedback to
government.
Information about the physical universe, including the
branches of knowledge we call science, engineering, medi-
cine and nutrition; is of great value in improving the
quality of life (when applied wisely), and has some power
to form world views. Of course, science and engineering,
together with ignorance and greed, created today's pollution
crisis. But the solution must include still more science
23
and engineering; ecology and pollution preventment technology.
The operation of markets requires a flow of information
to traders. The New York Stock Exchange ticker is the
mechanism of one such flow. It is an exceptional source
of market information in that it is inexpensive and available
to all. Markets are generally dominated by clubs ("The
Establishment") whose power comes from mutual support and
access to inside information. For example, some information
might have prompted nine major stockholders of the Penn
Central Company to unload their holdings just before the
subsidiary Penn Central Transportation Company filed for
bankruptcy on June 21, 1970 [Bed71]. The wealth of
dominant clubs comes from the exploitation of non-members,
such as the buyers of the soon-to-be-devalued Penn Central
stock in the example just given. These clubs require
privacy to operate, and they have privacy.
Information about law and legal rights becomes impor-
tant to individuals in times of conflict. Such informa-
tion has always been available to the wealthy, while
recent social movements have begun to make legal rights
such as civil rights and welfare rights available to poor
people.
Credit bureaus collect, hold, and disseminate credit
and "other" information about individulas. This is an
essential service for the people who want and get credit,
and for the institutions that provide it.
Ordinary operating information, such as accounts re-
2+~
ceivable files, can be essential to the survival of an institu-
tion. It is not widely enough recognized that the loss or
destruction of certain essential files can force a company
into bankruptcy. [Bri71]
Sources of information considered reputable by the public
can publish false reports, forged by intelligence agents,
purposely designed to create political unrest or scandal. This
is called "disinformation." For example, there was "the fab-
rication -- by a White House aide -- of a letter to the editor
alleging that Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine) condoned a racial
slur on Americans of French-American descent as
'Canucks.'" [Ber72] The letter was published in the Manchester
Union Leader less than two weeks before the 1972 New Hampshire
primary.
These examples of the uses of information, gathered from
the worlds of politics, academia, the economy, and the cloak-
and-dagger community; give an idea of the scope of life touched
upon by the exchange of information in our society. In all of
our examples, the value of information is related to the values
of expected outcomes of decisions made by persons or institu-
tions which have access to the information. Our description
of this relationship has been qualitative, but recent studies
by Hirschhorn [Hi71] have applied economic tools to quantify-
ing the value of information applied to the production de-
cision.
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2.3. Privacy, Disclosure, and Surveillance
"It is necessary at the outset to
sharpen the intuitive concept of
privacy. As a first approximation,
privacy seems to be related to secrecy,
to limiting the knowledge of others about
oneself. This notion must be refined. It
is not true, for instance, that the less
that is known about us the more privacy we
have. Privacy is not simply an absence of
information about us in the minds of others;
rather it is the control we have over infor-
mation about ourselves."
-- Charles Fried [Fr68]
This idea of privacy, i.e., control over information
about ourselves, is a large part of the concept. In addition,
privacy means the right to be let alone [Wa90], the right to
act anonymously, and the right to act without undue confusion,
paranoia, or fear of the chilling effect of government. Con-
fusion, paranoia, and fear can arise when government conducts
surveillance of political activities, as in these United
States.
"I know that many, many students are
afraid to participate in political activ-
ities of various kinds which might attract
them, because of their concern about the
consequences of having a record of such
activities appear in a central file. ...
I don't know to what extent these student
fears have any justification, but I can
tell you that they are real fears and that
they frequently have caused students to
back away from activities which attracted
them. I might add here that I am not re-
ferring to confrontations or planned violence,
but participation in seminars, political
study groups, etc., that were seriously
questioning governmental and social arrange-
ments or policies.
-- Jerome B. Wiesner [US71]
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Privacy is part of the bundle of rights retained by
autonomous humans after they have given up to society those
other rights which society requires to provide for the sur-
vival of the community. If this bundle of rights is too slim,
as when a society's survival seems to require extensive
surveillance, the dignity of the citizen and his "inviolate
personality" [Wa90] are abridged.
In giving information voluntarily, an individual is
exercising his right to privacy by deciding what to give. In
many circumstances, however, there is an element of coercion
in the disclosure of information. For example, an individual
accepts some degradation of his privacy in exchange for credit.
That is, he must provide some information about his financial
condition, and expect to have the facts he gives verified and
his personal affairs investigated if his application for credit
is to be approved.
Surveillance is the coercive negation of privacy. In
other words, surveillance is the willful invasion of an in-
dividual's privacy for the purpose of gathering information
about actions, associations, conversations, thoughts, motives,
etc.
"Surveillance is obviously a fundamen-
tal means of social control. Parents watch
their children, teachers watch students,
supervisors watch employees, religious
leaders watch the acts of their congregants,
policemen watch the streets and other public
places, and government agencies watch the
citizen's performance of various legal obli-
gations and prohibitions. Records are kept
by authorities to organize the task of in-
direct surveillance and to identify trends
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that may call for direct surveillance.
Without such surveillance, society could
not enforce its norms or protect its
citizens, and an era of ever increasing
speed of communication, mobility of per-
sons, and coordination of conspiracies
requires that the means of protecting
society keep pace with the technology of
crime."
-- Alan Westin [Wes67]
An invasion of privacy sometimes produces embarrassing
information for the invader, as in the case of marital infidel-
ity or a criminal record. Such information can be used by
one individual to gain power over another, or if made public,
can lead to a crippling loss of face on the part of the
exposed individual. It is for this reason that public dis-
closure of a very personal nature is sometimes considered
tortious.
The emerging computerized personal data banks represent
a threat to individual privacy. The availability of data
banks of personal information to public and private office-
holders in America reduces the level of privacy that can be
enjoyed by the people about whom information is stored. The
individual is in a very poor position to protect his privacy
by himself, because so much information about him is held by
institutions. The quality of privacy in our society, there-
fore, is controlled by the institutions that hold personal
information.
Every society finds some balance between privacy and
surveillance, which is a balance between the individual's
right to be secure in his person and the community's right to
know some things about the individual. In analysing public
policy that affects this balance, it is essential to realize
the value of privacy.
"...privacy is not just one possible
means among others to insure some other
value, but...it is necessarily related
to ends and relations of the most funda-
mental sort: respect, love, friendship
and trust. Privacy is not merely a good
technique for furthering these fundamental
relations; rather without privacy they are
simply inconceivable. They require a con-
text of privacy or the possibility of
privacy for their existence...To respect,
love, trust, feel affection for others
and to regard ourselves as the objects of
love, trust and affection is at the heart
of our notion of ourselves as persons
among persons, and privacy is the neces-
sary atmosphere for these attitudes and
actions, as oxygen is for combustion."
-- Charles Fried [Fr68]
"...one of the central elements of the
history of liberty in Western societies
since the days of the Greek city-state has
been the struggle to install limits on the
power of economic, political, and religious
authorities to place individuals and private
groups under surveillance against their will."
-- Alan Westin [Wes67]
2.3.1. Privacy and U. S. Law
The rights of individuals to protection from invasions
of privacy has been acknowledged many times in the history of
U. S. law. However, these protections are scattered throughout
the law, and each protection is limited and narrow. As a result,
the law does not define any unified and comprehensive concept
of privacy. In this section, we will describe some Constitu-
tional protections of privacy, some statutory protections of
privacy, and the impact of developing technology on privacy
and the response of the legal system to this impact.
The Bill of Rights provided the first protections of
privacy, in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The
First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly (among other
things). This right of peaceful assembly includes the right
to form associations freely, for any purposes, no matter how
unpopular (although this right does not protect purposeful
complicity in advocating violent overthrow of the government).
The protection of freedom of association also protects privacy
of association, and guarantees freedom to participate in
political life without unjustified governmental interference.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees protection of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The basic purpose of the amendment is to safe-
guard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials. The word "unreasonable" is
crucial, and questions of reasonableness are examined by courts
in deciding whether to grant search and seizure warrants.
Warrants are issued on the basis of probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation; and they must describe specifically
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person may be
forced to bear witness against himself. The guarantee reflects
the concern of society for the right of each individual to be
let alone. The purpose of the guarantee is to enable the
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citizen to create a zone of privacy which the government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment. Also, the amend-
ment forbids torture of witnesses and defendants, which was
just going out of style in Europe at the time the Constitution
was written.
The Ninth Amendment states that the enumeration of rights
in the Constitution shall not be construed to deny or reduce
other rights retained by the people. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."
Particularly mentioning the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments, the Court held unconstitutional a
Connecticut law forbidding the use and dissemination of birth
control information and devices. The Court spoke of the
"intimate relation of husband and wife" as "a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights." This landmark decision in
effect created a new constitutional right to marital privacy,
establishing in the law the idea that there are personal zones
of individual experience which must be inviolate.
Various statutes enacted by Congress provide for some
protection of individual privacy. We will describe a few of
these protections, provided by laws governing the Census and
fair credit reporting.
The Census Bureau collects and disseminates information
on population, housing, commerce, agriculture, governments,
1
and many other things. The Census statutes prohibit the
Secretary of Commerce and all officers and employees of the
Department of Commerce (which includes the Census Bureau) from
using census information for any purpose other than the statis-
tical purposes for which that information was supplied. The
officers and employees are prohibited from making any publica-
tion of census information whereby the data furnished by any
particular establishment or individual can be identified, and
they are prohibited from permitting anyone, other than sworn
officers and employees of the Commerce Department, access to
the individual reports. The Secretary of Commerce may furnish
certified copies of certain returns to Governors, courts, or
individuals, for proper purposes, but information so furnished
may never be used to the detriment of the persons to whom the
information relates. Also, any sworn officer or employee who
publishes or communicates census information without proper
authorization can be fined up to $1000.00 or imprisoned up to
two years or both. These statutory prohibitions and require-
ments have proven to be effective protection of confidentiality
and privacy for institutions and individuals that provide in-
formation to the Census Bureau.
Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act to protect
consumers against inaccurate, outdated, and out-of-context in-
formation in consumer reports. Such reports tell how the
subject pays bills, and whether the subject has been sued,
arrested, or filed for bankruptcy, etc. Some consumer re-
ports give neighbors' and friends' views of character, general
reputation, and manner of living.
"The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires
credit bureaus to:
(1) Follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of information;
(2) Disclose to the consumer, upon request,
the "nature, substance" and sources of in-
formation in the file, and recipients of
the report within the preceding six months;
(3) Provide an opportunity for a subject to
challenge the completeness or accuracy of
any item in his file, to record the dispute
if it is not resolved, and to correct any
error;
(4) Limit access to credit reports to those
with a court order, the consumer's consent,
or "a legitimate business need for the in-
formation;"
(5) Delete adverse information which is
7-14 years old;
(6) Notify the subject when detrimental
public information is included in a report
to be used for employment purposes,or to
make sure that the information is current."
-- Note, Yale Law Journal [YLJ71]
The note [YLJ71] goes on to cite weaknesses and problems
in the Act in four major areas:
"...the subject'sright to (1) be notified
of the existence of the report and inspect
it; (2) correct or explain detrimental entries;
(3) control access to the report; and (4) be
protected by the Act while still pursuing
common law remedies."
For example, with respect to the subject's right to in-
spect and correct private detrimental information, the Act is
not very effective.
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"While under the Act the credit bureau
must disclose the nature, substance and
sources of information contained in the
files on demand, it apparently need not
let the subject read the report. Further,
the sources of information about the sub-
ject's "character, general reputation,
personal characteristics and mode of liv-
ing" need not be revealed. The identity
of the source is essential to any attempt
to rebut the statements, which may be based
on bad motive, lack of opportunity to
observe, or similar grounds.
"There seems to be no reason why only
sensitive public information in employment
reports need be current or reported to the
subject. But the most critical limitation
is that the subject need never be notified
when a report containing detrimental private
information is being sent to a user, and
there is no requirement to keep it current
either. ... These problems drastically re-
duce the effectiveness of the statute."
-- Note, Yale Law Journal [YLJ71]
The note, after concluding that the Fair Credit Reporting
Act is "a first, if short, step toward solution, but may cause
more problems than it solves," suggests further legislation
required for the protection of consumers.
While the Constitution and statutes of Congress served
reasonably well to protect individual privacy in the context
of eighteenth century technology, new technological develop-
ments have seriously threatened the environment of privacy
created by the framers of the Constitution. The telegraph
(1850's) and telephone (1880's), and wiretapping, were developed.
Microphones (1870's) and audio recording inventions (1890's)
appeared, and microphone eavesdropping came into active use
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"Instantaneous photography" (1880's)
allowed candid snapshots of persons and events without the
subjects' prior consent. Radio technology and miniaturization
extended the flexibility of microphone eavesdropping. The
computer (1940's) can support dossier systems that carry out
data surveillance of massive populations.
In the 1890's and early 1900's, mass-circulation news-
papers published exposes of the private lives of public
figures, based on the newly available candid snapshot tech-
nology. In a famous article, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
argued that such commercialized gossip was an unreasonable
intrusion against the "right to be let alone."
"...The intense intellectual and emo-
tional life, and the heightening of sen-
sations which came with the advance of
civilization, made it clear to men that
only a part of the pain, pleasure, and
profit of life lay in physical things.
Thoughts, emotions, and sensations de-
manded legal recognition, and the beauti-
ful capacity for growth which character-
izes the common law enabled the judges to
afford the requisite protection, without
the interposition of the legislature."
"...The intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence
of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to
mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."
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before World War .
"The general object in view is to pro-
tect the privacy of private life, and to
whatever degree and in whatever connection
a man's life has ceased to be private, be-
fore the publication under consideration
has been made, to that extent the protec-
tion is to be withdrawn. Since, then, the
propriety of publishing the very same facts
may depend wholly upon the person concern-
ing whom they are published, no fixed for-
mular can be used to prohibit obnoxious
publications."
-- Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis [Wa90]
A majority of the states have adopted the principles
proposed by Warren and Brandeis, but this common-law right to
privacy has not been applied to surveillance by agencies of
government.
The use of wiretaps by police agencies without the prior
approval of a competent court was tolerated for more than a
century by U.S. law. In the Olmstead case of 1928, the Supreme
Court held (in a 5-to-4 decision) that a federal wiretap of a
bootlegger's telephone was not a search and seizure covered by
the Fourth Amendment. They chose not to demand that telephone
taps satisfy the Fourth Amendment's rule of reasonableness,
because no physical intrusion had occurred and because the
conversation overheard "was not tangible" and was therefore
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection. It is noteworthy
that other eavesdropping technology can be used without physical
intrusion, e.g., highly directional microphones and microphones
that can listen through walls.
In the 1960's, the Supreme Court moved away from the
property oncepts enunciated in Olmstead, and Congress has
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furthered this movement with the Crime Control Act of 1968
(Pub.L. 90-351). Title III of this Act makes it a crime to
intercept wire or oral communication, or to use any device for
intercepting oral communication in many cases, or to disclose
an intercepted communication or to use information from an
intercepted communication while knowing that it was inter-
cepted. The statute prohibits the manufacture, distribution,
possession,and advertising of wire or oral communication inter-
cepting devices; provides for confiscation of the prohibited
devices; prohibits the use of intercepted wire or oral commun-
ications as evidence; and establishes a civil cause of action
against persons who illegally intercept oral or wire communi-
cation. Perhaps most important, the statute authorizes the
interception of wire or oral communication by federal and state
agents when approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction, and
such legally intercepted communications can be used as evidence
in court. The statute specifies procedures for authorized
interceptions, and it provides for reports to Congress on the
level of bugging. Also, the statute establishes a National
Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating
to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance which will be
appointed in 1974 and make its final report in 1975.
The Crime Control Act's requirement for a warrant to
authorize interception of wire or oral communication does not
apply to interceptions undertaken in the interests of national
security, because the Executive branch has traditionally used
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wiretapping as part of espionage and counter-espionage activ-
ities directed against foreign powers, and because Congress
did not want to expand, contract, or define Presidential
authority to intercept wire or oral communications in matters
affecting national security. However, the claimed "Mitchell
doctrine" of an unlimited right to use wiretapping for domestic
security surveillance without court approval was not upheld by
the Supreme Court (in U.S. v. U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan).
While Congress has acted to redefine the protection pro-
vided by law against wiretapping and electronic surveillance,
Congress has not acted to protect individual privacy against
data surveillance, except in a limited way in the context of
consumer credit reporting as described above.
"Although the United States is the most
advanced nation in the world in the field
of computer science, we must look elsewhere
to find comprehensive legislative proposals
for solving the computer-privacy problem--
in particular in Canada, Great Britain, and
Germany. Under bills before the Ontario
legislature and the British Parliament,
(1) all data banks would be registered,
(2) every person on whom a data bank main-
tains a file would receive a printout con-
taining the file's original contents and
have the right to demand printouts at later
points in time, and (3) each printout would
be accompanied by a statement of the file's
use since the previous printout was supplied
and a list of those who had received data
from it. In addition, the individual could
object to any item in the dossier and secure
an expungement order from the Registrar of
Data Banks, if he could show that the entry
was incorrect or unfair. Civil liability and
penalties also would be available if the bank
supplied erroneous information or violated the
act's provisions. b9
"By and large these are remarkable pro-
posals. I say this even though neither bill
expressly deals with file security or snooping,
prescribes the proper scope of data acquisition
and input, contains limitations on dissemina-
tion, applies to all data banks that might con-
tain information of a potentially damaging
nature, imposes a duty of care on data bank
operators except in the ex post facto sense of
relying on individuals to seek correction, or
requires the use of hardware or software con-
trols to meet privacy-protecting standards.
Many of these objectives would be achieved in-
directly, however, because the possibility of
liability under the proposed statute will en-
courage data banks to upgrade their practices."
-- Arthur R. Miller [Mi7l]
2.4. Data Banks
The U.S. Government maintains a score or so large data
banks about individuals in the Internal Revenue Service, the
Social Security Administration, the Veterans Administration,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc. These data banks
exist to serve the operating needs of the agencies that main-
tain them. Of course, data banks are found at all levels of
government. At the state level, motor vehicle registrations
and operator licensing are accomplished with the help of data
banks. At the county level (e.g., in California), welfare
data banks are found. Cities and counties maintain data banks
to administer property taxes, sewer taxes, and so forth.
Governments are not alone in maintaining data banks. The
credit bureaus maintain credit and "other" information in their
private dossiers on more than 100 million Americans [US68b],
and life insurance companies maintain a shared data bank of
medical information on policyholders.
37
In addition to these data banks of operating information
for government and private agencies, governments at all levels
maintain data banks of dossiers about political extremists and
activists, and criminals. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation maintains the Security Index of 10,000 persons
to be detained "in the event of a national emergency," and
their National Crime Information Center holds information
about wanted persons, stolen cars and other property. Also,
the U.S. Government maintains data banks of dossiers about
persons investigated for security clearances. Such investi-
gations are conducted by the Civil Service Commission, the FBI,
and the Armed Services Intelligence agencies.
Computers can hold data banks efficiently. The ongoing
development of low-cost random access mass storage devices
and data communication services allows us to envision a not-
too-distant future when all these data banks will be on-line
to computers linked in networks in such a way that anyone any-
where with a terminal to the network could access any data
bank and find out anything recorded about anyone.(*) This is
a nightmare.
(*)The FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) is an
example of what this technology can do. If a policeman sees a
suspicious car, he can report the license plate number to his
dispatcher, who will key it in at a console attached to a com-
puter at their state police headquarters, which will relay the
number to NCIC in Washington, D.C. If the car is stolen, NCIC
gets a "hit" in its files and reports back to the state com-
puter, which informs the dispatcher, who informs the officers
who requested the information.
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Because the technology is available, many people are afraid
that the computerization of data banks will lead to computer
networks that give every police officer, government official,
and bank vice-president access to all the computerized infor-
mation about everyone; which would be the end of personal
privacy as we have known it. This fear has a potent force,
which was felt when a National Data Center [US68a] was pro-
posed as a step toward a unified Federal statistical data
base. The danger that such a data base can be used as a
dossier system prompted the hearings conducted by Senator
Edward V. Long and Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher which
have served to delay the proposal while safeguards to protect
personal privacy are incorporated.
People would be more comfortable about data banks if their
rights to know of their files' existence, and to see their own
files and to challenge errors, were clearly established. Such
rights now exist with respect to credit bureaus and investiga-
tive reports [Hanl7la, YLJ71], but not with respect to files
held by agencies of government [Hanl7lb]. The right to see one's
file will be difficult to obtain in some cases because of con-
flicts of privacy. A conflict of privacy exists when disclosure
of the file contents to the file subject would violate the
privacy of some person who contributed to the file.
Congress, and perhaps all the state legislatures, must act
to establish the civil rights of seeing and challenging one's
file in most data banks. In addition, a person should be noti-
fied as to when his file has been accessed, by whom, to what
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extent, for what reason, and toward what end the information
has been obtained. Furthermore, procedures must be devised to
resolve problems with files in the context of conflicts of
privacy.
2.4.1. Safeguards for a National Data Center
A statistical data bank is a much milder establishment of
surveillance than the computer network suggested above. And
certainly our expectation of rational government is that it
should use the best possible statistical information in formu-
lating its policies. Therefore we expect a National Data
Center [US68a], with some safeguards, might be implemented.
Any system intended to protect personal privacy will
naturally replace identifying data, in each record of the
National Data Center's data bank, with a code number. Such
usual identifying data as names, addresses, and Social Security
numbers will be related in a one-to-one fashion to code numbers
by a separate file. Agencies which contribute data to the
bank do not need access to the (code number, personal identity)
file, since their contributions have identifying information
which can be translated into code numbers after the data are
received by the National Data Center. The users of the data
bank, who might be statisticians, have no need for the (code
number, personal identity) file, except for such applications
as detailed studies of "interesting" subsets of the popula-
tion. In such studies the researcher will have devised a
questionnaire, and selected a group of code numbers representing
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individuals whose responses to the questionnaire are to be
solicited. Such studies should have to be approved by a board
of review whose charter includes the goal of protecting
personal privacy to a reasonable extent, balancing that against
the value of the information being sought to the well-being of
the community. If the study is approved, the questionnaires
can then be sent to the population selected, and the results
made available to the researchers, with the personal identi-
ties remaining unknown (to the researchers).
The agency that grants access to the (code number,
personal identity) file holds the power to allow use of the
data base as a surveillance mechanism; that is, to invade
privacy. The control of such power is a problem that will
have to be solved by Congress.
"...common-law notions of privacy are
aimed too acutely at protection of undue
publicity and emotional distress to meet
the problems of privacy in a centralized
information system. Nor are suits at law
a particularly effective means of afford-
ing relief to those whose privacy is in-
vaded by the system...
Legislation specifically relevant to
the organization of the proposed informa-
tion center would appear to be a more
appropriate legal solution. With so many
forms of interrelated access possible,
careful legislation would be needed to
explicate precisely who is entitled to
have access to what. Criminal sanctions
for misbehavior would provide a much
stronger deterrence than would the vague
fear of a possible lawsuit."
-- Jeffrey A. Meldman [Me69]
User's having access to a data bank through a statistical
information retrieval program can use a well-known
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technique [Ho70] to violate the privacy of individuals. The
technique involves requesting of the information retrieval
program the number of individuals satisfying given criteria.
The criteria are chosen from known information which describes
the individual under investigation. The investigator can keep
adding criteria to the list presented to the information
retrieval program until the program reports that there is only
one person satisfying the criteria; the investigator then
knows that he has "pinned down" his man. Through subsequent
use of the retrieval program, the investigator can determine
everything in the data bank concerning that individual by add-
ing the additional property he is interested in to the list
of criteria and querying the program. If the program reports
that one individual satisfies the criteria, the investigator
knows that his man satisfies the additional property; if the
program reports that no individuals satisfy the criteria, the
investigator knows that his man does not satisfy the additional
property.
The statistical snooping technique just described can
be prevented by modifying retrieval programs so that they will
not disclose the number of individuals satisfying given
criteria when that number is below a certain threshold. In
addition, users who make suspicious requests can be reported
to some higher authority by the retrieval program. These
prevention techniques reduce, but do not eliminate, the
possibility of using statistical data systems to violate
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individual privacy. It is not yet clear whether it will be
possible to implement a National Data Center with reasonable
safeguards to protect the privacy of individuals and groups.
2.5. Transfers of Information
Information flows in our society are staggering; our
environment is information-rich, and we are attention-poor.
The media provide us with all manner of news, opinion, specu-
lation, some educational material, and heavy doses of enter-
tainment, escape, and advertising; in short, a glut of inputs.
Similarly, the processes of learning and teaching engender a
cornucopia of information.
The flows of information that are of primary concern in
this thesis are those flows that begin and end in the files
of institutions. For example, applications for credit and
reports of credit ratings, applications for admission to
schools and transcript reports, applications for employment
and letters of reference and recommendation, and applications
for insurance. In addition, every financial transaction
carries with it a packet of explanatory information, which
sometimes involves persons.
Because the flow of information can have good as well as
harmful effects, it is natural to ask, for any particular
packet in the information flow, "Who is responsible for that?"
Actually this question isn't precise because the process of
information transfer has many components to be responsible for.
Figure 2-1 shows a model of institutional information
release that allows us to isolate some components of infor-
mation transfer. Shown is one office of an institution,
called office O, which releases data into a data channel
which could be the mails, a courier, or a network of computers.
The person in charge of office O is Q. The triangle surround-
ing him connotes his authority over O. Also shown is the
chain of command over Q, up to the president of the institu-
tion, P. The legal environment of the institution is shown
as a force acting from above.
When the office 0 releases a packet of information, the
office becomes responsible for releasing the information in
the first place, for designating the recipient of the infor-
mation, and for choosing a data channel that offers a level
of security commensurate with the value of the information.
Since Q is in charge of O, he is responsible for all this.
To a lesser extent (usually), so are the officials in the
chain of command above him; and the institution is legally
responsible for releasing the information if there is an
appropriate law.
Since Q probably doesn't do all the work of office O
himself, we must examine the operation of O more closely.
One way to view 0 is as a collection of workers. Another
view is as a collection of procedures; that is, O's work is
defined by the procedures used by the workers who work there.
Since the workers ought to know the procedures, Q must be
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The President of the Institution
The Manager of 0
.Data Released by 0
The Data Channel
The
The Institution
Figure 2-1. Model of institutional information release.
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responsible for seeing that they do. Also, Q should be re-
sponsible for seeing that the procedures are reasonable. For
example, if 0 were a university registrar's office, and the
data were transcripts, a reasonable prerequisite for the
release of a transcript would be a signed request from the
subject of the transcript.
It sometimes happens that information is released through
the improper action of a worker. For example, policemen in
New York City sold printouts from the FBI's NCIC to private
investigators [Com71]. If the worker isn't caught, he can't
be held responsible for what he did. Of course, if the im-
proper release goes undetected, no one will worry about hold-
ing anybody responsible for it. But if it is detected, the
office becomes responsible for having allowed it. That re-
sponsibility might then be pinned on some worker whose
negligence or lack of vigilance made the improper release
possible.
Much more important than the procedures of office 0 are
the policies from which those procedures are derived. For
example, is it the policy of the institution to release in-
formation about individuals without their consent? The in-
formation release policies of institutions are crucially
important features of the social environment, and such policies
must be reasonable(*) and responsible.
Figure 2-2 shows a model of the data channel from figure
2-1, expanded to take into account the institution that im-
plements it. The path that a packet of data follows through
the data channel is shown as a sequence of "offices" 01,
02'... 'On In this context the word "office" is not always
meant literally. Rather, the Oi can represent stations (which
includes mailboxes and the storage components of store-and-
forward message switching systems) and vehicles (such as mail
(*) "Reasonable" is the well-known lawyer's word that is in-
tended to encapsule the judgement of a group of "reasonable
men." As times change, so does the definition of "reasonable."
For example, Ralph Nader would not have been considered a
reasonable man in 1960, whereas he is today (in 1971). The
men who wrote and passed Connecticut's law against the sale
and distribution of birth control information and devices were
reasonable men in their time. But in our time the Supreme
Court struck down their law as unconstitutional. To this
author the Connecticut legislators appear self-righteous and
definitely not reasonable.
Higher Authority
The Data Channel
Figure 2-2. Model of the data channel.
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trains and electronic digital data transmission systems(*)) as
well as offices where data packets are sorted and scheduled
for delivery to other offices or to the addressee.
The overall responsibility of the data channel is to
deliver the data packet to its addressee within a reasonable
time, and to hold the data packet securely during the time it
is in the data channel, which means to protect the packet
from malicious or accidental damage or loss, and also to
prevent the data in the packet from being released to anyone
except the addressee. The responsibility of the data channel
to hold information securely falls on all the offices 01,
02'. '0n; while the responsibility to deliver the information
(*) When the data transmission vehicles of the data channel
are electronic transmission lines, the data channel is sus-
ceptible to wiretapping. This problem has received consid-
erable attention in the context of military communications
systems. In [Ba64] a solution is proposed which involves
point-to-point and end-to-end encryption of the information.
That is, the message is encrypted at the sending station and
decrypted at the addressee's station, which is end-to-end
encryption; and in addition the (encrypted) message is
encrypted and decrypted every time it passes through a trans-
mission line between stations. This latter encryption of the
already once-encrypted message is point-to-point encryption.
The end-to-end encrypted message contains the address of the
message in its original (clear, unencrypted) form so that the
intermediate stations can forward it; but when point-to-point
encryption is used, that address is encrypted when the message
is sent between stations. Thus point-to-point encryption pre-
vents wiretappers from determining the addressees to whom
traffic is directed, and also can raise the work factor of the
entire system. (The work factor is the measure of the resources
the wiretapper must expend to cryptanalyse and decrypt the
message. A sometimes useful rule for choosing encryptions is
to choose one whose work factor is so high that the cost of
breaking the crypt is greater than the value of the informa-
tion obtained thereby.)
with reasonable dispatch falls on those offices that do
sorting, and the vehicles that move the packet. Of course,
these responsibilities fall on a given office Oi, with re-
spect to a given packet of information, only after the given
packet has entered that office. In other words, the re-
sponsibilities of the data channel with respect to the packet
are bound to the trail the packet takes through the channel.
Figure 2-3 shows a model of an institution absorbing
information from a data channel. The office 0, where the
information is delivered, becomes responsible for accepting
the information, for estimating the probability that the
identification of the source of the message is a forgery,
and for the further distribution of the information inside
the institution. For example, figure 2-3 shows a packet of
information from the files of office 0 being transferred to
office R. The office 0 is responsible for releasing the
packet to R.
Any office that uses information received by office O
is responsible for its own usage. Thus, when R uses the
information it got from 0, R is responsible for its usage.
Similarly, if R releases information that it holds, either
inside or outside the institution, then it is responsible
for that.
An important general responsibility of all the offices
in figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3, is to hold information with
precautions taken to insure its security. As before,
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Figure 2-3. Model of institutional information absorbtion.
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"security" means the prevention of accidental or malicious
damage or loss, as well as the prevention of unauthorized
release.
2.6. Surveillance and Responsibility
Officials of institutions and managers of offices are
faced with the problem of encouraging their workers to be
responsible. To make workers responsible, institutions often
hire inspectors to carry on inspection and surveillance of
work and workers. Our government has organized inspection
and auditing of certain institutions to protect the public
interest by keeping these institutions responsible. For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.)
requires disclosures of information by corporations before
they may sell stock to the public, the Federal Aviation
Agency inspects aircraft and issues airworthiness certifi-
cations to declare which aircraft are permitted to carry
passengers, and the Post Office has a corps of Postal Inspec-
tors who try to prevent mail theft.
Inspection, auditing, and surveillance must be carried
out by independent, impartial agencies. In the case of air-
craft certification, this means that the inspector who
examines and certifies the aircraft must have no interest in
(i.e., not stand to profit by) seeing the aircraft carry
paying passengers. In the case of the disclosures required
by the S.E.C., this means that the auditors who certify the
disclosure must not stand to profit by sales of the audited
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corporation's stock. In both these cases, the aircraft in-
spector and the auditor are supposed to protect the public
interest. By their actions they restrict, discipline, and
make responsible the actions of others.
Some work must be inspected, especially when the work
(or lack of it) can hurt people or cause other undesirable
effects. Sometimes inspection of work is not adequate pro-
tection, and surveillance must be used. Whenever surveil-
lance is a condition of employment, such surveillance should
stop at boundaries which are known to the employee and re-
spected by his employer.
2.6.1. Surveillance of Information Transfers
Surveillance can be used to improve the security with
which an institution holds information. For example, in-
stitutions which work with classified information use guards
and closed-circuit TV to construct a security envelope. Of
course, no such precautions are 100 percent effective --
witness the work of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. [DoD71]
Surveillance can be used to insure that releases of in-
formation by offices are authorized. If, when an office re-
leases information, a record is made of which worker released
what information, then that worker can be held responsible.
Since the worker will know that such work is being watched,
he will endeavor to "cover himself" by determining that the
release is properly authorized.
Similarly, surveillance can be used to hold offices and
the workers in them responsible for information they receive.
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A typical method is to require the execution of a receipt to
be returned to the office or person who released the infor-
mation.
2.6.2. Programmed Surveillance
When the work of offices to be watched is carried out by
a computer, the surveillance can be programmed into the com-
puter. Figure 2-4 shows a clerk using a computer to manipulate
a data base. Also shown is a surveillance file, maintained
by the computer, which records all the clerk's actions and
all other actions that affect the data base.
If the surveillance log is to include all actions that
affect the data base, it must be impossible to access the
data base except through authorized programs which collect
surveillance information. This is a crucial requirement:
it must be possible to bind a data base to some caretaker
programs and insure that no other programs can access the
data base. Furthermore, the caretaker program which writes
the surveillance log must be correct, and protected from
modification. We are confident that such protection can be
provided by an authorization system that permits only certain
programmers and administrators to modify the caretaker pro-
grams, and surveillance over those authorized programmers
and administrators. This surveillance over programmers and
administrators can also be provided by a program. Figure 2-5
shows a programmer modifying the program of figure 2-4. He
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would modify the source program, compile it, test it, and
finally install it. His installation triggers the writing
of a record in the surveillance log of figure 2-5, so he is
held responsible for a change. This surveillance log can be
designed to record exactly what the change was, by including
a copy of the program before the change was made, and another
copy with the change incorporated, in the log.
The reader will no doubt want to know how changes to the
surveillance program of figure 2-5 are watched. Of course,
this cascading of surveillance could go on forever; but we
postulate that the surveillance program of figure 2-5 is
relatively fixed and unchanging, and that its correctness is
guaranteed by human certifiers. Whenever a change must be
made to it, the program is re-certified.
2.7. The Computer as a Social Arena
The computer is a powerful tool for processing informa-
tion, and information has a powerful force in society. One
way for society to protect itself from this potentially
dangerous tool is to hold those persons who use it, especially
programmers, responsible for their actions. But just as im-
portant is the problem of understanding what goes on inside
the computer, and determining who should be responsible for
the events that occur there. For example, such an event
would be the passage of information, inside the computer,
into the possession of a blackmailer.
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In general, it is important to be able to say who is
responsible for events, in the computer, that have potentially
harmful effects. There are three major categories of events
which are likely to have some harmful effects. These are:
(1) unauthorized release of information, which might violate
the privacy of some individual or group, (2) unauthorized
modification of information, which might leave inaccurate
information in the computer, and (3) reduced availability of
the computer system. The reader should note that the concept
of harm expressed here is as perceived by the authority which
controls the information in the computer, and this will
coincide with the reader's concept of harm only to the extent
that the reader shares the value system of that authority.
But apart from such differences in values, the three classes
of harmful events above serve to outline a precise definition
of computer security, which consists of secrecy (no unauthor-
ized release of information), integrity (no unauthorized modi-
fication of information), and availability (no system failures
which reduce the level of service).
In the following chapters, we develop a design for a
secure computer system, and within the context of that design
it is possible to say what programs are responsible for.
Appendix 5 contains our enumeration of the responsibilities
of programs.
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2.7.1. Criminal Activity
It is likely that some criminal activity will go on with-
in multi-access computers. A criminal could use a computer
for his everyday data processing, or to spy in some way on
another user. As a counterforce to criminal activity, multi-
access computers might include spying mechanisms to be
monopolized by government; e.g., to be used by police agencies
with the approval of a competent court. When police have
obtained a search warrant to seize information held in a
computer, the warrant will say exactly what is being searched
for, since "general warrants" are unconstitutional. The spy-
ing mechanisms used by police can be programmed to refer to
the warrant and thereby prevent the police from conducting
"fishing expeditions" -- i.e., sifting through files apart
from the ones which they told the court they were looking for
when they asked for the warrant. Also, the spying mechanisms
can conduct surveillance over the spying, to make the officers
who direct the spying responsible to the higher authority to
whom the surveillance records will be released.
2.7.2. Computer Penetration Technology
Some considerable money and effort is being spent on the
problem of building secure computer systems, and a part of
that money and effort is going into the study of ways to
break into, penetrate, and take over computer systems. For
example, the RISOS project (Research In Secured Operating
Systems) at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is studying ways
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and means of penetrating A.E.C. and military computer systems.
After they develop the penetration technology, they will
write guidelines for designers of future, more secure systems.
It is likely that two standards for secure computers
will come into existence: a commercial standard and a mili-
tary standard. A computer meeting the military standard would
be more secure than computers meeting the commercial standard,
because whenever a penetration technique is found which can
be used to take over a computer, a protection mechanism to
defeat the penetration technique will be added to the mili-
tary standard. The military officers responsible for secure
computing would have to take this step because penetration
of a computer-based military command and control system would
allow sabotage. When a penetration technique is very expen-
sive, e.g., costing more than the value of the information
or services provided by the average commercial computer, the
protection mechanism to defeat the penetration technique is
not likely to be included in the commercial standard. There-
fore computers that are secure by commercial standards will
probably be penetrable by techniques developed by the military.
The crucial question is: who will control this dangerous
penetration technology?
It is clear that the agency which can penetrate com-
mercial computers will have the power to invade individual
privacy, carry out blackmail, etc. As things are developing
now (in 1972), this power will be held by the military, the
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C.I.A., and generally, the Executive branch of government.
The old problem of controlling illegal use of Executive
power will become more serious as new computer penetration
techniques are developed. Twelve years to 1984, and the
awesome, ugly power to create a 1984-like negative-utopia
[Or49] is coalescing.
2.8. Requirements on Computers
From the considerations of this chapter, and related
technological considerations, we can infer a number of prop-
erties of computers which will be socially beneficial.
First, computers should keep secrets. That is, com-
puters should release information into society only when the
release is authorized. Computers must contain authorization
mechanisms which inform the computer whether and how to re-
lease information; and modifications to stored information
must be similarly controlled.
Second, no individual should have absolute power, or
even a large amount of power, over any computer which serves
substantially important social functions. Power over com-
puter utilities will probably be divided in patterns that
reflect the interests in the social arena affected by com-
puters, but the principle of preventing tyranny should
prevail.
Third, computers should be auditable. If a computer is
supposed to keep secrets, only an audit of its hardware and
software can build trust among the computer's users that it
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is keeping secrets. Computers with important and sensitive
social functions,such as electronic libraries which should
not keep lists of who reads what, ought to be open to audits
by any citizen. That is, every citizen should have the right
to obtain the data necessary to carry out an audit and
evaluate the propriety of such a computer's actions. If such
an audit might violate someone's privacy, the conflict between
the right to audit and the right to privacy can be resolved
by using a professional auditor who would be bound by a pro-
fessional code of auditing ethics and procedures. The pro-
fessional auditor would report on the propriety of the
audited computer's actions,while avoiding unreasonable
infringements on privacy.
Fourth, it should be easy to bind a data base in the
computer to a caretaker program in such a way that references
to the data base can be made only through calls to the care-
taker program. A data base and caretaker program are said
to be encapsulated when bound together in this way. Encap-
sulation protects the data base from the actions of all pro-
grams other than the caretaker program. The caretaker pro-
gram can control what use is made of the information in the
data base (e.g., release only statistical summaries), and it
can collect surveillance concerning releases of information
and modifications to stored information. Other important
surveillance information can be collected only by the operat-
ing system, or with its secret assistance [Ro71].
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In the remainder of this thesis, we present a design for
a secure computer system which meets the above four require-
ments.
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Chapter 3
Elementary Protection Mechanims
3.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review the means by
which the goals of protecting the secrecy and integrity of
information were achieved in multi-access computer systems
that were conceived as prototype computer utilities. As
before, "secrecy" is achieved when the computer prevents
unauthorized releases of information, and "integrity" is
achieved when the computer prevents unauthorized modifi-
cation of stored information.
We will proceed by exploring means by which computations
in multi-access computer systems are protected from accidental
and/or malicious interferences. We will describe two different
methods of protecting the memory of processes in multi-access
computer systems. From these examples (many others are avail-
able and could be used equally effectively [De66, Bu61, Fa68])
we will extract the concept of the domain. Then, to explain
why the domain is the most useful concept upon which to build
computer protection mechanisms, we will abstractly examine
the concept of protection, and offer a metaphorical model of
protection in general, whereupon the domain will be seen as a
special case.
In the following examples, we will consider two multi-
access computer systems, and regard them as collections of
66
processes. Each user of the system has his own process,
which will execute programs as commanded by the user. We
agree with Thomas Th7l that a process is best defined to
be the activity of an active part, called a processor, which
interprets and changes a passive part, called a process state.
The process state is a collection of information that includes
working registers, a program counter, a program, data, etc;
while the action of a processor is defined by a state transi-
tion rule which specifies how the processor is to modify the
process state. Since multi-access computer systems are time-
shared, the processors are multiplexed among the processes.
When a process does not have a processor, it is considered to
be not running, and the operating system maintains its process
state until such time as a processor is again available to run
the process.
Our symbol for the processor is 8, and our symbol for a
process state is 9. Our symbol for a running process is .
We use these symbols because they emphasize the combining of
Yin and Yang in a process.
-3.2. CTSS
The Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS) [Cr65] was im-
plemented using a specially modified IBM 7094 computer. The
process state of a CTSS process was the tuple = (pc,
registers, base, bound, M). The first component of the tuple,
pc, is an integer which serves as the program counter of the
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process. The second component, registers, represents the
central processor registers of the processor that is the active
part of this process. In CTSS, implemented on an IBM 7094,
the registers are the AC, the MQ, the index registers, sense
indicators, instruction register, etc. The third and fourth
components, base and bound, are integers which control the
memory protection tests in the state transition rule. These
components represent registers which were added on to the
7094 to make memory protection possible. The fifth component,
M, represents the user memory bank of CTSS. We will proceed
by assuming that M = {(word#, bitstring)}, a set of ordered
pairs. Each of these ordered pairs represents one word of the
memory; word# is an integer which is the address of the repre-
sented word, and bitstring is a string of bits which represents
the contents of the word. To insure that word addresses are
well-defined, we require that the set {(word#, bitstring)} not
contain two or more ordered pairs with the same first component
word#. (Another way of expressing this restriction is to say
that the set {(word#, bitstring)} is a function in the set-
theoretic sense.)
The state transition rule of the CTSS processor is shown
in figure 3-1. Notice that all references to the memory M by
the process must be to words whose addresses are < bound, and
all addresses which pass this test are added to base and the
resultant sum is used as the address in M. So the process'
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memory references are confined to a contiguous portion of M,
as shown in figure 32. The supervisor of CTSS arranges to
have the process' "core image" in that contiguous portion of
M whenever the processor is assigned to the process, and the
supervisor places the correct values of base and bound in the
process state to prevent the process from reading or writing
information anywhere except its "core image". When processes
are not being run, their "core images" are swapped out to the
drum and their pc and registers are tucked away in the super-
visor's memory bank.
It is useful to consider a different view of the CTSS
process. In the model just presented, all the processes share
the same memory bank M, restricted by the base and bound regis-
ters. This is how things actually were, from the system
designer's point of view. But from each process' point of
view (or, from the user's point of view), each process had its
own isolated contiguous memory space. (People who were there
or heard the stories know that this wasn't completely true in
the beginning!)
We now present the CTSS process seen as having its own
isolated contiguous memory space. The process state is the
tuple9=(pc, registers, {(word#, bitstring) ). The first
two components, pc and registers, are just as they were pre-
viously. The third component is the memory space, which is
a function in the set-theoretic sense, and that function has
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as its domain an interval [0, bound] of the integers. The
state transition rule is given in figure 33. In the figure,
M = {(word#, bitstring)} denotes the third component of the
process state. Since M, in the state transition rule, always
means the memory of the process being executed; each process
is confined to referencing only its own memory.
This model of CTSS is more elegant that the first one be-
cause it is easier to see that processes are isolated; no ar-
guments about swapping and base/bound registers are required.
The critical reader will argue that this elegance is purchased
at the price of hiding the actual protection mechanism; and
while this is correct, nevertheless this elegant point of view
is necessary to support the generalization which follows later
in this chapter.
CTSS provided a good measure of protection of secrecy and
integrity by keeping the memory spaces of processes isolated.
Certainly, no process in CTSS was permitted to read or write in
any other process' memory space. CTSS provided long-term
storage for information in files, and a permission mechanism
was available which allowed information owners to say which
processes were allowed to read and write their files. But when
a process read a file, it obtained in its memory space a copy
of the information in the file, rather than having direct
access to a single copy shared directly with other processes.
This situation was improved in the Multics system with the
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introduction of the segmented address space.
3.3. Segmented Address Space
The Multiplexed Information and Computing Service
AMultics) [Cor72] was implemented using a Honeywell 645
computer, which was specially designed by General Electric
in 1965. The Multics process possesses an address space
composed of many independent segments. A segment is a con-
tiguous linear array of words of memory. Segments hold pro-
grams and data. Processes refer to the segments they refer-
ence using two-dimensional addresses of the form (seg#, word#).
The first component of this address selects a segment from
the array of segments which is the address space of the process,
and the second component selects a word from that segment.
We can model the process state of a Multics process with
the tuple9 = (pc, registers, {(seg#, (mode, length, page_
table addr))}). The first component of the state, pc, is an
address having the form (seg#, word#); as before pc is the
program counter of the process. The registers are arithmetic,
base, and index registers. (Note that the base registers also
hold addresses of the form (seg#,word#).) The third component
represents the descriptor segment of the Multics address space.
This third component must be a function in the set-theoretic
sense, so it defines a mapping from the set of segment numbers
to the set of triplets {(mode, length, page_table_addr)}.
When the processor sees that the process is making a reference
to a particular segment, it applies this mapping to obtain a
triplet Cmode, length, page table addr) for the segment.
(Actually, the mapping is simply a reference to the array in
the descriptor segment, using the seg# as the index.) From
the components mode and length, the processor determines if
the reference is permissible; and if it is, the processor
uses the page tabl'_addr, an absolute address, to find the
segment's page table. From this point to the referencing of
the referenced word, standard virtual memory techniques are
applied: a page table word is selected from the page table,
yielding the absolute address of the page, and the desired
word is selected from the page. The critical reader will
have noticed we haven't mentioned the segment fault and page
fault events which permit multiplexing the system memory; he
should remember that memory multiplexing is not the subject
we are addressing.
Figure 3-4 shows the state transition rule of the Multics
processor. The rule applies three different tests to the
mode component of the triplet (mode, length, addr). These
tests are notated e(mode), r(mode), and w(mode), and they
test for execute permission (e(mode) = 1), read permission
Cr(mode) = 1), and write permission (w(mode) = 1) respectively.
Thus the mode component can be represented by a 3-bit string.
Furthermore, the state transition rule refers to segments with
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the notation "Seg(page_table addr)". This simply means the
segment whose page table address is given. For the purposes
of this model, segments are assumed to be sets of ordered pairs
{ word#, bitstring)} which are functions in the set-theoretic
sense, and these functions are assumed to have domains- (in the
set-theoretic sense again) which are intervals [0, length(Seg)]
of integers. This definition of segment is more precise than
the verbal definition given above ("A segment is a contiguous
linear array of words of memory"), and it makes notating the
state transition rule of figure 3-4 easy.
One of the more curious parts of figure 3-4 is the test
in cases of read intent, "is t = seg#(pc)?". The purpose of
this test is to allow executable segments to direct processes
to read constants out of themselves without having the r(mode)
bit on, and it makes a good example of a point which will be
brought up later in this chapter.
Multics protects the secrecy and integrity of information
by including the r(mode) and w(mode) bits in the triplets that
make up AS, the address space. It is the information owner
who has the authority to say what these mode bits shall be,
for any triplet (mode, length, addr) for which Seg(addr)
belongs to him (the information owner). The information owner
authorizes processes to access his information by making
entries on an access- control list associated with the segment.
An access control list entry names a process or processes
(using a name space which is not important to us in this
context) and specifies the permissible access with a 3bit
string. Once the information owner does this, a process which
is named by the access control list can obtain a triplet in
its address space and reference the information owner's segment.
3,4. Domains
At this point it is appropriate to draw from the pre-
ceding examples that important feature which they have in
common: the domain. First consider the CTSS process whose
process state was the tuple = (pc, registers, {(word#,
bitstring)}). The things which the process can get at (in
terms of reading or writing) are the bitstrings in the set
{Cword#, bitstring)}, and in addition its own program counter
and registers. And these very things cannot be gotten at by
any other process, and so they are protected from any harmful
process that might be lurking about. Of course, what the bit-
strings are protected from is unauthorized reading and writing
by the harmful process.
Now consider the process of Multics, whose process state
is the tuple = (pc, registers, AS), where AS = {(seg#,
(mode, length, pagetable addr))}. Aside from its own pro-
gram counter and registers, the process can get at the bit-
strings in the segments Seg(pt_addr) where pt_addr is the
third component of a triplet (m,l,pt_addr) which appears in
the address space AS of the process. These bitstrings cannot
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be gotten at by any other process, provided no other process
has a triplet in its address space whose third component is
ptaddr. Whether or not such an additional triplet exists,
the bitstrings in Seg(pt addr) are protected from unauthorized
reading and writing because all the triplets (m,l,pt_addr) are
authorized by the owner of Seg(pt addr).
The following definition springs from these examples: a
domain is a dynamic set of abilities to use computing objects.
By "dynamic," we mean varying as a function of time. Two
domains can be equivalent for periods of time, just when the
sets of abilities are equal, but this is not likely to occur
often in practice. The abilities which constitute the domain
are used by processes in the context of rules which bind pro-
cesses to domains. These rules are called the Postulates of
Domains.
Postulate 1: Every process is bound to one domain at
Postulate 2:
Postulate 3:
Postulate 4:
a time.
Only processes bound to a domain can use
the domain's abilities.
All information entering a process state
is authorized to enter by an ability in the
domain the process is bound to.
All information leaving a process state
is authorized to leave by an ability in
the domain the process is bound to.
In the examples just given, th.e domains have been part
of the process state. In the CTSS process, the domain is the
set {(word#, bitstringi}, all of whose computing objects are
bit strings which the process uses for program and data stor-
age. In the Multics process, the set AS is a domain, in
whinch the computing objects are segments, and the degree of
freedom of use of segments is specified by modes. So the
binding of processes to domains, as required by Postulate 1,
was easily accomplished: the binding is implicit in the
definition of the process state.
The state transition rules force each process to use only
the abilities of the domain the process is bound to, thus en-
forcing Postulate 2. This depends crucially on the correct
interpretation of the symbols "M" and "AS" in the state
transition rules of CTSS and Multics, respectively. These
symbols must be interpreted to mean the domains to which the
processes of CTSS and Multics are bound.
The state transition rules provide no way for information
to enter or leave the process state except through references
to the memory M in CTSS, and references to segments in the
address space of Multics, thereby enforcing Postulates 3 and 4.
The Postulates imply immediately that all the activity
of computation carried on.by processes is authorized, partic-
ularly including using instructions, reading data, and
modifying data. Controls placed on the bindings of processes
to domains by mechanisms yet to be introduced allow information
owners to be protected from the actions of both blundering and
hostile processes.
We will need from time to time to speak of the abilities
to use computing objects that a domain is made up of; we
shall call thesescapabilities. In the Multics process, the
triplet (mode, length, page table addr) is a capability which
gives the ability to reads execute, or write Seg(page_table_
addr), depending on the bits of mode. Rather than regarding
a domain strictly as a set of capabilities, we will for rea-
sons of easy implementation take a domain to be an array of
capabilities indexed by a capability number; and this is called
capability list, or C-list [De66].
Many workers have recognized that the domain is a funda-
mental concept in computer protection systems [De66,La71,Sc72a,
Gr68]. To see why this is so, it is necessary to delve into
the nature of protection.
3.5. Abstract Protection
The purpose of this section is to say what protection is,
in general. The Random House Dictionary of the English langu-
age says that protection is "act of protecting; state of being
protected; preservation from injury or harm." We find the
center of the idea to be "preservation from harm."
Abstractly, a protection problem consists of an object,
or a state of an object (the thing being protected) which we
call the ox; a harmful agent which seeks to .gore the oxF and
a concerned community whose interests will be harmed if the ox
is gored. The reader is urged not to take these mundane words,
"gore" and "ox", too literally. They are simply metaphors
which allow us to deal with the question of protection on an
abstract level. The essential quality of the ox is that it
serves the purposes of the concerned community, and the es-
sential quality of goring the ox is that it disserves those
purposes. The reader is further urged not to attach excess
significance to the word !'community"; all that is meant is a
set of people who are concerned about the ox.
When a protection problem exists, the concerned commun-
ity will go out and hire a protection engineer; and he will
design and construct a protection mechanism, which is simply
a wall placed between the ox and the harmful agent, preventing
the action of the latter. The choice of materials for build-
ing this wall, for example between bricks and transistors,
obviously depends on the nature of the harmful agent.
The protection engineer deals with threats, wall-building
technologies, costs, and work factors. A threat is a method
of goring the ox. Information about threats is available
from the protection engineer's own imagination, from history
(e.g. the Trojan Horse), and from the remains of previously
gored oxes. Wall-building technologies can be studied in the
architecture of banks and police stations, or in an accredited
Institute of Technology. Usually the protection engineer
can apply more than one technology to the problem, and thus
generate several different wall designs for the concerned
community to choose from. Their choice will be based on the
costs of the proposed walls, and their work factors. The
costs will include the sums of the design costs (which might
include research and development), the implementation costs,
and the maintenance costs for the finished walls. In addition,
there may be a cost in time, as for example the time to com-
plete research and development. And there may be a cost due
to reduced functionality of the ox, if it should happen that
the protection mechanism interferes somehow with the purpose
of the ox. The work factors of the walls are the measures of
how much time, energy, or other resources must be expended to
gore the ox. A higher work factor provides more protection,
but usually at a higher cost.
The concerned community will choose to build a wall based
on the expected value (the work factor) and the available re-
sources. Leonardo DaVinci designed many fortifications, but
none of his designs were implemented. Perhaps he was too in-
terested in running up the work factors, mindless of the avail-
able resources. In fact, it is in that direction that the
problem is most interesting.
Now, how does this abstract model of protection help to
explain the domain as defined in section 3.4? First we must
say what are the oxes, and what harmful agents seek to gore
them. To do this, we need only return to the goals of this
chapter: protecting the secrecy and integrity of information
stored in the computer. The secrecy of information is an ox.
An agent can gore this ox by making an unauthorized copy of
the information. Similarly, the integrity of information is
an ox which can be gored by modifying or erasing the infor-
mation without authority. The concerned community consists
of the information owners, who wish to prevent such unauthor-
ized reading and writing.
The domain is a wall which cannot be penetrated by the
activity of processes not bound to the domain. This property
is established by Postulate 2. The concern behind this pos-
tulate is that processes not bound to the domain might be
harmful agents. Since some of these processes are under the
control of unknown users who might be malicious, this is a
reasonable concern. The purpose of Postulate 2 is to keep
the activities of every process confined to the limits es-
tablished by some domain. Together, the postulates erect
walls (defined in detail by C-lists) which limit the scope of
the activities of processes. Therefore, the domain is a
protection mechanism.
But the domain is not a complete protection mechanism.
First, it says nothing about harmful activities that don't
come from processes. Second, it provides little protection
against a Trojan Horse program that gains control of an in-
nocent process and turns that process to some harmful task.
Generally, a Trojan Horse program is one which, in addition
to doing whatever it is advertised to do, does something that
the program's users don't know about and wouldn't want done.
This fact, that a process can be innocent sometimes and
not so innocent at other times, is the reason for the curious
test, "is t = seg#(pc)" in figure 3-4. When the process is
executing the segment in question, the state transition rule
allows the process to read words from the segment. The
process is presumed to be harmless because it is obeying
the will of the segment in question. As soon as the process
is executing some other segment, it might be trying to copy
and steal the first segment. The owner of the segment can
make it available as a program which cannot be stolen by
authorizing e(mode) = 1, r(mode) = 0, and of course w(mode) = 0
to prevent any modification.
When a process is executing a program whose innocence
cannot be assumed, it might suffice to place that program
off in its own domain. This idea is expanded in the next
chapter, and the resulting system is adequate to deal with
suspected Trojan Horses. The'only other approach to a Trojan
Horse is to look inside it; i.e. audit the suspicious program.
Certainly auditing of some kernel of supervisor programs of
multi-access computer systems will be necessary to insure
security, but in our research we have tried to eliminate the
necessity for auditing as much as possible because the cost
of auditing will rise with'the cost of living, while the cost
of computer hardware continues to fall. When auditing is
necessary and important, the program can be audited by several
auditors independently, operating under a code of ethics which
says they mustn't discuss with one another what they're auditing.
Now we must return to the problem of harmful activities
that don't come from processes. For example, a malicious
maintenance engineer using the computer's maintenance panel.
And we suggest simply locking up the maintenance panel. In
this research, we have assumed that all the activity comes
from processes. From this assumption the reader can see the
scope of this research: we have focused on processes. Cer-
tainly processes are the most interesting, active elements
of multi-access computer systems; they amply deserve all this
attention.
Chapter 4
Additional Protection Mechanisms
4.1. Introduction
The first purpose of this chapter is to present new
protection mechanisms which will support proprietary services
in a computer utility, and will reduce the cost of operating
system development. These two goals are elaborated in sec-
tion 4.2. The first notable protection mechanism presented
here is the sectioned stack, which will be described in
section 4.4. The second notable protection mechanism is a
hardware processor design which will support an operating
system partitioned into compartments separated by secure
barriers. The detailed specification of this processor is
given in Appendix 1.
The second purpose of this chapter is to present a naming
and authorizing system which will provide a suitable context
for the support of proprietary services. This naming and
authorizing system, similar to the file hierarchy of Multics,
is described in section 4.7. The third notable protection
mechanism presented here is the system of certifications and
warrants, described in section 4.7, which allows users to
place trust in and depend on audits of programs performed
by others.
The remainder of this introduction will be devoted to
reviewing and defining the three types of computing objects;
i.e., processes, domains, and segments; upon which we will
build our new protection mechanisms. In addition, we pre-
sent a useful notation for these concepts.
As before, a domain is defined to be a set of abilities
to use computing objects; and these abilities are called
capabilities. These capabilities are organized into a linear
array, called a capability list, or C-list. We call the
index of a capability in a C-list its capability number. The
Postulates of Domains stated in chapter 3 are our first
design principles. For completeness, they are restated below.
Postulate 1: Every process is bound to one
domain at a time.
Postulate 2: Only processes bound to a domain
can use the domain's capabilities.
Postulate 3: All information entering a process
state is authorized to enter by a
capability in the domain the process
is bound to.
Postulate 4: All information leaving a process
state is authorized to leave by a
capability in the domain the
process is bound to.
A process is the activity of a processor, defined by a
state transition rule, accessing and modifying a process
state, which is a collection of information.
A segment is a contiguous linear array of words of memory,
numbered from zero to some adjustable upper bound. A segment
capability allows a process bound to the domain containing the
capability to reference the segment designated by the capability
with a two-dimensional address of the form (seg#,word#). The
component seg# is the capability number of the segment cap-
ability, and the component word# selects a word from the
segment designated by the capability. Segment capabilities
include 3-bit modes to control read access, write access,
and execute access.
Figure 4-1 illustrates our notation for processes,
domains, segments, and capabilities. The domain is shown as
a large circle with the capabilities, represented by small
triangles, drawn inside. The large circle serves to evoke
the walling-off function of the domain. A single running
process is shown bound to the domain. The domain contains
capabilities for the two segments P and D. The capability
for P has mode "e", so the process can obey an instruction
stream that comes from P. In other words, P is executable
as a program in this domain. The capability for D has mode
"rw", so the process can read data from and write data into
the words of D.
When we speak of the actions which the program P directs
the process to do, we often use a shorthand expression of the
form, "The domain does such-and-such." In this expression
the program and process being spoken of must be determined
from context, but this will not be difficult. Another short-
hand expression is "The program in the domain does such-and-
such," in which the process being spoken of must be identi-
fied from context.
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Figure 4-2 shows how this notation is used to represent
more than one process sharing a domain, and also more than
one domain sharing a segment. Part (a) of the figure shows
two processes bound to one domain. Postulate 2 implies that
these processes have equal access rights to the segments
designated by capabilities in the domain. Part (b) of the
figure shows a segment for which capabilities exist in two
domains. Such a segment is called shared because a cap-
ability for it exists in more than one domain. Note that
the different domains in figure 4-2(b) have different
access rights to the shared segment, because the two cap-
abilities declare different modes.
4.2. Goals
One of the long-standing goals of architects of multi-
access computer systems is to allow users of computers to
build on the work of others, especially in the form of
programs and data. At university computer centers, users
can make their subroutines available to one another through
a common library. These programs are available for free,
whereas in the software marketplace, programs are available
for sale or lease. The first goal of this chapter is to
allow users to build on the work of others in the form of
programs and data, while simultaneously protecting the
secrecy, integrity, and availability of the information being
processed. The domain mechanism is useful in providing this
cz
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protection, provided that the domains established to protect
the users' computations are small enough.
To see why small domains are necessary, consider figure
4-3. The figure shows four segments for which capabilities
exist in some domain D: the segments A and B are programs,
while the segments X and Y are data. A process bound to D
can read and write X and Y, while executing either A or B.
Now suppose that A normally uses only data segment X, and B
normally uses data segment Y. There is a problem with the
arrangement in figure 4-3 because A might direct a process
to access Y and B might direct a process to access X. If
this happened, A might spy on, modify, or destroy B's data,
and vice versa. This would not be a problem if the authors
of A and B trusted each other. But the necessary trust may
not exist in many cases, as when B is a proprietary program
obtained on a lease. Roughly speaking, the problem can be
solved by using two domains.
The second goal of this chapter is to design secure
barriers between the modular components of the operating
system. This is expected to make the operating system faster
and less expensive to debug because the impact of a single
operating system failure can directly affect the data bases
of only one small part of the operating system. The barriers
that will be used are those of domains; the new element is
the hardware processor design to support domains in which
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the operating system can be placed.
4.3. Building on the Work of Others
In the previous section, we introduced the problems which
can arise when two programs share a domain. These problems;
namely, reduction of secrecy, integrity, and availability of
the information being processed; can be avoided if the two
programs are in different domains. But a new problem
immediately presents itself: the communication of arguments
and results between the two programs. The purpose of in-
troducing two domains was to isolate the two programs, but
this isolation must not be complete if the usefulness of the
called program to the caller is to be retained.
Lampson's message system [La71] is one way of allowing
the two programs to communicate. Each domain has an
associated process, as illustrated in figure 4-4. The pro-
gram A requests B's service by sending B a message, using an
operating system primitive. The operating system copies A's
message into B's input buffer. In Lampson's message system,
the sharing of segments by domains is not allowed: all com-
munication between the isolated subsystems is via messages.
The operating system prefixes the identity of A's domain to
A's message, so that B will be able to detect messages from
non-customers. B returns its results in a second message.
The greatest advantage of the message system is its elegance
and simplicity. The PRIME system at Berkeley is an example of
a message system.
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We find that the message system has some diseconomies
built into it, however. First of all, it requires two processes
to do what one process could easily do. Furthermore, it does
not behave well during periods of peak load. Messages pile
up in B's input queue and service deteriorates (in terms of
turnaround time). If B detects this condition and requests
more processes to run in its domain to handle the load, then
the system is creating processes when it should be processing
messages. Furthermore, we feel it is inelegant to have one
group of processes responding to messages while another group
of processes waits. The system's users must pay the overhead
costs for all of these processes.
To avoid the inelegant proliferation of processes and
the diseconomy of excess process overhead, we have chosen to
define our process in such a way that when it requires a
service, it binds itself to the domain that provides the
service. This happens when a process executes a call-domain
instruction which specifies a domain entry capability. Figure
4-5 shows a domain entry capability, represented by a forked
arrow emanating from the triangle symbol. The forked arrow
points to the domain which can be called using the capability,
and the program which the calling process is to execute. The
domain entry capability also contains the word# address
(within the program segment) where the calling process is to
begin execution, although our notation does not represent this
(4)
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important detail. Figure 4-5(a) shows a process before it
executes the call-domain instruction, and figure 4-5(b) shows
the process bound to the called domain, just after execution
of the call-domain instruction. The return address in the
calling domain, to which the process will jump when the called
domain issues a return-domain instruction, is saved in a push-
down stack which is a part of the process state. The proces-
sor state transition rule tells how to manipulate this push-
down stack in response to call-domain and return-domain
instructions.
When the process is bound to A's domain, it has no access
to B or Y, but A can direct the process to call B because the
process can use the domain entry capability. After the
process is bound to B's domain, it can access B and Y and
nothing more; and it is under the control of B. But there
remains the problem of passing arguments and results between
calling and called domains.
4.4. Argument Passing and Reclaiming
One simple way to allow the two domains of figure 4-5 to
communicate arguments and results is to have these domains
share a segment. (We are passing over the even simpler case
when the arguments and results will fit into the registers of
the process state.) Such a segment, called an argument
segment, is shown in figure 4-6. The program A creates the
segment and obtains a capability for it with mode "r'. Then
A calls the pass-segment operating system entry point to give
lo0
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B's domain a capability for the segment. Figure 4-6 depicts
this point in time. The segment will probably have different
segment numbers in the two domains, so the pass-segment
primitive will return to A the segment number which B should
use to reference the segment. A then places its arguments in
the argument segment, loads the segment number for B to use
into a register agreed upon by convention, and directs the
process to call B by issuing a call-domain instruction.
When the process arrives in B's domain, B validates the
segment number of the argument segment by calling the operat-
ing system primitive is-arg-seg. This primitive's purpose is
to assure B that the given segment number is in fact the seg-
ment number of an argument segment that was passed, by the
pass-segment primitive, from the domain which directed the
executing process to call B. Upon being reassured, B reads
its arguments from the argument segment, does its work, places
its results in the argument segment, and directs the process
to return.
When A regains control of the process, it can call the
supervisor primitive reclaim-segment to remove the capability
for the argument segment from B's domain. The purpose of
this precaution is to prevent any further accessing of the
argument segment by any processes bound to B's domain.
It is worth noting that the primitives allow A and B to
work together even though neither of them trusts the other.
B need not trust that A sends across the correct segment
1io
number, and A need not trust that B will leave the argument
segment alone after the process returns. This lack of trust
is good to the extent that it helps A and B to catch errors
that might occur. But extreme lack of trust would deter A's
author from using B at all; as might happen if A's author
knew that B would copy and steal the arguments passed by A.
Such problems are treated at length in the next chapter.
The argument segment mechanism has the disadvantage of
being a moderately expensive method of passing arguments and
results, since it requires the creation of a segment and in-
voking up to three operating system primitives. When the
arguments and results are only a dozen or so words of memory,
as is often the case when the side effect of the call is the
important thing, the large information capacity of an entire
segment is not required and so the expense becomes a burden.
To meet the need for a less expensive argument passing
mechanism, we introduce the sectioned stack. This new
mechanism supplements, but does not replace, the argument
segment mechanism. (Argument segments are economical for
large arguments.)
The sectioned stack is a segment which is part of the process
state, together with two registers called Min and Max which de-
fine an accessible portion of the stack. Figure 4-7 shows a
sectioned stack and its accessible portion. In figure 4-7, the
notation 2Xmeans that the process state 9 contains x as a
component. The components of 9 shown in figure 4-7 are the
registers Min and Max, and a page table address (notated l )
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for the sectioned stack segment. The state transition rule
of the processor prevents the process from accessing words
of the sectioned stack with addresses less than or equal to
Min or greater than Max.
The sectioned stack is designed to be used both for
passing arguments and results between domains and for storing
procedure activation records. We feel it is elegant to
associate a stack segment with each process, because the use
of such a stack segment protects the secrecy and integrity
of arguments, results, and procedure activation records in
a way that absolutely prevents access by other processes.
Roughly speaking, the stack-per-process concept keeps the
processes out of each other's hair. This protection arises
from the fact that the sectioned stack is part of the process
state, rather than being accessible via a capability in a
domain, which can be used by any process bound to the domain.
Figure 4-8 shows five snapshots of the sectioned stack,
illustrating both argument passing and the storage of proce-
dure activation records (which include storage of temporaries,
e.g., automatic variables declared in programs written in
PL/I). In the first snapshot, the accessible portion of the
stack contains just the procedure activation record for A.
In the second snapshot, A has prepared for a call to B by
increasing Max sufficiently to make space in the accessible
portion for the arguments and results; and A has loaded its
arguments for B into the stack. A now calls B, and the third
105
CAr9LSneht
Woocdou
i//11/ 1111
(5)
Fitre - 9. Sherslotr of rectiovbe stock.
o06
N
(t) (2) (3)
/llllllN/
snapshot shows the stack just after the call. Note that Max
has remained unchanged, while Min has been increased to pro-
tect A's temporaries from the action of B. The portion of
the stack which holds the arguments and results is called the
argument window of the sectioned stack, because it is the
region which both A and B can access. Behind the scenes, in
a history stack in the process state, the old values of Min
and Max (just before the call) are saved. Now B increases
Max to make room for its temporaries, as shown in snapshot
four. B runs, does its work, and loads its results into the
argument window. Then B returns to A, and snapshot five
shows the stack just after the return. The saved values of
Min and Max have been restored, so A can once again access
its temporaries which were protected from B. B's temporaries,
on the other hand, are erased automatically, so A can't access
them later. Erasing is controlled by the reduction in the
value of Max.
The sectioned stack allows caller and callee to share
one segment for storage of temporaries, arguments, and re-
sults; even though caller and callee do not trust one another.
The secrecy and integrity of A's variables are protected by
the "wall" erected around Min: Min may be reduced only by
the return-domain instruction. This is accomplished by the
processor state transition rule. The secrecy of B's variables
is protected from the action of A by erasing B's variables
o07
just before control is returned to A. The integrity of B's
variables is protected simply because control is not given
to A while B's variables are yet to be used again.
Erasing the stack as Max is reduced is specified in the
state transition rule. In fact this activity can be overlapped
with other activity of the process, as for example by zeroing
words in the machine's cache. The cache is primarily the
topmost element of the memory device hierarchy, but it has
the bandwidth and could be wired to zero stack words for the
processor.
If B should call a third domain containing a program C,
the sectioned stack will serve to protect B's variables from
the action of C and vice versa; and it also protects A's
variables from the action of C and vice versa.
4.5. The Binding of Processes to Domains
We first introduced the idea that processes are bound to
domains in chapter 3, where the binding served to help define
the set of computing objects that the process is permitted to
extract information from, to manipulate, or to otherwise use;
according to the Postulates of Domains. In section 4.3, we
introduced the idea that this binding may be time-varying.
This permits a process to obtain a service from a program
encapsulated in a domain D by calling domain D using a domain
entry capability and the processor's call-domain instruction;
and while the service is being performed, the process is
bound to domain D. When the service encapsulated in D has
10
finished its work, it issues a return-domain instruction and
then the process becomes bound again to the domain that
called D.
The first purpose of this section is to note the depend-
ence of overall system security on the non-forgeability of
the binding of processes to domains. If a process could
forge its domain binding, it could call any service encapsulated
in any domain in the computer system, whether it was authorized
to use that service (by means of a domain entry capability)
or not. The non-forgeability of the binding of processes to
domains is a property of the computer system which is a
logical consequence of the processor state transition rule,
which tells how and when this binding is to be changed. The
state transition rule specifies that the binding of processes
to domains is to be changed only by the call-domain instruc-
tion, the return-domain instruction, and system faults. The
complete state transition rule is given in Appendix 1.
Because system security depends on the correctness of
the binding of processes to domains, the processor hardware
which implements this binding, including but not limited to
the process state components dom_id, vb, and dom_pt_addr;
should be constructed from failure-detecting, failure-correct-
ing circuitry. (These process state components are defined
in Appendix 1.) The engineer who designs a hardware realization
of the state transition rule of Appendix 1 should compute bounds
lo0
on the probability of the binding being incorrect and this
failure going undetected; and an explication of this computa-
tion should be demanded by would-be users of the hardware.
The second purpose of this section is to explain a design
choice relating to address spaces. In our model, address
spaces are associated with domains, and therefore the binding
of a process to a domain serves to select an address space for
the process. In other words, the meaning of a segment number
is defined in the context of a domain, and every process
bound to a given domain referring to a given segment uses the
same segment number. This feature of our model should already
be clear to the reader from our discussion in section 4.4 of
validating the segment numbers of argument segments. Address
spaces are associated with domains also in a new computer with
advanced protection mechanisms being constructed at the
University of Cambridge. [Ne72]
It is possible to associate address spaces with processes
instead of with domains, in which case the domains must be
part of the process state. Figure 4-9 shows two such processes,
each of which contains a domain that encapsulates the proce-
dure and data segments P and D. The capabilities in the first
process (notated i ) for P and D are assigned segment numbers
5 and 6, respectively; whereas the capabilities in the second
process (notated Q2 ) for P and D are assigned segment numbers
6 and 7, respectively. We assume that there is no co-ordination
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in the assignment of segment numbers between processes; so
in general, P and D will have different segment numbers in
the different processes. This method is used by Schroeder
[Sc72b] in his model of mutually suspicious subsystems. The
problem with this method is that when the program P must main-
tain a data base in a linked list format, which is quite
common when P is a generalized data base manager (e.g., the
File Manager in Multics [MIT72,p.4-55]), the pointers must be
stored in process-independent form. In the example of figure
4-9, this problem is manifest whenever it is necessary to store
a pointer that points into D. The process-dependent form of
pointers, (seg#,word#), cannot be used because D has different
seg#'s in the different processes. Process-independent pointers
must be used instead, and each process must translate these
pointers into the (seg#,word#) form required by the hardware
for effective addressing. This translation is not necessary
when address spaces are associated with domains. Thus this
translation step appears to be a waste of time, and is likely
to deter the growth of parallel computation methods when
address spaces are associated with processes, because of the
added burden placed on parallel computations.
The third purpose of this section is to explain two inter-
related design choices relating to the name space of domains
from which a selection is made by the binding of a process to
a domain. Stated simply, the questions are whether this name
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space should be large or small, and whether it should be im-
plemented once per-process or once per-system.
It might appear economical to design a small name space
for the domain binding if the designer expected each process
to use only a few domains. That is, if the process is ex-
pected to bind itself to only a small number of domains in
its lifetime (e.g., 8), then the domain binding component of
the process state might be implemented as a small register
in the processor hardware (e.g., 3 bits). But this seemingly
economical choice has a diseconomy built into it, because the
community that is using this computer system with a small
name space for the domain binding will be using it to build
services that use services built by other. Eventually, which
could be quite soon if the per-process name space were very
small, somebody would build a service that used up all the
available domain names. But then noone could build a service
that used this service, and planned obsolescence would strike
again. The conclusion of this argument is that the name space
for the domain binding should be a large name space.
The second question relating to the name space of domains
is whether it should be implemented once per-process or once
per-system. We feel that a per-system name space is more
elegant, and this choice insures that the name space will be
large. Also, some economies of scale might be realized from
maintaining one central, per-system name space as opposed to
maintaining many per-process name spaces.
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In our design, the domain binding name space is a collec-
tion of unique identifiers, called domain identifiers. These
domain identifiers are found, for example, in domain entry
capabilities, where they serve to identify the domain to be
called. The operating system maintains a mapping from domain
identifiers to page table addresses of the C-lists(*) of
domains, so that the processors can effectively examine the
capabilities of a domain, given the domain's unique identi-
fier. This mapping, which is an associative memory for the
domain binding name space,is called the Active Domain Table
(ADT). The ADT is introduced in Appendix 1 and described in
Appendix 2; but we suggest that the following section be read
before Appendix 2.
4.6. The Operating System
The purpose of this section is to introduce our design of
an operating system which will multiplex the resources of a
hardware computer whose processors are defined by the state
transition rule in Appendix 1. Our design provides for multi-
plexing the memory and processor resources of the hardware
computer, for supporting the protection mechanisms described
in this chapter, and for protecting the operating system
itself.
(*) Recall that C-list means capability list. The C-list of a
domain is a linear array of capabilities that defines the
domain. 1lf
In our design, we have assumed that the memory resources
of the computer are made available in the form of segments.
In fact, this assumption of a segmented virtual memory is
supported by the technique of paging, which requires the
operating system to maintain page tables for all segments.
We will describe how the limited memory space which is avail-
able for page tables is multiplexed among all the segments
which require page tables.
The processor resources of the hardware computer are
multiplexed among all the processes being evolved by the com-
puter, using the technique of time-sharing. We will describe
the traffic controller, a part of the operating system, which
accomplishes this sharing.
The operating system supports the protection mechanisms
defined in this chapter in several ways. The operating system
maintains the C-lists which define the domains of the system,
and it protects the domains by requiring that all changes to
C-lists be properly authorized. The operating system sup-
ports processes calling and returning between domains by
maintaining the Active Domain Table,which holds information
needed by such processes. It also maintains a collection of
sectioned stacks, one for each process; and it insures that
each process can access its own, and only its own, sectioned
stack. Finally, the operating system implements the three
primitives which allow entire segments to be used to hold
arguments and results of an inter-domain call.
is
In addition to the protection mechanisms for users just
described, the operating system is programmed to protect it-
self. This protection, like the protection for users, comes
from the walls defined by domains; and also from complete
validation of arguments passed to the operating system by
calling processes; and also from authorization mechanisms,
described in section 4.7, which limit what the operating
system will do for processes calling it.
Figure 4-10 shows six domains of the operating system.
After we describe the functions of these six domains, we will
explain our reasons for partitioning the operating system
into domains with these particular functions. The arrows
between domains in figure 4-10 represent domain entry cap-
abilities which allow the operating system domains to call
one another. The arrows with floating tails notated
"<type> fault" also represent the movement of processes
between domains, but these are processes coming from any
domain in the system, in response to a fault.
We now turn to describing the individual domains of the
operating system. The ADT domain maintains the Active Domain
Table, which provides a mapping from domain identifiers to
page table addresses of the C-lists of domains. When a process
calls or returns between domains, the domain that the process
is becoming bound to will be called the target domain. When-
ever a process calls or returns between domains, the processor
must change a component of the process state to point to the
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page table of the C-list of the target domain. If the needed
information is in the ADT, the movement of processes between
domains is very quick. When the needed information is not in
the ADT, a domain fault occurs and the ADT domain makes the
target domain active. Appendix 2 details the structure of
the ADT, the algorithm that responds to domain faults, and
the process synchronization strategies which are required
because every process in the system is using the ADT.
Page table addresses for C-lists of domains of the
operating system will always be in the ADT. Thus calls
between operating system domains are quick, and a cascade of
domain faults is not possible.
The AST domain maintains the Active Segment Table, which
is the place where page tables of segments are stored. The
memory space for page tables is multiplexed because the
processes refer to time-varying collections of segments and
the page tables for these segments occupy expensive high-speed
memory. But the ADT contains page table addresses, and so
the maintenance of the AST and the ADT must be co-ordinated.
The traffic controller domain multiplexes the processor
resources of the hardware computer. Recall that each process
has a sectioned stack. Because each process being evolved by
a processor is bound to its sectioned stack by means of a
page table address, the traffic controller co-ordinates its
work with the AST domain in order to guarantee that the sec-
tioned stack segments of running processes are active.
I f
One domain of the operating system, the firewall domain,
is responsible for manipulating and protecting C-lists. Every
C-list segment in the computer system is accessible in the
firewall domain, including the C-list of the firewall domain
itself. The firewall domain protects itself and its C-lists
by not allowing any C-lists, including its own C-list,to be
accessible from any other domain.
We must note that the protection which the firewall
domain enjoys depends upon the correctness of the page tables
which define access paths to C-list segments. So the pro-
tecting power of the firewall domain could be violated by
accident or maliciousness in the AST domain.
While the firewall domain has the power to manipulate
C-lists, it does not have the responsibility for deciding
what manipulations are to be performed. This is done by the
AST domain and the ToC domain, and these two domains are the
only domains which have domain entry capabilities which allow
calling the firewall domain.
The Table of Contents (ToC) domain maintains the segments
which serve to explain and associate information with C-list
entries, similar to the KST in Multics [Ben72]. For every
C-list segment in the firewall domain, there is a correspond-
ing table of contents segment in the ToC domain. The ToC
domain responds to segment fault events, which in effect are
requests that inactive segments be made active. It does this
I i
by determining the identity of the inactive segment from the
appropriate table of contents segment and by calling the
AST domain and the firewall domain to make that segment active
and accessible (to the extent specified by mode information
stored in the table of contents segment).
Appendix 3 details the strategies of the ToC domain, the
AST domain, and the traffic controller in multiplexing the
page table memory space.
Finally, the stacks domain allows the operating system
to have unrestricted access to the sectioned stacks of
processes. Such access is required to implement the argument
segment primitives introduced in section 4.4. Appendix 4
details these argument segment primitives.
The boundaries between the domains of the operating
system, as just outlined, were chosen with two design principles
in mind. The first principle is functional modularity, accord-
ing to which the domains are defined by the maintenance require-
ments of particular data bases, e.g., the AST, or the ADT; and
the domains are limited to the functions of maintaining those
data bases because we want to minimize the number of program
modules which can access the crucial operating system data
bases. This desire to minimize the number of programs in
each operating system domain springs from the fact that pro-
grams are the sources of bugs, and bugs are the source of high
costs in developing operating systems. It will be easier to
debug an operating system which is partitioned into domains,
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because the direct damage to operating system data bases
caused by each bug will be localized and minimized.
The second design principle which guides our partition
of the operating system is simplicity in allocating segment
numbers in the domains of the operating system. For example,
the ToC domain and the firewall domain have a congruent alloca-
tion structure in their address spaces. Each C-list segment
is allocated a segment number in the address space of the
firewall domain, and similarly for the table of contents
segments in the ToC domain. Every C-list has an associated
table of contents segment, which is why we call the allocation
structures of the two address spaces congruent. In fact, each
C-list and its associated table of contents segment could have
the same segment number, since segment numbers have meaning
in the contexts defined by domains. The ToC domain and the
firewall domain could be combined into a single domain which
would contain capabilities for both C-list segments and table
of contents segments. But this would complicate slightly the
allocation structure of the address space of the combined
domain. Also, because any implementation of this design will
place some limit on the number of capabilities in a domain,
combining the ToC domain with the firewall domain would reduce
by a factor of two the total number of domains supported by
the operating system.
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4.7. Naming and Authorization
The purpose of this section is to describe the structure
and control of a name space, implemented by the operating
system, which users of the computer will use to catalogue
segments and domains. This name space takes the form of a
hierarchy of directories and their entries, and is called the
naming hierarchy. The naming hierarchy is similar to the file
hierarchy of Multics [MIT72].
Names of computing objects which are catalogued by the
naming hierarchy are defined in terms of directories. A
directory is a node in the tree of the naming hierarchy, con-
sisting of entries which point to other directories, or to
computing objects like segments and domains. Each entry has
an associated name, which uniquely selects the entry from the
directory. A unique directory, the Root, is not pointed to by
any entry in another directory. The tree name of a computing
object catalogued in the naming hierarchy is the sequence of
entry names which defines a path from the Root directory to
the computing object. Figure 4-11 shows a naming hierarchy
containing four directories, a segment, and a domain. The
tree name of the segment is (a,x,x); the tree name of the
domain is (a,x,y). The entries in directories are repre-
sented by lines drawn from the directories to the object
pointed to by the entry, and entry names are written next to
this line.
Control over the naming hierarchy is established by giving
control over particular directories to particular domains.
LZ2
d rector
A ha2ih AierarcL.
123
i
X j
Fiuwe.
L eehi
7 
This control is implemented with an access control packet
(acp) associated with each entry of each directory. The con-
tents of acps are different for each type of object that can
be represented by an entry in a directory. We will describe
what an acp must contain to control access to directories,
segments, and domains.
The acp of a directory consists of a list of terms, and
each term consists of the tree name of a domain and a mode of
access to the associated directory. The meaning of each term
is that the named domain may access the directory using operat-
ing system primitives which are permitted by the given mode
of access. Directory-accessing primitives are available which
obtain a list of the entries in a directory, and which display
the status of single entry, including its acp. These operations
are permitted if the call to the primitive comes from a domain
with "read" access to the directory. This is the first mode.
A second mode, "modify", allows the authorized domains to
successfully invoke primitives which create and destroy entries
in directories, rename entries in directories, and modify access
control packets associated with entries in directories.
Figure 4-12 shows how one directory of the naming hierarchy
is placed under the control of a particular domain. The
directory (users,Proj,Pers), a typical user's directory, is
under the control of the domain (users,Proj,Pers,home), which
is the domain named by the single term in the acp of (users,
Proj,Pers). The characters after the colon in our denotation
Iz4
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of the acp term, "rm", declare that the named domain has
read ("r") and modify ("m") access to the directory with
which the acp is associated. Our example assumes that users
(persons) are organized into projects, so (users,Proj) will
have directory entries for other persons belonging to the
project Proj; and (users) will have directory entries for
other projects. This pattern of user and project directories
is conventional in Multics.
The acp of a segment consists of a list of terms, and
each term consists of the tree name of a domain and a mode of
access to the associated segment. The meaning of each term
is that the named domain may obtain a segment capability,
giving those modes of access specified by the term, for the
segment. The modes of access to segments defined by the
processor state transition rule are the modes which can be
specified by the terms of a segment's acp: read ("r"),
execute ("e"), and write ("w").
In addition to the domain tree name and mode, each term
of a segment acp contains a one-bit copy flag, the purpose of
which is to authorize (prohibit) the named domain to pass
(from passing) segment capabilities for the segment to other
domains, using the pass-segment primitive. But note that
this copy flag does not prevent any domain that has read
access to a segment from making a copy of the information in
a new segment and passing a capability for that new segment.
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Suppose a user is commanding a process bound to a domain
that has modify access to a directory which contains an entry
for a segment. Such a user has the power to modify the acp
of the segment. If the user commands his process to call the
operating system to remove a term from that acp, the effect
is to revoke the access of the domain named by the term to
the segment whose acp was modified. It is not difficult to
design an operating system which implements access revoking
by immediately removing segment capabilities from the affected
domains. For example, under some conditions Multics provides
immediate access revoking.
Figure 4-13 shows how access to one segment is authorized
for one domain. The segment (users,Proj,Pers,memo) is read-
able and writable in the domain (users,Proj,Pers,home).
The acp of a domain is a much more complicated object
than the acps for segments and directories. This complexity
arises from the fact that domains have several different types
of uses. In the following paragraphs we will describe five
different modes of usage for domains, and extract from each
description the need for a separate component of the access
control packet of a domain.
The previous two figures in this section both showed a
user's home domain, located (in terms of its name) in a user's
directory (users,Proj,Pers). Figure 4-12 showed that the
home domain typically has control of the user's directory.
The purpose of the home domain is to provide a protected
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environment for the user's process to be bound to while the
process is obeying the user's commands to examine and manipu-
late his user's directory, or its entries (or their entries,
if some of the entries of the user's directory are directories,
and so on). For example, the user could command his process,
running bound to his home domain, to edit the segment (users,
Proj,Pers,memo) shown in figure 4-13; also, the user could
command his process to modify the acp of (users,Proj,Pers,
memo) so as to share the segment with another user. This
process would relay this request to the operating system by
invoking the appropriate primitive, and the request would be
honored because the home domain, from which the primitive is
invoked, has modify access to the directory (users,Proj,Pers).
Now suppose a foreign program were introduced into this
user's home domain, and suppose that program gained control
of a process bound to the domain. The foreign program could
perfectly easily invoke the operating system primitive to
modify the acp of (users,Proj,Pers,memo), giving access to
the segment to a spy. For this reason, it is necessary for
the owner of a domain to have control over the collection of
segments for which his domain contains a segment capability.
Protection from foreign programs is the first use for such
a control mechanism. In addition, this control can be used
by a project administrator to define limited service sub-
systems in home domains of project members, when the home
domains are under the control of the project administrator.
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To provide control over the collection of segments for
which a domain contains capabilities, the access control
packet for a domain contains a component called seg-limit.
This component consists of two lists: a list of terms which
represent individual segments, and a list of acceptable
certifications. Each term which represents an individual
segment consists of the tree name of the segment, and a mode
which is some combination of read ("r"), execute ("e"), and
write ("w"). The interpretation of each term is that the
domain with which the acp is associated may obtain a segment
capability for the segment named by the term, with a mode of
access not greater than the mode specified by the term. The
owner of the domain will place terms representing individual
segments in the seg-limit component of his domain's acp when
he has certified for himself that his domain should have a
capability for the segment.
The second list in the seg-limit component of the acp of
a domain allows the domain owner to depend on certifications
performed by others. For example, the command interpreter
and the directory-listing and manipulating command programs
which run in home domains will be certified by some central
authority, and the list of acceptable certifications in the
seg-limit component of the acp of a domain allows the domain
owner to express his trust and acceptance of such certifica-
tions. Certifications are designated by ordered pairs con-
sisting of the tree name of a domain and a character string
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called a warrant. Any domain can originate a certification
by invoking an operating system primitive; warrants serve to
distinguish between different certifications that originate
in the same domain. The operating system primitive that
originates certifications will attach a certification to the
segment specified by the domain invoking the primitive, and
that certification will consist of the tree name of the in-
voking domain together with a warrant specified by the invok-
ing domain. The certification originating primitive will also
associate a mode of access, specified by the invoking domain,
with the certification attached to the segment being certified.
The meaning, then, of a certification specifier in the second
list of the seg-limit component of the acp of a domain, is
that the domain is allowed to obtain segment capabilities for
segments to which the specified certification is attached, and
the mode of the domain's segment capability must not be
greater than the mode associated with the certification
attached to the segment.
Now that we have described the mechanism which establishes
the domain owner's authority over the collection of segments
for which his domain contains a capability, it is appropriate
to say that the domain owner is responsible for the composition
of that collection of segments. In particular, the domain
owner is responsible for bringing together the collection of
capabilities for program segments in his domain, and there-
fore the domain owner is responsible, together with the authors
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of the program segments, for what those program segments
make processes do. This responsibility of the domain owner
is shared, to some extent, when the domain owner depends on
certifications performed by others. But in simple cases
(i.e., when no certification specifiers appear in the seg-
limit component of the acp of the domain, and the domain
owner wrote or certified all the programs for which the domain
contains a capability), a single social entity, the domain
owner, is completely responsible for what the programs in a
domain make processes do.
Another instructive mode of usage of a domain is for
isolating a borrowed program. Working on the theory that the
borrowed program might be a Trojan Horse(*), the borrower
decides not to put a segment capability for the program in his
home domain, and instead he creates a new domain to encapsulate
the borrowed program. The borrower might be afraid that the
borrowed program will spy on him by making calls and thereby
passing information to some domain belonging to the program's
author (or one of the author's friends). To give the borrower
some control over this sort of behavior, the acp of a domain
contains a component called call-out. The call-out component
(*) A Trojan Horse program is one which, in addition to doing
whatever it is advertised to do, does something that its users
don't know about and wouldn't want done.
is simply a list of tree names of domains that may be called
by the domain with which the acp is associated. The call-out
component of the acp of a domain is consulted by the operating
system whenever it is about to add a domain entry capability
to the domain, to insure that the domain which could be called
through the domain entry capability being added is a domain
to which calls are allowed.
The third interesting mode of usage of a domain is for
sharing a data base and controlling access to it with a
caretaker program. The programs that use the data base will
all reside in domains that have domain entry capabilities for
calling the domain that encapsulates the data base and its
caretaker. The owner of the data base will be the owner of
the domain that encapsulates it, and he will want to control
access to his data base, not only through writing (or borrow-
ing an appropriate) caretaker program, but also through being
able to say which domains can call his domain. To meet this
need, the acp of a domain contains a component called call-in.
The call-in component is simply a list of tree names of
domains that may call the domain with which the acp is
associated. The call-in component of the acp of a domain D
is consulted by the operating system whenever it is about to
add to any domain a domain entry capability which allows
calls to D, to insure that the domain obtaining the domain
entry capability is allowed to call D.
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The fourth important mode of usage of a domain is for
debugging a newly written program. The author of the pro-
gram might use a certified debugger in his home domain to
create and control a domain encapsulating the newly written
program. Debuggers require some unusual features to operate,
such as the ability to interrupt processes executing the
program being debugged, the ability to insert breakpoints in
the program being debugged, etc. The design of a debugging
protection environment is outside the scope of this thesis,
but we can hypothesize that the acp of a domain will require
a component called debug to authorize the operation of the
debugger.
The fifth important mode of usage of a domain is for
encapsulating a proprietary service. There are many important
protection problems associated with providing proprietary
services to users of a computer utility, and these are covered
in the next chapter. We will need to refer to the user domain
of a proprietary service; this domain is the domain for which
the service is working. The user domain of a proprietary
service has one or more domain entry capabilities which it
uses to call the proprietary service. The owner of the user
domain of a proprietary service needs to have some powers of
control over the service his domain is using, and the control
information is placed in a component of the access control
packet of the user domain called the proprietary call-out
component. This component is replicated in the access control
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packet once for each proprietary service which the user domain
is a user of, and its structure and meaning is described in
detail in the next chapter.
4.8. Summary
We began this chapter with the three simple concepts--
segment, process, and domain--which emerged from our review
of elementary protection mechanisms in chapter 3. We defined
our process to have a binding to a domain, rather than to
contain domains, because we observed that processes and domains
are logically distinct and roughly of equal importance. We
noted that small domains (in terms of the number of program
segments' authors) are required for adequate protection. To
allow users of a computer utility to build on the work of
others, we introduced the domain entry capability and two
methods of passing arguments and results between domains:
shared argument segments and the argument window of the sec-
tioned stack. We presented the design of an operating system
for our computer utility that protects itself with a collection
of domains, supports the protection mechanisms defined pre-
viously, and multiplexes the memory and processor resources
of the hardware computer. The details of this hardware and
software design may be found in Appendices 1 through 4. Finally,
we defined a naming hierarchy with an authorization mechanism,
the system of access control packets, for controlling computing
objects.
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Chapter 5
Proprietary Services
5.1. Summary of Problems
Users of computers want to build on the work of others
in the form of programs and data. Thus there is a demand
for useful programs and data. A software industry has emerged
and considerable effort is being expended to develop propri-
etary programs which can be rented out. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore in detail the privacy and protection
problems which must be solved in order to offer the services
of proprietary programs and data to users of a computer utility.
This problem was investigated in an abstract setting by
Vanderbilt [Va69]. This chapter extends his results in the
practical setting provided by the domain-supporting mechanisms
of chapter 4.
We have investigated nine important problems which must
be solved in any practical computer utility in order to offer
proprietary services in a context that protects the interests
of all the users, especially the lessor and lessee of the
proprietary service. We have already shown the basic stra-
tegy for solving the problem: proprietary services are en-
capsulated in domains.
The mechanisms of chapter four are an adequate solution
to the first three of the important problems we will present
in this chapter. The first problem is to protect the
integrity of a proprietary service encapsulated in a domain
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by restricting access to the entry points of the domain. The
entry points are the addresses in the program segments where
processes calling into the domain are expected to begin
executing instructions. The operation of the programs in
the domain will not be reliable if calling processes can begin
execution of programs at arbitrary points. The domain entry
capability solves this problem by specifying the entry point
address at which the calling process begins execution in the
called domain. The operating system primitives which create
domain entry capabilities will not allow any domain entry
capabilities to specify an entry point address not authorized
by the authority(ies) that control the called domain. Further-
more, access to the entry points which are valid entry points
is restricted to domains having an appropriate domain entry
capability.
When a process returns from a called domain to the calling
domain, the same protection problem presents itself. The re-
turn point, i.e. the address in a program segment where the
returning process should resume execution in the calling domain,
must be protected from any modification after being established
by the calling domain, at the time of the call. Our sectioned
stack solves this problem by making available an inaccessible
region of the stack segment in which to store the return
address. The return-domain instruction can access this other-
wise inaccessible region to retrieve the stored return address
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and effect the return.
The second important protection problem is to pass argu-
ments and results between the calling and called domains.
Our solution to this problem is the sectioned stack for
small arguments, and argument segments for large arguments.
These mechanisms allow calling and called domains to pass
arguments and results without compromising the secrecy or the
integrity of any other information. Other mechanisms for
solving these protection problems have been developed by
Schroeder [Sc72b] for a process in which the domains are part
of the process state and every segment in the address space
of the process has the same segment number in every domain
of the process. Schroeder's solution is to introduce hard-
ware processor features to dynamically create capabilites
for argument and result subsegments at every cross-domain
call, and to dynamically destroy the capabilites created by
such a call when the corresponding cross-domain return occurs.
The third important protection problem is to protect
proprietary programs and methods from being stolen. The
thief could either steal the program, or steal copies of its
intermediate results and deduce therefrom its method of op-
eration. The domain mechanism itself, and the information-
erasing activity of the sectioned stack, provide a solution
to this problem. The program segment is protected from
being stolen by the lessees of the service the program imple-
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ments because the program segment cannot be accessed directly
by any lessee: a lessee's domain does not have a segment
capability for the program; instead it has a domain entry
capability to call another domain which does have such a
segment capability. This level of protection for a program
segment can also be achieved by the "e" mode of access de-
fined in Appendix 1. If a domain has a capability for a
program segment and the mode of the capability is just "e",
other programs in that domain cannot steal the given pro-
gram, because they cannot read its words as data. This
protection is available even though the program is per-
mitted to read constants out of itself.
But to protect a program's methods from being stolen,
the program's intermediate results must be unavailable to
the would-be thief. By placing its intermediate results
only in the sectioned stack and in data segments which can
be accessed only in the domain that encapsulates the pro-
prietary service, the program protects itself from this
threat. Intermediate results in the sectioned stack will
be erased when the process returns to the calling domain,
while the intermediate data segments can be accessed only
13
by the proprietary program and other programs in its
domain (*).
The fourth important protection problem is to protect
the secrecy of argument information passed to a proprietary
program. That is, the user of a proprietary program might
be concerned that the data he supplies to the program could
be stolen. For example, suppose the proprietary program
was written by company R and did circuit analyses; and sup-
pose that the would-be user is an engineer working for
company G. He wants to use the program to analyse a circuit
but he won't use it if he thinks that his competitor, R,
will learn his circuit design as a result. In other words,
the problem is to allow the proprietary program to "know"
the circuit, which is necessary for the program to do its job,
but to prevent the program's owner from knowing the circuit.
(*) The program, or its data, might yet be stolen by means of
the compiler-caller two-pronged attack. This attack
method requires a conspiracy between, or identity of; a
caller (user) of the proprietary service, and the author
of the compiler which was used to compile the proprietary
program. The compiler inserts extra instructions in the
proprietary program, and the caller passes particular ar-
gument values which trigger the execution of the extra
instructions. The extra instructions can provide the
caller with copies of the proprietary program and any of
its intermediate results. This method of attack can be
prevented by auditing the compiler, or by examining its
output with another program, a compiler output verifier,
which will detect the insertion of unwanted instructions.
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It would be possible to audit a proprietary program to
insure that it does not contain spying code that reports to
someone what it worked on. Since 'auditing is a human function,
this is a very expensive solution. A more attractive pos-
sibility is to design an environment for the proprietary
service that prevents it from doing such spying. Such an
environment can be made available in a computer under the
control of a third party (i.e., neither the lessor nor the
lessee of the proprietary service). Then the integrity of
the system's protected, constrained environments would be
the responsibility of that third party; and the use of pro-
prietary services would involve agreements with him. The
logical choice to serve as this third party is the adminis-
tration of the computer utility where the services are offered.
The environment which prevents argument spying is composed of
benign domains, and is described in section 5.2.
The fifth important protection problem is the possibility
that a proprietary service will spy on its caller by hiding a
few bits in its results. These few bits would be derived
from the arguments passed by the caller, so the reader should
regard this problem to be a special case of the argument spy-
ing problem just presented. Unfortunately, the benign domain
mechanism does not solve this problem. Since we are forced
to treat it separately, we give it a name: the hidden data
flow problem.
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Hidden data can replace the low-order bits of floating-
point numerical results, or fill the space unused by a
varying string result, without requiring any variation in
the storage formats expected by the caller of the proprietary
service. If those formats include areas in which blocks
can be allocated and freed, the hidden data can occupy a
hidden block. The proprietary service and its brother
spy might need to use an error-detecting encoding to deal
effectively with the hit-or-miss mechanics of getting the
hidden data to the brother spy.
More obscure methods of hiding data can surely be
found (*). Our treatment of the problem in this chapter
is at the level of a game, with teams of spies and counter-
spies, similar to the communities of users and breakers of
crypts. The problem cannot be adequately solved without the
privacy restriction mechanism introduced in chapter 6.
(*) Sometimes hidden data can be encoded in a major distor-
tion of the results returned by the proprietary program,
provided the brother spy has access to a mechanism that de-
tects the distortion. For example, a list of stockholders
of a certain corporation could be obtained by spies who
program a proprietary service for preparing tax returns.
The program would produce incorrect returns for all users
who were stockholders of the given corporation. The IRS
publishes lists of taxpayers who file incorrect returns;
this .is the detection mechanism followed by a broadcast.
The spies obtain a partial list of stockholders by inter-
secting the lists published by IRS with a list of the
users of their proprietary service.
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The sixth important protection problem is the possibility
that a proprietary service will spy on its caller by sending
information through the information channel whose purpose
is to allow the preparation of detailed invoices for services
rendered. The problem is to establish the communication
necessary for billing without allowing communication for spying.
Like the hidden data problem, this problem can be regarded as
a special case of the argument spying problem. One solution
that eliminates spying is to eliminate billing and charge a
fixed monthly rental. Other methods, which throttle the rate
at which spied information is communicated through the billing
mechanism, are described in section 5.4.
The seventh important protection problem is a conflict
that develops between the owner (maintainer) of a proprietary
service, and its users. The owner wants to fix bugs that
are found in the service, and perhaps also upgrade the level
of service, which sometimes involves substantial modification.
The users, on the other hand, don't like to see the service
change at all, unless it is in response to a problem they're
having with it. So for any given change, many users are
against it.
A,typical owner response to this problem is to make new
releases of his service available to his users, and to refuse
to maintain any but the most recently released version. Thus,
the owner conserves the resources expended for maintenance,
while the. users are forced to. update to the latest release
when they encounter problems with'older versions.
Now suppose the service is offered through a computer
system under the control of a third party. The users of an
old version of the service might want that version to remain
unchanged. Other users will switch'to the latest version as
soon as it is available, because they are willing to adapt
to the change (they have the resources to expend to do it).
But if the owner of the service were to remove the old ver-
sion, he might arouse the ire of his old-version users.
Thus the users need an agreement with the owner, enforced by
the computer system, that no proprietary service in use may
be modified. (This would not prevent a new version of the
service from being offered.) The enforcement would create
the needed trust between user and owner, because the user
would know that the proprietary service could not be
modified. An operating system mechanism to record and en-
force such agreements is described in section 5.5.
The eighth important-protection problem is the possibility
that a proprietary service will stop working, or begin to
give out bad answers, at a time chosen by some clever enemy
of the user of the service. For example, a failure could be
timed to coincide with a demonstration to some would-be client
of the user. As with the argument spying problem, two methods
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of solution seem feasible; audit the proprietary program, or
place it in an environment that prevents it from exhibiting
the threatening behavior described above. Such an environment
would have to deny the proprietary service knowledge of who it
is working for, and the time of day; in fact, the proprietary
service would have to be denied all sources of input that
might be influenced by the enemy, because such inputs could
contain encoded signals to the service. We will call a service
in such an environment a blind service. Blind services are
defined and discussed in section 5.9.
Finally, the ninth important protection problem is the
desire of the competitive owner of a proprietary service to
withhold the use of his service from his competitors.
Competition is a way of life in America, and because the
development of software is best accomplished by small groups
of workers, the software marketplace might be served reason-
ably well by a large number of small, independent, competitive
suppliers.
The problem of denying one's service to one's competition
is compounded when one service is part of another. To be
precise, suppose owner A builds a service S, and suppose
another owner, B, builds a service T that uses (calls) S. If
A does not want his competitor A' to use S, he must make an
agreement with B in which B promises A not to sell the ser-
vices of T to any user that A doesn't approve of. Now A
must expend time and energy approving of applicants who want
to use T, in addition to screening applicants who want to
use S. Competition has its inefficiencies'. The privacy
restriction mechanism of chapter 6 can eliminate some of these
inefficiencies. We return to this problem in section 6.11.
5.2. Argument Spying, and Benign Domains
The purpose of this section is to present the definition
of a constrained environment in which a proprietary service
will find it extremely difficult to do argument spying. This
constrained environment begins with a domain containing a
proprietary service which can be called from its user's domain.
Whenever a user's process calls into the domain of the
proprietary service, the program which implements the service
has an opportunity to copy information, to compute, to call
other domains (including the operating system); in short,
to struggle by these means to communicate the arguments, or
information derived from them, to a spy hiding someplace
in the computer utility.
The proprietary service could write the arguments into
a segment shared with a domain containing a spy process, for
example. Therefore the constrained environment may not con-
tain any shared writable segments, nor any writable segments
which are ever readable by any other domains. The constrained
environment must have some writable segments to allow it to
remember things for its caller, but these segments must not
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be useful for spying. Thus, all the segments. which are
writable from domains of the constrained environment must be
under the control of an authority dedicated to the prevention
of spying. This authority will allow each writable segment
to be accessible in one, and only one, of the domains of the
constrained environment. Having made the above strong state-
ment, it is necessary immediately to moderate it in two
important cases: first, if the segment serves as an argument
segment for two or more domains of the constrained environ-
ment, and second, if all the parties having bona fide rights
of control over information in the segment agree to its
release. The authority which enforces these rules will be
called the Proprietary Services Administration (PSA), and
the writable segments of the constrained environment will be
called closeted segments.
Another method by which the proprietary service might
try to communicate the arguments is by calling into a domain
that works for the spy. To prevent the would-be spies from
gaining any advantage from this ploy, we require domains
which are called from domains of the constrained environment
to be themselves members of the constrained environment.
Domains of the constrained environment may also call
operating system domains, but not at every entry point. For
example, the primitive which writes entry names into the
naming hierarchy will not be accessible by domains in the
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constrained environment. The operating system will carry the
responsibility of keeping a domain in its constrained environ-
ment once it has been placed there, and the responsibility of
preventing any domain of the constrained environment from
writing information anywhere other than in closeted segments.
Domains of the constrained environment will not be allowed to
do input or output.
Another method by which the proprietary service could
communicate information to a spy is through a process that
calls into the domain of the proprietary service from some
domain that works for the spy. The author of the proprietary
service could make a special entry point for this purpose,
unknown to the user of the service. To prevent this method
of spying, we require that every domain of the constrained
environment be callable only from other domains of the
constrained environment, and from the domain of the user of
the proprietary service.
This completes the definition of the constrained environ-
ment. To see this, reflect on the fact that there are only a
few ways for information to get in and out of domains (*):
(*) Information is in a domain if it can be read as data by
a process bound to the domain. nformation gets out of a
domain by getting into some other domain, or by leaving the
computer system through an output device.
through segments, through processes calling and returning
(calls to the operating system being a special case), and
through input/output.
To summarize, a constrained environment that works for a
user domain D is a set C of domains such that (1) all the
writable segments of domains in C are closeted segments,
C2) domains in C can be called only from other domains in C,
and from domain D, (3) domains in C can invoke only limited
services of the operating system, as described above, and
(4) domains in C can call only other domains in C, and the
operating system. If we assume for the moment that there is
no flow of billing information out of the domains of C, and
if we postulate also that the operating system refuses to
allow any information to be written in user-accessible places
by domains of C, it follows that all the information that
leaves domains of C must enter domains of C, or domain D.
The information that enters domain D is the result of the
computation of the proprietary service in the constrained
environment, plus any hidden data placed in the results by
the proprietary service.
We will call the domains of the constrained environment
benign domains, because they do not have the power to do ar-
gument spying. We can prove rigorously that they do not have
such power by considering the path through the benign domains
taken by a process calling from the user domain. An example
will clarify the construction on which the proof depends.
Figure 5-1 shows a constrained environment and the path of a
process through the benign domains, represented as a tree of
domain invocations. Each domain invocation is the process
entering a domain. The arcs between the domain invocations
represent calls and sebsequent returns by the process. When
a domain invocation calls more than one domain before returning
to its caller, more than one arc will emanate from that
domain invocation in the tree. Each domain invocation in the
tree of figure 5-1 is labelled with the name of the domain
invoked, and a number i which means that the invocation is
the ith invocation of the named domain by the process.
Our proof proceeds by induction on the tree of domain
invocations. For the basis step, let x be a domain invocation
CX,i) at the bottom of the tree. The only ways for information
to leave the domain X at invocation x are through a segment,
through a call to the operating system, and through a return
to the caller of X. (Since (X,i) is at the bottom of the
tree of domain invocations, the process will not call any
domains other than the operating system.) We have already
postulated that calls to the operating system will not
result in releases of information when.the calls originate
in benign domains. Furthermore, information cannot leave
domain X through a segment because 'all the writable segments
of X are closeted. So we need be concerned only about infor-
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mation leaving..d'omain X through the process returning. The
process will return to .the user domain of the constrained
environment, or to one of the domains of the 'constrained en-
vironment. If the return is to the user domain of the con-
strained environment, we need not be concerned about argument
spying because the user domain had access to the arguments in
the first place. If the return is to some domain of the con-
strained environment, the argument information which we are
concerned about remains in the constrained environment.
For the induction step, let x be a domain invocation
(X,i) not at the bottom of the tree. The only ways for in-
formation to leave the domain X at invocation x are through
a segment, through a call to the operating system, through
a call to another domain of the constrained environment, and
through a return to the caller of X. By induction hypothesis,
calls to other domains of the constrained environment will
not allow information to leave the constrained environment.
Since X is a benign domain, calls to the operating system
will not result in releases of information, and all the
writable segments of X are closeted. So once again, we need
be concerned only about information leaving domain X through
the process returning. If the return is to the user domain
of the constrained environment, argument spying is not pos-
sible because the user domain has access to the arguments
already. If the return is to a domain of the constrained
environment, no information leaves the constrained
5-2
environment.
So, by the principle of mathematical induction, the only
information that can leave a constrained environment must
flow into the user domain of the constrained environment.
It is important to note that this result depends
crucially on the postulated properties of the operating
system. Those parts of the operating system which act to
constrain the operation of benign domains and sequester
closeted segments must be audited.
5.3. The Proprietary Services Administration
The Proprietary Services Administration (PSA) is a part
of the operating system of the computer which creates and
controls domains encapsulating proprietary services, in
response to requests coming from domains, or owners of domains,
that want to use the services. PSA is responsible for es-
tablishing constrained environments, benign domains, and
closeted segments. When a service is implemented by using
other, previously established services, PSA will create
domains for each of the component services.
The domains created by PSA are given names chosen by PSA,
in apart of the naming hierarchy which is under the control
of PSA. The names chosen by PSA are not predictable because
of races for slots of PSA's name space between concurrent
users of PSA, and this creates a problem for the owner of a
domain who wants to authorize his domain to call a domain
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which will be created by PSA. He :cannot know the name of,.the
called domain in advance," but he does' know the name 'of the
service which PSA will install in that domain once it is
created. For this reason, the owner of the domain which will
use Ccall) a proprietary service cannot employ the 'call-out
component of the acp of his domain to specify the domain to be
called. Instead, he will use the proprietary call-out com-
ponent, in which he specifies. the name of the service to be
placed in the domain created by PSA.
When a user names a service whose implementation depends
on other services, PSA must take this name and effectively
obtain from it the names of the component services. These
details concerning the structure of a service should be
provided by the implementor of the service, and for this
purpose we introduce the service declaration segment. In this
segment, the lessor (implementor) of the service names the
services which are components of the service being declared,
by giving the tree names of their service declarations.
Similarly, the proprietary call-out component of the acp of
the user domain of a proprietary service implicitly names the
domain which encapsulates the service by specifying the tree
name of the service declaration,.
When a domain owner authorizes his domain to call a
proprietary service, he might want to demand that the service
occupy a constrained environment. This demand can be regarded
Is-
as a conditional authorization, of the form "if the service is
benign, then let my domain call the domain which encapsulates
the service." The demand can also be regarded simply as a
declaration. The proprietary call-out component of the access
control packet of the user domain of a proprietary service is
the place where such demands are specified, and PSA will honor
the demand, if it is there, and construct a constrained en-
vironment for the service with which the demand is associated.
Similarly, a service declaration can contain a demand that a
component service occupy a constrained environment, because
the owner (implementor) of the service might want the algorithm
of his service protected from any possibility of theft
through observation of the information it passes to the
component service through processes calling the component
service.
The access control packet of a service declaration seg-
ment is used to store authorizations which allow domains
to use the declared service. The acp of a service declaration
segment has three components: a normal component, a user
component, and an outer-service component. The normal
component of an acp of a service declaration segment S has
the same form as the acp of an ordinary segment, and it is
used for the same purpose: to specify the modes of access
Ceither "r" or "rw") which'domains named by the terms of the
normal component may have 'to segment S. The 'other' components
of an acp of a service declaration segment S relate to the
use of the service declared by S.
The user component of an acp of a service declaration
segment S consists of a list of texms, and each term must be
the tree name of a domain which 'is allowed to use the service
declared by S. PSA will not create a domain encapsulating
the service declared by S for any would-be user domain unless
the user domain is named by a term of the user component of
the acp of the service declaration S. The outer-service
component of an acp of a service declaration segment S con-
sists of a list of terms, and each term must be the tree name
of a service declaration segment S'. The meaning of each
term is that the service declared by S is allowed to be used
as a component service of the service declared by S'. PSA
will not create a domain encapsulating the service declared
by S as a component of another service unless that other
service's declaration is named by a term of the outer-
service component of the acp of the service declaration S.
In the next two sections, we discuss solutions to the
protection problems associated with billing information and
mutually agreed maintenance; and the impact of these solutions
on the design of PSA. Then, in section 5.6, we present a
detailed example of the operation of PSA.
5.4. Billing InformatiOn
If a communication channel whose purpose is the prepara-
tion of invoices is availlable to a proprietary service, the
channel can be used to spy on arguments. The spying would
not go unnoticed by the lessee of the service, since he would
vigilantly observe the additional information (probably
encoded) on the face of his bill. This notification depends
on the lessee seeing all the information which the proprietary
service sends into the invoice channel -- if the lessor has
the chance to edit out the encoded message of his spy program
before the lessee sees the bill, the lessee is kept in the
dark. The Proprietary Services Administration therefore pro-
vides the service of accepting invoice information from pro-
prietary services, preparing bills from the information, and
sending one copy of each bill to both lessor and lessee. We
will call this method of billing the open account channel.
It is characterized by the reproduction in the bill of long
character strings emitted by the proprietary service, giving
the service a high rate of information transfer to its
brother spy, if it should ever start to use it.
A throttled account channel can be made available to the
proprietary service in the form of an operating system
primitive which accepts an integer account item code, which
is an integer between 1 and N, where N is agreed to by lessor
and lessee. Thus the expressive power of the account channel
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is limited, but certainly not eliminated; information can be
encoded in the sequence of item codes emitted. The item
codes are used by the operating system in preparing bills,
with fixed charges being associated with each item code.
Charges are fixed for each item code in order to reduce the
expressive power of the proprietary service generating the
bill. As before, one copy of each bill is sent to both
lessor and lessee.
It is clear that to eliminate completely the passage of
spied data through the accounting channel, it is necessary to
eliminate the accounting channel. In its place, two accoun-
ting methods are viable options. The first, and the simplest,
is to have no accounting information at all collected by the
computer utility. Instead, the lessor could charge the lessee
a flat monthly fee. If this option is chosen, the lessee can
be sure that the lessor is not getting any information through
the billing mechanism. However, this mechanism will not
notify the lessor if the lessee should begin to rent out the
service to other users. If the service is designed to com-
pute a result based on its inputs without remembering or
using any information from previous calls, then the lessee
could rent out the service to other users without sharing
any of his own information. So the lessor of such a memoryless
computational service could not accept a flat monthly fee.
The second alternative to having an accounting channel
is to let the lessor charge a fee based on the number of
processes per month which enter (by calling) the domain that
encapsulates the proprietary service. This information can
be collected by installing a counter and a control bit in the
blocks of the ADT defined in figure A2-5, and adding to the
logic of the state transition rule instructions to increment
the counter, when the control bit is on, for every process
that calls into the domain. Once a month the operating sys-
tem would reset this counter, and report to the lessor and
lessee the value it had reached when it was reset. Having
this information, the lessor would be reassured that the
lessee was not selling the service behind his back. But the
lessee might be concerned that the lessor has this detailed
information concerning this aspect of the lessee's activities,
i.e. the number of times the service was called. While this
concern may seem far-fetched, it is possible that the lessor
can draw some intelligent inferences from the number of pro-
cesses that called into the domain of the service. To make
this drawing of inferences more difficult, the reported
number of entrances could be made approximate -- e.g. the
system could report a number of dozens, or scores, or hundreds.
So if the system reported "3 dozen" the actual number could
be anything between 36 and 47.
The lessor and lessee of a proprietary service must agree
to use one of the billing mechanisms described here before
the service is put into operation. The lessor of a service
records in the service declaration of his service the type or
types of bills which his service is prepared to generate, and
the lessee of a service records in the proprietary call-out
component of the acp of the user domain of the service the
type or types of bills which he is willing to let the service
generate. PSA will give the domain encapsulating the proprietary
service, domain entry capabilities for PSA primitives which
implement the most expressive billing method which the lessor
and lessee have agreed to. Also, if the service declaration
specifies more than one acceptable billing method, PSA will
give the domain encapsulating the service a domain entry
capability for a PSA primitive which will return to the ser-
vice the type of billing information it should generate.
In order of their expressiveness, the billing methods
available through PSA are
(1) the open accounting channel
(2) the throttled accounting channel
(3) fees based on the number of calls per month
(4) fees based on the approximate number of calls
per month
(5) flat monthly fees.
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Only the first two of these require the domain encapsulating
the proprietary service to have domain entry capabilities
for sending accounting information to PSA.
If the lessor and lessee specify billing through a
throttled accounting channel, the number of account item
codes which will be used must be specified in the service
declaration and in the acp of the user domain, and these
numbers must agree; and the dollar amount associated with
each item code must be specified by the service declaration.
If the lessor and lessee specify billing through a fee
based on the approximate number of calls per month, the
divisor which accomplishes the approximating effect must be
specified in the service declaration and in the acp of the
user domain, and these numbers must agree.
When a service is implemented through calls to other
services, all the domains encapsulating the services will be
generating bills which must be paid by the owner of the user
domain of the overall service. This multiplicity of sources
of billing information does not present any great problem:
the lessee of the overall service and the lessors of all the
component services must agree on billing methods by means of
the strategies presented above. The service declaration of
each component service is compared with the proprietary call-
out component of the acp of the user domain of the overall
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service, and a billing method is selected for each component
service.
But when a component service is forced to occupy a
constrained environment by a demand in the service declaration
of some other service working for the user domain of the
overall service, the service declaration that demanded the
constrained environment may also limit the types of billing
methods available to the constrained service. For example,
figure 5-2 shows four domains linked together by domain entry
capabilities. (Program segments are not shown.) Domains
C and D occupy a constrained environment because the service
declaration of service 1 demanded it. The lessor of service
1 is afraid that argument information passed from domain B
(which encapsulates service 1) to domain C will be passed
on to a spy. But the constrained environment will not
prevent billing information from flowing out of domain C to
the owner of domain A, who might be the spy. Therefore the
lessor of service 1 becomes a third party to the billing
information agreement between the lessor of service 2 and the
owner of the user domain, and similarly for the agreement
between the lessor of service 3 and the owner of the user
domain. In the service declaration of service 1, the lessor
of service 1 records the type or types of bills which he is
willing to let the domains in the constrained environment
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generate, and PSA will enforce these restrictions. In
addition, the lessor of service 1 may demand that he receive
copies of the bills generated by domains C and D, so that he
can inspect them and detect suspicious flows of information.
Finally, we must consider accounting and billing tech-
niques for processor time expended and storage space utilized
by proprietary services. Since a hardware mechanism is used
to move processes between domains on inter-domain call and
return, it is not easy to know precisely when a process
enters and leaves each domain it is bound to. Therefore
bills for processor time expended should go the user the
process is working for. On the other hand, it is possible
to measure the storage utilization of a proprietary service
(e.g. in page-days of secondary storage). The owner of the
user domain of the service should pay these costs.
5.5. Mutually Agreed Maintenance
The mutually agreed maintenance problem has two parts.
First, the user of a proprietary service wants to be sure
that the service is not going to change when he doesn't want
it to change. Simple operating system mechanisms accomplish
this form of protection in a straightforward way; they will
be described presently. The second part is that the user of
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a proprietary service wants the service to be fixed quickly
whenever a lurking bug appears, but this desire conflicts
with the user's desire to keep his information protected;
and in addition the process of finding and fixing a bug
threatens the privacy of information belonging to others.
This second part of the problem cannot be resolved by
operating system mechanisms.
To implement the idea of a service not changing, the
operating system requires a feature for keeping a segment
from changing. We will call an unchangeable segment frozen.
A frozen segment may not be written once it has been made
frozen; and it can never by unfrozen, once frozen. The
access control packet of a segment must contain a bit which
indicates that the segment is frozen, and if the bit is on
the packet may not contain terms giving "w" access to any
domain. To freeze a service, all that is required is to
freeze all the program segments of the service and all the
data segments of the service which are provided by the
lessor of the service. Data provided by the user of the
service may be stored in writable segments in the domain
that encapsulates the service and allowed to affect the
operation of the service, but this will not violate the
frozenness of the service. In other words, a service is
frozen when the lessor cannot affect what the service does.
1•5
The owner of the user domain of a service can demand that
the service be frozen with a variable in the proprietary call-
out component of the acp of the user domain. The lessor of
the service can assert that his service is frozen in his
service declaration, and if the assertion is made the lessor
must provide a list of all the segments which implement the
service. When PSA constructs a domain to encapsulate the
service, it will honor the demand of the user domain owner
by initializing the seg-limit component of the acp of the
domain encapsulating the service with the list of segments
provided in the service declaration, and by checking to see
that each of these segments is frozen, and by requiring that
the seg-limit component may be expanded only by the addition
of closeted segments. These constraints on the seg-limit
component of the domain encapsulating the service insure
that the lessor can do nothing to affectthe service after
he has frozen all the segments which he listed in the ser-
vice declaration. Furthermore, the lessor is required to
freeze the service declaration, and PSA will check to see
that it is frozen when it constructs domains encapsulating
the service.
When a service is implemented through calls to other
services, and the owner of the user domain of the overall
service demands that the service be frozen, then all the
component services of the overall service must be frozen.
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PSA will propagate this requirement from the proprietary
call-out component of the acp of the user domain, onto all
the component services of the overall service.
When a bug is discovered or suspected in a proprietary
service, a knowledgeable programmer must test or debug the
service. Since bugs are sometimes data-dependent, it is
necessary for the debugging programmer to have access to
data which exercises the bug, i.e., causes the bug to
appear. Since having access to such data might tend to
violate somebody's privacy, appropriate permissions must
be secured before debugging can take place. For example,
figure 5-3 shows a proprietary service composed of two
component services and two onstrained environments. The
outer constrained environment was requested by the owner
of the user domain, while the inner constrained environment
was requested by the lessor of service 1, the service en-
capsulated in domain B. If the owner of the user domain
suspects that there is a bug in the service, he will pro-
duce documented evidence of the bug and take it to the
lessor of service 1 and complain; and give the lessor of
service 1 permission to investigate the workings of domain
B. This permission must be given by communicating it to
PSA, since PSA has control of domain B. Now suppose that
the debugging programmer employed by the lessor of service
1 decides that the problem is in domain C. He will have
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to produce documented evidence for the lessor of service 2,
and both the owner of the user domain and the lessor of ser-
vice 1 will have to give the lessor of service 2 permission
to investigate domain C. Again, these permissions must be
communicated to PSA, since PSA has control of domain C. PSA
requires two permissions before allowing a debugging programmer
to investigate domain C because domain C is an occupant of
two constrained environments.
This example illustrates a general rule: if a domain
occupies n constrained environments, then permissions from
the n social entities whose oxes are being protected by the
constrained environments, must be communicated to PSA in
order to allow the operation of the domain to be investigated.
Once a bug has been found, the domain whose investigation
led to an understanding of the bug can be fixed immediately.
The fix is incorporated in a corrected program segment, and
a new service declaration must be prepared which names the
corrected segment in place of the one with the bug. Both
the new program and the new service declaration must be
frozen, if this is required by users of the service. Then
PSA is requested to update the domain that was investigated,
by replacing the program with the bug with the new program
segment specified by the new service declaration.
Other domains encapsulating the same service can be
updated to incorporate the change, when this is requested
by the owner of the user domain of the service. When this
updating requires a modification of the format of data
segments, the lessor of the service will prepare a program
to accomplish re-formating of the data segments. PSA will
run this program, in the domain encapsulating the service,
when the lessee of the service requests that his incarnation
of the service be updated.
The lessor of a service makes an updated version of his
service available to users by creating a new service
declaration. Since different versions of the service are
implemented with (slightly) different programs, the service
declaration must name the program segments which implement
the service. This part of the service declaration was
introduced in the context of the requirement that program
segments be frozen, but in fact all service declarations
must name all the program segments that implement the ser-
vice, so that PSA will know which segments to create capabil-
ities for in domains created by PSA which encapsulate the
service. If a new version of a service differs from the
old version because of re-formated data bases, the service
declaration of the new version must name the program which
will accomplish re-formating.
5.6. An Example of the Operation of PSA
In this section, we present an example to show the data
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structure created by PSA when PSA constructs constrained
environments. Figure 5-4 shows a constrained environment
constructed around the domain B, which encapsulates a ser-
vice constructed from component services encapsulated in
domains C1, D, and C2; all working for the user domain, A.
(The domains C1 and C2 each encapsulate the same service,
but they operate on different data.) Figures 5-5, 5-6, and
5-7 show the service declarations for the servies encap-
sulated in domain B, domains C1 and C2, and domain D, respec-
tively. In any real computer utility, the service declara-
tions would be expressed in some computer language; but we
are expressing them in English because our goal is to
communicate to the reader. (The details of a computer
language to express service declarations would obscure
the point of this example.) Figure 5-8 shows that part
of the-naming hierarchy which is used to catalogue the
service declarations and other segments which define the
three services in our example. Our figure 5-5 represents
the contents of segment (user, factoryl, productl, sd.vl);
figure 5-6 represents the contents of (users, factoryl,
product2, sd.v4); and figure 5-? represents the
contents of the segment (users, factory2, productl, sd.v3).
Figure 5-9 shows the lessee's sector of the naming hierarchy,
including the user domain A of the service in our example.
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"The lessor of this service is Benign Enterprises, Inc.
The lessor's mailbox is at (users, factoryl, mailbox).
The short name of this service is "servicel".
The segments which implement this service, with required
access modes, are: (users, factoryl, productl, prog.vl),
mode "e"; (users, factoryl, productl, data.vl), mode "r".
This service is frozen.
The lessor will accept billing on an open accounting channel,
a throttled accounting channel (with 5 symbols having the
following meanings: $2.00, $10.00, $1.00, $3.00, $7.00), or a
fee based on the number of calls per month, or the approximate
number of calls per month (measured in 20's).
The component service referenced by the name "service2" is
declared by segment (users, factoryl, product2, sd.v4).
The component service referenced by the name "sneaky-pete" is
declared by the segment (users, factory2, productl, sd.v3).
This component service must occupy a constrained environment.
Bills generated in this constrained environment must be based
on a throttled accounting channel (with 4 symbols), a fee
based on the number of calls per month, or the approximate
number of calls per month (measured in 20's); and the lessor
of this service must receive copies of bills generated in this
component's constrained environment."
Figure 5-5. Service declaration of service encapsulated in
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"The lessor of this service is Benign Enterprises, Inc.
The lessor's mailbox is at (users, factoryl, mailbox).
The short name of this service is "service2".
The segment which implements this service, with required
access mode, is: (users, factoryl, product2, prog.v4), mode
This service is frozen.
The lessor will accept billing based on an open accounting
channel, a throttled accounting channel (with 3 symbols hav-
ing the following meanings: $1.00, $2.00, $4.00), or a fee
based on the number of calls per month, or the approximate
number of calls per month (measured in 20's)."
Figure 5-6. Service declaration of service encapsulated in
domains C1 and C2.
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"The lessor of this service is Sharptooth Enterprises, Inc.
The lessor's mailbox is at (users, factory2, mailbox).
The short name of this service is "confidence".
The segment which implements this service, with required
access mode, is: (users, factory2, productl, prog.v3), mode
l l
"e.
This service is frozen.
The lessor will accept billing based on an open accounting
channel, a throttled accounting channel (with 4 symbols having
the following meanings: $7.00, $8.00, $6.00, $2.00), or a fee
based on the number of calls per month, or the approximate
number of calls per month (measured in 20's).
The component service referenced by the name "sawhorse" is
declared by the segment (users, factoryl, product2, sd.v4)."
Figure 5-7. Service declaration of service encapsulated
in domain D.
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proprietary call-out component
This domain refers to the service declared by
Cusersfactorylproductlsd.vl) with the name
"football". This service must be frozen, and
it must occupy a constrained environment. The
lessee of the service is Warrior General, Inc.
The lessee's mailbox is at (users,lessee,
mailbox). The lessee will accept billing based
on the approximate number of calls per month
Cmeasured in 20's).
Figure 5-9. The lessee's sector of the naming hierarchy, and
the acp of the user domain A.
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From the acp of the user domain, we can see that the billing
method which will actually be used by the service in our
example will be a fee based on the approximate number of calls
per month, because this is the only method to which the lessee
will agree. The mailboxes which are shown in figures 5-8 and
5-9 serve to receive bills generated by PSA. The mailboxes
are named in the service declarations and in the acp of the
user domain so that PSA will know where they are.
Figure 5-10 shows the structure in the naming hierarchy
which PSA creates to organize the benign domains and closeted
segments of the constrained environment shown in figure 5-4.
This structure provides a unique directory for each of the
domains B, C1, D, and C2; and these directories provide a
place to catalogue the data segments, especially closeted
segments, used by the domains B, C1 , D, and C2. A unique
directory is provided for each domain of the protected
environment in order to avoid name clashes between segment
names. For example, if both the domains C1 and C2 create a
closeted segment named "own-data", no name clash results
because one of these segments will be entered in the
directory (PSA-data, 473, service2) and the other in (PSA-data,
473, servicel, sneaky-pete, sawhorse). In both directories,
the name of the segment entry will be "own-data".
All the directories in the naming hierarchy below the
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directory (PSA-data) are under the control of PSA. This is
because all these directories were created by PSA originally,
and PSA keeps control over everything it creates. Since
control over closeted segments and benign domains depends on
having control over the directories which these segments
and domains are entered in, control over these directories
is crucial. Most crucial of all is the question of control
over the directory (PSA-data). Assuming that PSA is imple-
mented with a program encapsulated in the domain (system, PSA),
figure 5-11 shows how that domain is given exclusive access
to (PSA-data).
The name space of entry names in the directory (PSA-data)
is the name space for whose slots concurrent users of PSA
will race. These races are resolved on the basis of a lock
implemented in the segment (PSA-data, global-control). It
is in this segment that PSA remembers the use of each entry
in the directory (PSA-data). For example, PSA must remember
that the entry named "473" was created to structure a ser-
vice working for the domain (users, lessee, caller), and
that the user domain refers to the service with the name
"football".
The directory (PSA-data, 473) is used to organize those
domains in the outer constrained environment E1 which are
not part of any contained constrained environment. The seg-
ment (PSA-data, 473, control) is PSA's scratchpad
sitern
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for information about E1, such as the tree names of the
service declarations of services encapsulated in B and C1.
The short names of services, declared in service declarations,
are used as entry names in (PSA-data, 473).
The directory (PSA-data, 473, servicel, sneaky-pete) is
used to organize the domains in the inner constrained
environment E2. As with the outer constrained environment,
this directory has a segment entry named "control", and
PSA uses this segment for information about E2. The other
entry names used in (PSA-data, 473, servicel, sneaky-pete)
are the short names of services, as declared in service
declarations.
Before it builds the structure shown in figure 5-10,
PSA will insure that all the demands and provisos specified
in the acp of the user domain, A, and in the service
declarations of the three services involved, can be met.
After the structure shown in figure 5-10 is constructed,
PSA will fill in the call-in and call-out components of the
acps of the domains B, C1, D, and C2 so that the domain entry
capabilities shown in figure 5-4 can be created. We will
not specify when the domain entry capabilities will be
created since this question is bound up with the problem of
specifying the operating system's control structure, which
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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5.7. The Hidden Data Game
Suppose that the user of a proprietary service were
afraid that the service was hiding data in its results. The
user could employ a counter-spy program to sift through the
results, looking for hidden data. Of course, the user will
require some assurance that the counter-spy program is not
the brother spy; so the counter-spy program will have to be
audited.
The counter-spy program would go through the results,
zeroing all unused bits. This is effective in dealing with
storage formats that do not use all their allocated bits,
like varying strings. Floating point results present a
special problem, since data can be hidden in their low-
order bits. One way to control the problem is to have
programmers specify more accurately the necessary precision
of floating-point data. When this is done, the counter-spy
program, from the declarations of the results, will check
that the low-order bits not needed for the specified pre-
cision are zero. This will force the proprietary service
hiding data in floating-point results to alter those results
more severely than otherwise, thus increasing the risk of
using this method. An alternative approach to floating
point results is to have the counter-spy program perturb
the low-order bits -- enough to scramble the hidden data,
but not so much as to reduce the precision of results
1i3
required by the user.
If the results include an area allocated in blocks (e.g.
by PL/I allocate and free statements), the counter-spy pro-
gram must check to see that there are no hidden blocks. The
blocks which are expected to occupy the area will be connected
together b-jpointers in a known way. The counter-spy program
can copy all the expected blocks into another area, and then
examine the blocks remaining in the first area. Unexpected
blocks probably contain hidden data. Also, data can be hid-
den in an area's pool of unused space. Furthermore, each
block which was expected should be sifted through by the
methods of the paragraph above.
These ad hoc methods are suggested to deal with the
threat of hidden data because there does not appear to be
a uniform method of countering the threat that works in all
cases. In fact, it is not possible to enumerate the places
in a proprietary service's results where hidden data might
appear without knowing the meanings of all the result data
returned. These meanings are implicit in the declarations
provided to the counter-spy program described above.
Because the operating system cannot deal with meanings very
well, each user of a proprietary service must protect
himself -- for example, with the counter-spy program driven
by appropriate declarations. The point is that the operating
fslt
system cannot provide the declarations.
It is possible to enumerate the domains into which
hidden data might flow, which are the domains where the
brother spy might reside. But this probably isn't useful
because the enumeration might be quite long, and because
an investigation of any of the domains on the list would
require an invasion of privacy, which would require in
turn a court order. Showing probable cause to get such
a court order would be difficult. The privacy restriction
mechanism of chapter 6 makes hidden data much easier to
deal with.
5.8. Sneaky Signalling
There is a way by which a proprietary service can
broadcast information, namely by manipulating the working
set size of processes which are using the service. There
is no way to stop a proprietary service from doing this
except through auditing. Because the possibility of this
sort of behavior exists, the operating system primitives
which give out information about the working set sizes of
processes must not be widely available. In other words,
information about the working set size of a process using a
proprietary service might be very sensitive information.
A proprietary service can encode information in its
time of running (that is, the amount of processor time
required for an invocation of the service by some user process).
Therefore this quantity is a piece of sensitive information.
A proprietary service can encode information in its
time of delivering an answer if it has access to information
about the passage of real time.
A proprietary service can broadcast information through
a lock that the service is allowed to set and reset, provided
that the service does not occupy a constrained environment.
This is because setting a lock involves writing into the
lock datum, and the only writable data accessible to services
in a constrained environment are the contents of closeted
segments. (Data in a process state is also writable, but
such data is not used for locks for inter-process communication
because data in a process state can be accessed only by one
process.) Since a closeted segment S is accessible only in
one domain D, setting a lock in S cannot broadcast information
to processes outside (i.e., bound to some domain other
than) the domain D.
5.9. The Threat of Sabotage
The purpose of this section is to define the blind
service, and discuss its properties. A blind service is a
service placed in an environment which protects the user
of the service from the possibility that the service will
stop working, or begin a sabotage campaign, at a time
chosen by some enemy of the user. This environment, called
a blind environment, operates by denying to domains in the
environment all unfrozen sources of information. This pre-
vents the enemy from sending signals to his saboteur service.
Also, domains in the blind environment can't find out whom
they're working for, or what time it is. This prevents
narrowly directed sabotage campaigns, unless the saboteur ser-
vice can determine from its input the identity of the user of
its services; and the timing of a sabotage campaign is made
difficult since the saboteur service must deduce the passage
of real time from the limited set of events to which it is
privy. We do not offer any proof that. a blind environment
accomplishes any prevention of sabotage campaigns because
such a conclusion depends on the quantity and quality of
useful information which a saboteur can deduce from its
inputs.
To be precise, a blind environment is a set B of
domains such that:
(1) B is a constrained environment,
(2) all domains DB encapsulate frozen services,
(3) all domains DB can't access any unfrozen objects
except closeted segments,
(4) all domains DB can't find out whom D is working
for, and
(5) all domains DB can't find out what time it is.
A blind service is a service implemented in blind environment.
The owner of the user domain of a proprietary service
may demand that the service occupy a blind environment with
a variable in the proprietary call-out component of the acp
of the user domain of the service. Similarly, the owner of
a service S that uses a component service T may demand that
T occupy a blind environment with a variable in the service
declaration of S. Furthermore, owners of services will
specify in service declarations whether their services will
operate in blind environments, and PSA will not make a
service available to a user who demands that the service
occupy a blind environment unless the service declaration
specifies that the service will operate in a blind environment.
Those parts of the operating system which are responsible
for limiting the flow of information into blind environments
must be audited.
5.10. Summary
There are many ways for the lessor of a proprietary
service to harm a lessee of his service, and there are a
few ways for a lessee to harm the lessor. Some of these
harms can be prevented by the technological means presented
in this chapter, all of which depend on a correctly
implemented operating system which includes a Proprietary
Services Administration (PSA). PSA constructs constrained
environments using benign domains and closeted segments
in order to make it very difficult for a proprietary service to
do argument spying. PSA implements account channels which
proprietary services must use to send invoices for services
rendered. PSA allows users of services to demand that the
services be frozen, to guarantee mutually agreed maintenance
of services. Finally, PSA implements blind environments which
make it difficult for a service to carry out a sabotage cam-
paign which is narrowly directed (i.e., against a particular
set of users) or well timed.
PSA is not useful in solving a number of problems
presented in this chapter, particularly the hidden data
flow problem, the compiler-caller two-pronged attack problem,
and the sneaky signalling problem. It is likely that legal
protections will evolve to fill the gaps in the available
technological protections.
Chapter Six
Privacy Restrictions
6.1. Invasion of Privacy
The mechanisms of the previous two chapters were moti-
vated largely by the privacy needs of would-be users of pro-
prietary services. The fact that we must regard the hidden
data flow problem as a game, to be won by the more clever
team, is indicative of the limitations of the mechanisms
already described. In fact, if a user, e.g. a systems pro-
grammer, has the power to make copies of information and
authorize others to access the copies; then he can invade the
privacy of the original information owners (or others named
by the copied information). This method of invasion of pri-
vacy is illustrated in figure 6-1. A systems programmer and
a spy are shown communicating with their own domains through
consoles. We are assuming that the programs in use in these
domains (D1 and D2) include command interpreters which give
the users at their consoles control over the processes bound
to the domains. The systems programmer has a domain entry
capability into D3, a domain holding a data base; and we are
assuming that the systems programmer can obtain records from
the data base by calling D3. The systems programmer steals
information for the spy by directing his process to call into
D3 to obtain the information, and then to copy the informa-
tion provided by D3 into the shared segment A. The spy can
direct his process to cause the output of information from
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segment A to his console, thereby obtaining the information
stolen for him by the systems programmer.
Furthermore, it would be easy for the systems programmer
to write a program to automate this entire operation by using
segment A as a mailbox for the spy's requests. The spy could
put messages in A which identified the records he wanted, and
the system programmer's process would read these messages,
make calls to D3 and place the answers in additional messages
in A.
The purpose of this chapter is to deter such invasions
of privacy, and to raise the work factor for the humans per-
petrating the invasion. Prevention of such an invasion of
privacy requires that the flow of information to the spy be
cut off, and two times at which this flow might be cut off
are immediately evident. First, the information might be pre-
vented from entering the spy's domain (*). Alternatively,
the information might be prevented from appearing at the spy's
terminal. This second, more permissive alternative is de-
scribed in section 6.2. We call this scheme permissive be-
cause the spy's process is allowed to read the information
whose output is to be prevented; but this permissive scheme
is shown to have a flaw: the spy process can output the
secret information using the very mechanism which is supposed
to protect the information! This problem appears to be in-
trinsic to this type of protection mechanism. While it is
(*) Recall that information is in a domain if it can be read
as data by a process bound to the domain.
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not possible to prevent the unauthorized output of informa-
tion, it is possible to detect it and trigger corrective
action.
The privacy restriction mechanism is similar to, but
more highly evolved than, the system of security compartments
implemented in ADEPT-50 [Wei69].
6.2. Privacy Restrictions
Our method of preventing the invasion of privacy involves
associating a set-of priva-cy restrictions with every segment
and every process in the computer. The crucial idea is that
the restrictions are associated with the information contained
in the segments and processes, and whenever information moves
between segments and processes, the restrictions follow along.
Whenever information is about to leave the computer (e.g. to
appear at a user's console) the restrictions associated with
the information have the power to prevent output.
Figure 6-2 shows our notation for sets of privacy re-
strictions. Rp is the restriction set of the process in
figure 6-2, and RA and RB are the restriction sets of the
segments. For the moment, the restrictions should be thought
of as primitive, indivisible objects. We will describe the
ownership and interpretation of restrictions presently.
The restrictions are propagated from one restriction set
to another as processes execute load and store instructions
which reference segments. Suppose the process of figure 6-2
reads from segment A with a load instruction. Then before the
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process executes another instruction, the process' restric-
tion set is updated as follows: Rp = %RU RA
.
Thus restric-
tions on the information in A are propagated to the process
when the process reads A. Similarly, suppose the process of
figure 6-2 writes information into segment B with a store
instruction. Then before the process executes another in-
struction, the segment's restriction set is updated as
follows: RB = RBu %. Thus restrictions on information in
the process state are propagated to the segment when the pro-
cess writes B.
The reader should remember that segments are not the
only information-holding entities in a computer system.
Names on entries in directories contain information, and
these names can be read and written by user computations.
Therefore, they must have restriction sets also, and these
restriction sets must be updated and used as just described
for segments.
In order to show how restrictions prevent the output of
information, we must introduce a formal mechanism for identi-
fying users of the computer system to whom output is directed.
Our strategy is to adopt the convention that users are re-
quired to associate themselves with formal objects called
principals when they use the computer. The purpose of the
principal is to identify a person or a set of persons playing
a specific role in an institution. Although in general a set
of persons will be able to associate themselves with a given
principal, only one person at a time will be allowed to so
"s7
associate himself.
Now we introduce a function which serves to define the
effect of restrictions in preventing output. Let be the
set of all restrictions, and let p be the set of all prin-
cipals. Then let f:J- 2 That is, for every restriction
r, f(r) is a set of principals, and these principals are the
ones to whom output of information is to be restricted when
the restriction r is associated with the information.
Although we write the function f as a single function
defined for every restriction, this is mainly a notational
convenience for the following discussion of the operating
system primitive send. In fact, for each restriction r the
set of principals f(r) is defined by the owner of restriction
r. In other words, different pieces of the function f are
defined by the different authorities who control the release
of information stored in the computer.
The effect of restrictions is most easily explained if
we assume that information can leave the computer only if it
is displayed at a terminal where a user is logged in and
associated with a principal. Furthermore, we assume that
there is exactly one operating system primitive, called send,
which can initiate the output of information to a terminal.
Suppose a process P calls the send primitive to output infor-
mation from segment A to a terminal where the user is assoc-
iated with principal Q. The send primitive will allow the
output only if
I vR F Rp
In words, Q must be in the intersection of the f(r)'s as r
varies over RAv Rp. ("r" is a dummy variable in the formula.)
In other words, Q must be in the set f(r) for every restric-
tion r in both of the restriction sets RA and Rp.
It is fairly easy to see why we want Q e n (r) for out-
r'RA
put to be allowed, and somewhat difficult to see why we must
also insist that , n (r) . Restrictions arrived in RA as
r Rp
A was written. When the information is to be output from A,
there is no way to tell which of the restrictions in RA were
originally associated with the information being output, so
all of the restrictions are applied. That is, we require
Q f(r) for all r in RA for output to be allowed to Q's term-
inal.
To see why we also insist that Q e F4(r), consider the
re Rp
program in figure 6-3. It will output the bit string seer no
matter what restrictions are associated with it unless we
insist that QE nf(r). It works by outputting constants
which have no restrictions whatever associated with them, and
the restrictions on the information that governs the choice
between the two constants, the restrictions on secr, get no
further than Rp.
When a process calls send and send finds that r i {¥)
the output to Q's terminal will not be allowed and when this
happens, we say the restriction strikes.
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declare secr(100) bit based(p); /* a secret */
declare one segment integer init(l); /* a constant in its
own segment */
declare zero segment integer init(O); /* ditto */
do i = 1 to 100;
if p -> secr(i) then call send(one);
else call send(zero);
end;
Figure 6-3. A program to output any secret bit string.
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Now we illustrate the use of privacy restrictions to fix
the invasion of privacy problem shown in figure 6-1. Figure
6-4 shows figure 6-1 reproduced with restriction sets and
principals added. The systems programmer is associated with
principal Q1 and the spy is associated with principal Q2.
All that is required to solve the problem is to associate a
restriction r with the data base segment accessed by D3, and
define f(r) so that Q2 f(r). Of course Qld f(r), so the
systems programmer (associated with Q1) can see information
that comes from the data base. But when the system program-
mer's process writes information from the data base into the
shared segment, the restriction r is propagated to RA, where-
upon the spy, associated with principal Q2, will not be
permitted to see any information from A displayed at his
console. Furthermore, as soon as the spy's process reads
from segment A, it will be unable to send any information to
the spy's console, because the process will have r in its
restriction set.
6.3. Information Leakage Despite Restrictions
Restrictions striking are signals. That is, when a
restriction strikes this fact is observable to the user whose
output was not permitted. This might not be the case when
the user doesn't know what to expect of the program producing
the output, but many users will know what to expect from
their programs. In particular, the program of figure 6-5 is
so simple that any reader can quickly see what to expect from
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it. The purpose of the program is to output an array of 100
bits, called "secret", as a pattern of striking restrictions.
The first do loop of the program creates 100 segments in the
directory whose name is held by the variable dir, using the
operating system primitive make-seg. The entries in the di-
rectory are given the names "1", "2", ... , "100" by the
make-seg primitive, and the domain where the program is being
executed is given capabilities for the newly created segments.
The segment numbers f the newly created segments are stored
in the array seg(100). As each segment is created, its
zeroeth word is initialized to the index of the segment in
the "array" of segments in the directory named by dir. (The
function "ptr" constructs a pointer of the form (seg#,word#)
from its arguments.) The second do loop stores the secret as
a pattern of restrictions in the restriction sets associated
with the segments just created. We are assuming that the
secret is stored in a segment S whose restriction set RS con-
tains a restriction which will prevent output of the secret
to the user who is running the program. When the test "if
secret(i)" of the second do loop is executed, the restrictions
of RS are propagated to Rp, the restriction set of the pro-
cess. If the ith bit of secret is 1, the program stores a
zero into the first word of the ith segment, thereby propa-
gating the restrictions of R to the restriction set of the
thith- segment. When this encoding is completed, the program
directs its executing process to self-destruct by calling the
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declare secret(100)
declare seg(100) integer;
declare i integer;
do i = 1 to 100;
call make-seg(dir,char(i),seg(i))
ptr(seg(i),0)
end;
do i = 1 to 100;
if secret(i)
end;
call logout;
login;
do i = 1 to 100;
-> word = i;
then ptr(seg(i) ,l) word = 0;
call send(ptr(seg(i),0)
end;
-) word);
Figure 6-5. A program which encodes and outputs information
as a pattern of restrictions.
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operating system primitive logout. The user immediately logs
back in again, and commands his process to execute the third
do loop. The purpose of the logout-login sequence is to get
a process which is not contaminated by restrictions of R in
its restriction set, which is accomplished because the login
command creates a process with an empty restriction set. (*)
The third do loop calls the operating system primitive send
100 times, attempting to output the zeroeth words of each of
the 100 segments created earlier. If the output is success-
ful, the index of the segment in the array of 100 segments is
printed at the terminal. If a restriction strikes and output
is not allowed, the index does not appear at the terminal.
Assuming that the program runs to completion, the user has a
list, printed by his terminal, of the zero bits of the secret;
and a notification from the system that a restriction struck
for every one bit of the secret.
Some deterrence against this use of restrictions to leak
information might be provided by a mechanism which notifies
the owner of a restriction whenever his restriction prevents
output of information to any user. That is, the restriction
mechanism would provide the information owner with a message
to notify him that his information is being sneaked out of
the computer. In the example above, one message would be
(w] If the login command gave the user a process with the
same restriction set which that user's process had when it
last logged out, this method of information leakage would re-
quire a crony's process to execute the third do loop.
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sent for every one bit of the secret bit string. But in fact
this mechanism would compound the problem, by allowing encod-
ing of information as a pattern of restrictions in a single
restriction set. Figure 6-6 shows a program which demon-
strates this method. The first do loop creates 100 restric-
tions, in the directory named by the variable dir, with entry
names "1",... ,"100". The create-r primitive establishes each
new restriction's owner and the restriction definition f(r).
For our example, we will assume that the owner of these re-
strictions is the author of the program of figure 6-6, and we
assume they are defined with f(r) = the empty set. The sec-
ond do loop of the program encodes the secret as a pattern of
restrictions in the restriction set of the process by using
the operating system primitive place-p, which adds the re-
striction specified by its arguments to the restriction set
of the process. Finally, the program directs the process to
call the operating system primitive send, and all the restric-
tions in strike. Some of the striking restrictions are
from RS, having arrived in Rp when the process executed "if
secret(i)". The remainder of the striking restrictions are
the ones which encode the secret. Now suppose that messages
are sent to all the restriction owners. The author of the
program of figure 6-6 would receive a message for every one
bit of the secret. Of course each message would identify the
striking restriction, and so by examining all the messages
the secret can be reconstructed.
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declare secret(100)
declare i integer;
do i = 1 to 100;
call create-r(dir,char(i),
end;
do i = 1 to 100;
if secret(i)
end;
call send("!");
Figure 6-6.
then call place-p(dir,char(i));
A program which encodes information as a pattern
of surveillance-generating restrictions in Rp.
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From these examples it is clear that the privacy re-
striction mechanism does not erect walls through which
information cannot flow, once the information can be read by
a hostile program which can request output to a terminal,
because the restriction mechanism provides a method of signal-
ling for the hostile program. It should be noted that the
privacy restriction mechanism does provide some protection
against accidental, non-malicious unauthorized releases of
information; but it is less effective in preventing the non-
accidental, well-planned theft of information. The mechanism
can, however, be used to raise an alarm against suspected
theft of information.
An alarm which signals possible theft of information
should be raised whenever the number of times a given re-
striction strikes down output to a given principal exceeds a
fixed limit, specified by the restriction owner. The alarm
should be two-pronged: the restriction owner should be noti-
fied that the principal exceeded his limit, and the principal
which exceeded the limit should be denied any further use of
the computer until the situation has been investigated by an
appropriate authority. When a restriction strikes down out-
put to a principal the time the limit is exceeded, the com-
putation which is sending output to the principal should be
stopped and saved for examination by the "appropriate auth-
ority" introduced above. Since the restriction owner and the
principal whose computation exceeded the limit might be
2o6
responsible to different authorities, the choice of the
"appropriate authority" can be non-trivial.
We will denote the limit introduced above as L(r,Q),
where r is a restriction and Q is a principal. The owner of
r defines the value of this function for all principals Q.
The limit defined by L(r,Q) is the number of times the re-
striction r will quietly strike down output to principal Q,
where "quietly" means that the alarm reaction defined above
is not triggered.
The reader should note that even when the limit is set to
zero, a would-be thief can easily use a single striking re-
striction to signal 10 or 12 or so bits of information. The
method is similar to the program of figure 6-5, modified as
shown in figure 6-7. The program creates 210 segments, and
then places the restrictions on the secret, which arrive in
the restriction set of the process when it evaluates the ex-
pression "fixed(secret)", onto just one of the 210 segments
created previously. The segment whose restriction set is
chosen to be contaminated in this way is the secretth segment
in the array of 210 segments. Later, an uncontaminated pro-
cess executes the second do loop of figure 6-7, and the se-
quence of numbers "1","2","3",... begins to appear at the
terminal. When the executing process requests output from
the contaminated segment, the restriction strikes; and the
user, seeing that it struck, knows the 10 bits of the secret
by mentally adding 1 to the last number to appear at his
207
declare secret bit(10)
declare seg(1024) integer, i integer;
do i = 1 to 1024;
call make-seg(dir,char(i),seg(i));
ptr(seg(i),0)
end;
ptr(seg(fixed(secret)),l)
call logout;
login;
do i = 1 to 1024;
-> word = i;
word = 0;
call send(ptr(seg(i),0)
end;
Figure 6-7. A program which
restriction.
-> word);
encodes 10 bits with one striking
2OS
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terminal, and converting that number to binary notation.
All these methods of outputing secret information assume
that the information is readable by a program which is in a
domain that can request output to a terminal where the spy is
willing to let appear the garbage generated by the encoding
schemes discussed above. The next line of defense against
information theft is, therefore, to try to prevent the secret
information from being readable in the spy's domain. In the
next section, a mechanism to accomplish this is described and
evaluated.
-6.4. --Walls-Around Sets of Domains
In this section, we present an extension to the privacy
restriction mechanism which allows restrictions to prevent
information from entering domains. Recall that information
is in a domain if it is readable as data by a process bound
to the domain. Information enters domains through segments,
through processes calling and returning between domains, and
through input from some device attached to the computer.
To allow restrictions to apply to domains, we introduce
a new function dR-- 2 , where is the set of all domains.
That is, for each restriction r, d(r) is a set of domains.
Now suppose a process P is calling or returning to a domain
D. The call or return is permitted to occur provided D is a
member of d(r) for every r Rp. Using set-theoretic notation,
this requirement is written
D n(r).
r Rp
The reason for this rule is as follows: for each restriction
r in RP, P's process state does contain or might contain in-
formation associated with the restriction r. The restriction
owner has defined a set of domains d(r) where the information
associated with r is permitted to be read. So if D d(r),
the process will not be allowed to bind itself to domain D.
The intersection operator (" n") applies this rule for every
restriction in the restriction set of the process, Rp.
Now we want to introduce a similar rule for segments,
but this is difficult because of the sharing of segments by
domains. If a segment is readable in one domain and writable
in another, then information written into the segment by a
process bound to the latter domain immediately enters the for-
mer domain. The situation can be simplified by reducing the
flexibility of allowed segment sharing, so that if a segment
has a writer domain, that writer domain is the only domain
from which the segment can be read. Thus, if a segment can
be read from more than one domain, it cannot be written by
processes bound to any domain. This scheme does not allow a
segment to be readable in one domain and writable in another,
at the same time. Segment sharing is not outlawed, but it
must be mediated by operating system primitives, defined as
follows:
1) initiate-read(seg#,code);
The segment S, specified by its segment number, is made read-
able in the domain D where the primitive was invoked, pro-
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vided the segment is not writable in any domain, and provided
further that
D E Pd(r),
ri RS
where RS is the restriction set of segment S. The output arg-
ument code indicates to the caller the success of his request
for access. If the segment is writable in some domain when
initiate-read is invoked, initiate-read waits until the seg-
ment is no longer writable in any domain. If initiate-read
finds that D d(r) for some r Rs, the restriction r strikes.
2) initiate-write(seg#,code);
The segment S, specified by its segment number, is made read-
able and writable in the domain D where the primitive was in-
voked, provided the segment is not readable or writable in
any domain, and provided further that
D' nd(r)
rRs
where RS is the restriction set of segment S. As above, the
output argument code indicates success.
3) terminate-read(seg#);
The domain where the primitive was invoked ceases to be a
reader of the specified segment.
4) terminate-write(seg#);
The domain where the primitive was invoked ceases to be a
writer of the specified segment.
These primitives insure that when information enters
domains through segments, the restriction sets of the segments
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are examined and the formula D nd(r) is evaluated; and if
r# Rs
D d(r) for any re RS, the information in segment S will not
be permitted to enter domain D.
Finally, information can enter domains through some de-
vice attached to the computer. For simplicity, we will treat
this as a special case of information entering a domain
through a segment. The segment serves as a buffer: the in-
formation flows from the device to the segment, and then the
segment is made readable in the domain which requested the
input. The device owner can specify that input from the de-
vice to any buffer segment B results in propagating a set of
restrictions, Rdevice' into RB. Then, when the buffer is to
be made readable in the requesting domain D, the operating
system requires that
DE nd(r).
r Rc
This completes the specification of the extension of the
privacy restriction mechanism to erect walls around sets of
domains. As before, these walls provide protection against
accidents, but they are not very effective against well-plann-
ed efforts of a spy to steal information, when the spy can
place a program inside the wall. The methods of information
theft developed in section 6.3 are easily applicable to the
problem of getting information through this wall. For ex-
ample, the method of theft shown in figure 6-5 can be applied
by placing the program of figure 6-8 inside a domain which
has access to the secret information. This program creates
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declare secret(100) bit(l) based(p);
declare seg(100) integer;
declare (i, code) integer;
do i = 1 to 100;
call make-seg(dir,char(i) ,seg(i));
call initiate-write(seg(i),code);
ptr(seg(i),0) -> word = i;
end;
do i = 1 to 100;
if secret(i) then ptr(seg(i),l) -> word = 0;
end;
do i = 1 to 100;
call terminate-write(seg(i));
end;
Figure 6-8. A program to encode 100 bits.
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100 segments and encodes the secret information as a pattern
of contaminated restriction sets -- contaminated, as before,
with the restrictions from the segment holding the secret.
After the secret has been encoded, the spy can command his
process, running bound to a domain where the secret informa-
tion is not permitted to enter, to execute the program of fig-
ure 6-9. This program attempts to initiate-read each of the
segments which encode the secret. When a striking restriction
prevents a successful initiate-read, the return argument code
is set to a non-zero value. Thus, the secret information is
obtained by examining the values of the return argument code.
The spying method just illustrated can be defeated if
the system augments the restriction set of the process with
the striking restrictions whenever initiate-read or -write re-
turns a nonrzero code because D d(r), provided the strik-
ing restrictions also do not allow output to the spy's term-
inal, through an appropriately defined f(r). It can also be
defeated if there is a limit on the number of times a re-
striction will quietly strike down input to a domain; such
that when the limit is exceeded, the offending process and
its entire computation are saved for later examination by an
appropriate authority, the restriction owner is notified, and
the user whose process triggered this action is denied fur-
ther access to the system until a time set by the "appropriate
authority" just introduced (again). But this alarm mechanism,
like the alarm mechanism of the previous section, cannot pre-
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declare segment integer, i integer, code integer;
do i = 1 to 100;
call initiate(dir,char(i),segment);
call initiate-read(segment,code);
if code = 0 then call send(0);
else call send(l);
end;
Figure 6-9. A program to print out 100 encoded bits.
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vent a single striking restriction from signalling 10 or 12
or so bits of information. This is illustrated by the pro-
gram of figure 6-10, which encodes 12 bits by creating 212
segments and contaminating the restriction set of one of them
th
-- the secrett- one -- with the restrictions on the secret in-
formation. As before, the segments are created in the direct-
ory named by the variable dir. Once the information has been
encoded, the spy can run the program shown in figure 6-11
which will output to the spy's console the zeroeth word of
each of the 212 segments. We are assuming that the spy's
process is running bound to a domain which the secret informa-
tion is not permitted to enter, so when the program of figure
6-11 tries to initiate-read the contaminated segment, the
alarm described above goes off, and output to the spy's term-
inal is shut off by the system. So then the spy knows the 12
bits, by adding 1 to the last number to appear at his terminal
and converting to binary.
We will denote the limit just introduced as L2(r,D),
where r is a restriction and D is a domain. The owner of r
defines the value of this function for all domains D. The
limit L2(r,D) is the number of times the restriction r will
quietly strike down input to domain D, where "quietly", as be-
fore, means that the alarm reaction is not triggered.
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declare secret bit(12) based(p);
declare seg(4096) integer, i integer;
do i = 1 to 4096;
call make-seg(dir,char(i),seg(i));
call initiate-write(seg(i),code);
ptr(seg(i),0) -> word = i;
call terminate-write(seg(i));
end;
call initiate-write(seg(fixed(secret)),code);
ptr(seg(fixed(secret)),l) -> word = 0;
call terminate-write(seg(fixed(secret)));
Figure 6-10. A program to encode 12 bits with one striking
restriction.
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declare (segment, code, i) integer;
do i = 1 to 4096;
call initiate(dir,char(i),segment);
call initiate-read(segment,code);
call send(ptr(segment,0) -> word);
end;
Figure 6-11. A program to output 12 encoded bits.
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6.5. The Conflict between Disclosure and Privacy
In the previous two sections, we described alarm mech-
anisms triggered by a count exceeding a limit, where the quan-
tity being counted was the number of times a restriction
struck down output to a particular user(principal), or input
to a particular domain. The action which follows the alarm
includes checkpointing the computation which set off the
alarm, calling in an "appropriate authority" to investigate
the saved computation, and notifying the restriction owner
whose limit was exceeded. If two or more striking restric-
tions set off an alarm at the same time, it might be that
the notifications just specified are being used to encode
secret information, and so it might be appropriate to notify
one of the restriction owners before the other. Therefore
the computer system should not notify either(any) of the re-
striction owners at the time of the alarm. The "appropriate
authority" introduced above should notify the restriction
owners, in an order (and with a timing) based on his inves-
tigation of the saved computation. (The reader should note
that the above strategy assumes that there is no ranking of
restrictions available for use in deciding whom to notify
first. Such a ranking might be defined if all the restric-
tion owners were subject to a single authority.)
The important thing about the decision of the "appro-
priate authority" is that he is deciding whether the notifi-
cations he can authorize will result in disclosure of sensi-
tive information. To do this he must understand the meaning
of the presence of the striking restrictions in the restric-
tion set that struck down output to a terminal or input to a
domain. If one of the striking restrictions encodes secret
information, notification results in disclosure; whereas if
the striking restriction represents the presence, in the in-
formation that was to be output to a terminal or input to a
domain, of information that the restriction owner is respon-
sible for protecting, then notification results in an in-
creased awareness on the part of the restriction owner of
where his information is flowing inside the computer. In the
latter case, notification furthers protection of privacy, be-
cause the restriction owner will know that an unauthorized
release of information was attempted, and he can take remed-
ial action.
When a single restriction strikes and sets off no alarm,
the restriction owner should be notified because the striking
restriction represents an attempted unauthorized release of
information. But if two or more restrictions strike and set
off no alarm, the possibility remains that one or more of the
striking restrictions are being used to encode sensitive in-
formation. Once again, the problem is to decide whether the
purpose of each striking restriction is disclosure (through
encoding) or the protection of privacy. But there is no easy
way to decide this. The only obvious clue that would indicate
that restrictions are being used to encode information is a
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large number of striking restrictions. Therefore, our heu-
ristic solution to the problem of what to do when two or more
restrictions strike is to sound the alarm if there are many
striking restrictions, and otherwise, to notify the restric-
tion owners. If the decision is to sound the alarm, the com-
putation which set off the alarm is checkpointed and an "ap-
propriate authority" is called in to investigate the saved
computation and notify the restriction owners in some reason-
able order. If the decision is to notify the restriction
owners, the computation whose output to a terminal or input
to a domain was struck down is allowed to proceed: the off-
ending process signals an error condition and looks for an
enabled condition handler in the domain to which it is bound.
Now we must define how many restrictions striking are
enough to set off the alarm. In order to let the restriction
owners choose the amount of protection they are receiving, we
associate a limit L3(r) with every restriction r. When a set
of restrictions frl,r2,...,rnn,n >/2 strikes without sounding
the alarms defined in the previous two sections, the alarm
will be sounded nevertheless if for some i, L3 (ri) n, where
114iN n. It is clear that this algorithm will sometimes err,
but the fact that none of the previously defined alarms were
set off by the striking restrictions indicates that the in-
formation being protected by the striking restrictions is not
the most sensitive or valuable information stored in the com-
puter.
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6.6. After the Restriction Owner is Notified
After a restriction owner is notified that his restric-
tion has struck down output to a terminal or input to a domain
in the computation of a user associated with a principal Q,
the restriction owner will establish communication with the
user associated with Q, and ask him what question his program
was answering, and what its sources of data were, especially
the data which carried with it the striking restriction. Upon
receiving user Q's response, the owner of the restriction will
have to decide: (1) Is it reasonable for user Q to get an ans-
wer to his question, in light of the reduction of privacy
which such a release would imply for the restriction owner or
other parties whose privacy the restriction owner is respon-
sible for? (2) Does he (the restriction owner) believe what
user Q said his program was doing? The restriction owner must
make a judgement between disclosure and privacy.
If the judgement, once made, is to release the informa-
tion, the restriction owner will command the computer system
to. lift the restriction from the answers generated by Q's pro-
gram, perhaps replacing it with a new, slightly looser re-
striction. Assuming that the restriction struck down output
to a terminal, then if r is the restriction which struck, the
restriction owner could replace r, in the restriction set
associated with Q's answer, with a new restriction r' such
that f(r') = f(r) U Q . With the restriction thus loosened,
Q's process will be able to use the send primitive to get the
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answer to Q's terminal.
Thus we see the computer system must have primitives to
place, lift, and replace restrictions; create and destroy re-
strictions; and define and redefine f(r)'s and d(r)'s. These
primitives are defined in section 6.9.
It is important to note that the judgement which the re-
striction owner must make might be a delicate and difficult
judgement. This is because the judgement depends on the sen-
sitivity of the information which carried the striking restric-
tion in the first place, the nature of the computation which
Q's program performed on this information, and the nature and
sensitivity of Q's program's other inputs. For example, if
Q's program aggregates the information which carried the
striking restriction, as for example by computing the average
of a set of numbers, then the answer is likely to be consider-
ed less sensitive than the input data. But if Q's program
combines input information from two different sources, the
answer might well be more sensitive than either of its inputs.
For example, combining input about a person's income where the
information sources are the Internal Revenue Service and the
Census Bureau is illegal. This illustrates the fact that the
sensitivity of information is not an absolute, but rather is
a variable which depends upon the context in which the in-
formation is used.
If the restriction owner does not trust the user assoc-
iated with Q, he (the restriction owner) will want to audit
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Q's program before making his judgement on the question of
lifting the striking restriction. He will want to see whether
Q's program is aggregating the sensitive information, or com-
bining it with other information. If the judgement is to re-
lease the information (subject to some specified restriction),
and if Q intends to use the program periodically, the restric-
tion owner might be faced with the task of periodically audit-
ing Q's program. This is unreasonable on the face of it, be-
cause auditing is a costly task, performed by people. There-
fore the computer system must contain mechanisms for freezing
Q's program, once it has been audited, so that it cannot be
changed; and mechanisms for associating with the frozen pro-
gram the capability to lift or replace the restriction owner's
restriction. Mechanisms for freezing this type of program
are implemented by the computer system's- Restriction Removal
-Administration (RRA). The strategy of the RRA is to get a
copy of Q's program from Q (the source program), and release
it to the information owner, who will audit it. When the in-
formation owner agrees to release the information, the RRA
compiles the program from its copy of the source program, and
installs the program in a domain which is under the control
of the RRA. The information owner gives this domain the
capabilities for lifting or replacing restrictions, and the
RRA gives Q the right to call the domain. The primitives
which this domain can use to lift and replace restrictions
are given in section 6.9.
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The RRA strategy given extends easily to the case in
which Q's program is combining information that carries re-
strictions belonging to more than one restriction owner. Q's
program must be audited by all the restriction owners, and
all must agree to the release of the program's outputs and
give the domain containing the RRA's frozen copy of the pro-
gram the necessary capabilities for lifting or replacing re-
strictions.
6~7-, Benefits and Co-sts of Privacy Restrictions
The privacy restriction mechanism is a tool which society
can use to (1) hold information more securely, and(2) request
and enforce judgements between disclosure and privacy. The
mechanism is vigilant in its action to keep restrictions asso-
ciated with information by propagating restrictions to restric-
tion sets associated with information destinations (segments
and processes' states) whenever information is copied or com-
bined by the computer. The mechanism erects walls around
domains, striking down any attempt to make information enter
a domain which it is not permitted to be in by the function
d(r), where r is a restriction associated with the information.
Because each domain is under the control of a specific auth-
ority in society, and because the seg-limit component of the
access control packet of a domain allows such authorities to
place strict controls on the collection of programs which can
direct the actions of processes bound to domains, established
authority has effective means of preventing information pro-
tected by privacy restrictions from being read by hostile
programs.
When a restriction strikes, the restriction owner will
be asked to make a judgement between disclosure and privacy.
The privacy restriction mechanism will not operate to make
such judgements better in any moral sense, but it will make
them occur more frequently. Members of society will be more
aware of the balance between disclosure and privacy, provided
they are aware of the increased volume of decisions.
Policy decisions between disclosure and privacy will be
expressed in programs, as described in the previous section,
and as a result the complexity of these decisions can be
allowed to increase, to the limit of the programmer's art.
To the extent that the ability to handle complexity allows
policies which are more fair, the privacy restriction mech-
anism is a force for good.
The privacy restriction mechanism has six major costs.
First, there is the cost of hardware to perform and control
union operations on restriction sets associated with processes
and segments. This hardware is described in the next chapter.
Second is the cost of executing system software which makes
decisions regarding information transfers, which decisions de-
pend on restriction sets and the functions d(r) and f(r).
Third is the cost of using larger numbers of smaller segments,
which will result from the necessary efforts of programmers to
keep their restriction sets straight. Information which a
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programmer expects to carry a uniquely different set of re-
strictions must be stored in its own segment to avoid inad-
vertent association of the restrictions with other informa-
tion. Fourth is the cost of developing software to harness
the privacy restriction mechanism to solve real problems.
Fifth is the cost of developing and auditing programs that
aggregate or combine information in ways that demand a propa-
gation of restrictions more complex than the union operation
performed by hardware. And finally, sixth is the cost of re-
sponding to alarms generated by striking restrictions.
The first three costs are likely to fall dramatically
with the cost of computing hardware. Two of the costs (num-
bers 4 and 5) are one-time software costs whose levels are
tied to the productivity of programmers and auditors. The
sixth cost arises from a requirement for the services of a
highly trained investigator, and the amount of this cost will
depend on the rate at which alarms are set off, and the pro-
ductivity of the investigator.
Good estimates of these costs will not be possible until
the operation of a prototype system, serving a real community
of users, can be studied.
6.8. Process Synchronization
When two processes have access to the same segment, they
can interact in ways that defeat the purpose of the privacy
restriction mechanism, or that make its implementation in-
efficient. For one example, suppose that a process requests
227
that information be sent from a segment to a terminal. The
send primitive evaluates n f(r), and suppose the output is
r Rpu Rses
permitted and started; i.e., the send primitive causes the
computer hardware to begin sending information to the termin-
al. Now suppose that another process writes information into
the given segment, in such a place that the newly written in-
formation will be sent to the terminal. If this were allowed
to happen, the newly written information would escape from
the computer despite the restrictions associated with it.
This is called the sender-writer problem.
Another example of difficulties introduced by multipro-
cessing is the writer-reader problem. This occurs when two
processes are sharing a segment -- one writing and the other
reading. Suppose that the processes are implemented in a
multiprocessing computer system, and that there are two pro-
cessors available, one assigned to each process we are con-
sidering; and suppose that the writer process writes a word
in the segment, and immediately afterwards the reader process
reads that word. When these events occur, the restriction
set of the segment must be updated (as follows: R =
seg
Rseg URp , where Pw is the writer process) when the writer
process writes, and then the restriction set of the reader
process must be updated (r = RprU Rseg' where Pr is the
reader process) when the reader process reads. Thus we see
that restrictions must pass from the restriction set of the
writer process to the restriction set of the reader process.
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One logical way to accomplish this is to maintain a single
central copy of R in the multiprocessing computer system.
seg
All the processors would refer to this central copy. But this
reduces the efficiency and availability of the computer, be-
cause of contention for access to the central mechanism which
holds Reg, and because if the central mechanism breaks down,
the entire computer system becomes unavailable.
Our solution to these process synchronization problems is
to require that writable segments have no readers. This re-
quirement is not the same as the similarly worded requirement
introduced in section 6.4, because in that case the writers
and readers of segments which were discussed were domains,
whereas in this case the writers and readers are processes.
To be precise, we call a process which can read a segment S a
readersproce-Ss of S, and we call a process which can write a
segment S a writer process of S. Our strategy is to allow
segments to have one reader-writer process, or many reader
processes, but never one reader process and a different writer
process at the same time. So when a segment has a reader pro-
cess which isn't a writer process itself, it has no writer
process.
When a segment has no writer process, its restriction set
will not change. A multiprocessing computer system would be
free to make copies of such an unchanging restriction set.
A correctness proof for the send primitive would be free to
assume that the segment would not change.
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When a segment has a writer process, the writer process
is a reader process of the segment but the segment has no
other reader processes. When a writer process calls send,
send can assume the segment won't change provided send doesn't
return until the output is complete. A multiprocessing com-
puter system would not be required to broadcast changes in the
restriction set of a segment with a writer process, because
only one processor of the system at a time would be permitted
to deal with a segment with a writer process.
Segment sharing between would-be reader and writer pro-
cesses must be mediated by operating system primitives. Our
design incorporates this mediation into the primitives which
were introduced in section 6.4 to mediate sharing of segments
by domains. The primitives operate by manipulating a some-
what modified segment capability, in the context of a slightly
modified processor state transition rule. The segment capa-
bility introduced in Appendix 1 was the 4-tuple (type,mode,
length,addr). To implement the idea of a segment having a
single writer process, the segment capability must be expand-
ed by the inclusion of a component whose purpose is to ident-
ify the writer process, if the segment has one. The new seg-
ment capability is therefore the tuple (type,mode,proc_id,
length,addr), where procid is a unique identifier of a pro-
cess and mode is a 2-bit string (the bit w(mode) having been
superceded by the proc_id component). The processor state
transition rule (figure A1-2, part 3) is modified by the re-
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placement of the test of the w(mode) bit by the test,
"is proc_id(9) = pro id(cap)?", and the test which validates
segment reading is modified by the inclusion of tests to ex-
clude reading by non-writer processes when the segment has a
writer, which is indicated by a non-zero value in the proc_ id
component of the segment capability. No process will have a
zero proc id. A fragment of the modified state transition
rule is shown in figure 6-12.
Reading words as instructions from segments will be con-
sidered by the privacy restriction mechanism to be equivalent
to reading data words. Therefore the instruction fetch logic
of the state transition rule (figure A1-2, part 1) must be
modified, as shown in figure 6-13. The purpose of the addi-
tional tests is to exclude execution of a segment by non-
writer processes when the segment has a writer.
Having modified our definitions of process and capability
to support our segment-sharing process-synchronizing strategy,
we can proceed to define the primitives which implement the
strategy. These definitions supercede the definitions of the
same-named primitives in section 6.4.
1) initiate-read(seg#,code);
The segment S, selected by its segment number, is made read-
able in the domain D from which the primitive was invoked, and
the invoking process is remembered as a reader process of S,
provided that the segment S is not writable by any process in
any domain, and further provided that D fnd(r). The primi-
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tive makes the segment S readable in domain D by turning on
the r(mode) bit in the segment capability for S in D's C-list.
If S has a writer (process or domain), the process which in-
voked the primitive is made to wait until S has no writer, at
which time the executing process is made a reader. If informa-
tion in S is not permitted by restrictions to enter domain D,
and if none of the striking restrictions set off the alarm de-
fined by L2(r,D), the striking restrictions are associated with
the output argument code whose purpose is to indicate the out-
come of invoking the primitive.
2) terminate-read(seg#,code);
The process invoking the primitive ceases to be remembered as
a reader of the segment S, selected by its segment number in
the domain D from which the primitive was invoked. If the pro-
cess invoking the primitive is the last remembered reader of S
in domain D, S ceases to be readable in domain D. This is ac-
complished by turning off the r(mode) bit in the segment capa-
bility for S in D's C-list. The output argument code indicates
if invoking the primitive was successful.
3) initiate-execute(seg#,code);
4) terminate-execute(seg#,code);
These primitives are identical to the above two primitives, ex-
cept that the e(mode) bit of the segment capability is manip-
ulated. We consider execute access to a segment to be a spec-
ial case of read access in this context, so the list of remem-
bered reader processes introduced above will include processes
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which invoked initiate-execute as well as those which invoked
initiate-read.
5) initiate-write(seg#,code);
The segment S, specified by its segment number, is made read-
able and writable by the process invoking the primitive, in the
domain D where the primitive was invoked, provided either the
segment has no reader processes and no writer processes or the
invoking process is already the writer process, and provided
that D Wi(r). The primitive makes the segment readable and
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writable by the invoking process in domain D by placing the
proc id of the invoking process into the procid component of
the segment capability for S, and by turning on the r(mode)
bit in the segment capability for S, in D's C-list. If S has
either readers or writers, the process invoking the primitive
is suspended and placed in a queue of would-be writers. At
such future time that there are no readers, no writers, and no
higher-priority would-be readers or writers, the suspended pro-
cess is made a writer of S. If information in S is not allowed
by restrictions to enter domain D, and if none of the striking
restrictions set off the alarm defined by L2(r,D), the striking
restrictions are associated with the output argument code whose
purpose is to indicate the outcome of invoking the primitive.
6) terminate-write(seg#,code);
The process invoking the primitive, and the domain D where the
primitive was invoked, cease to be readers and writers of the
segment S, selected by its segment number in domain D. This
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is accomplished by zeroing the proc id component of the segment
capability for S, and by turning off the r(mode) bit in the
segment capability for S, in D's C-list; provided the invoking
process actually is a writer of S. The output argument code
indicates if invoking the primitive was successful.
The critical reader will have noticed that the above def-
initions of primitives do not make any reference to the access
control packets of segments which are being made accessible by
the primitives. We are assuming that the access control packet
of a segment is consulted at the time a segment is assigned a
segment number in a domain, and if access is not to be permitt-
ed, no segment number is assigned. If access is to be permit-
ted, the mode specified by the acp of the segment is intersect-
ed with the mode specified by the seg-limit component of the
acp of the domain, and this mode (possibly more restrictive
than the two modes it was formed from) is stored in the table
of contents segment for the domain; and it is this intersected
mode which must be consulted by the primitives just defined.
These primitives will not give any domain more access to any
segment than the amount of access specified by the intersected
mode.
When the owner of the segment or domain modifies his auth-
orizations stored in the access control packet, the intersect-
ed mode must be recomputed. If, at the time the intersected
mode is recomputed, the domain which is affected has a greater
amount of access than permitted by the new intersected mode,
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that access should be revoked. The reader should note that we
are giving priority to the revoker of access, placing his in-
terests above those of the user of the access (the domain and
process(es) affected). This is a social design choice because
the choice takes the form, "Whose purposes shall be served
first?" There are no great technological problems involved in
revoking access; for example, Multics implements immediate
access revoking.
6,9. Restrit'tion Administationo Primitives
Restrictions are named and controlled through the use of
the naming hierarchy. For this purpose, we define a new kind
of directory entry: the restriction entry. This type of entry
contains the following information about the restriction:
(1) the definition of the set of principals f(r), i.e. the val-
ue of f(r) for this r; (2) the definition of the set of dom-
ains d(r), again for this r; (3) the definitions of the three
limit functions L1(r,Q), L2(r,D), and L3(r); and (4) the name
of the principal who is to be the recipient of notifications
generated by the striking of this restriction.
The access control packet of a restriction entry consists
of a list of terms, and each term consists of a tree name of a
domain and a four-bit mode. The modes of access to a restric-
tion are called read ("r"), modify ("m"), place ("p"), and
lift "1"). The meaning of each term of the acp of a restric-
tion is that the named domain is allowed to successfully invoke
primitives: to examine the restriction entry if the "r" mode
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bit is on, to modify the restriction entry if the "m" bit is
on, to place the restriction in the restriction set of a seg-
ment or a process if the "p" bit is on, and to lift (remove)
the restriction from the restriction set of a segment or pro-
cess if the "1" bit is on.
The arguments of the primitives are defined with the
following declarations.
directory
entry
f
d
L1
L2
L3
principal
seg name
seg#
char(*) This is the tree name of a directory.
char(*) This is the name of an entry of a
directory.
chart*) This character string specifies a set
of principals, the set f(r).
char(*) This character string specifies a set
of domains, the set d(r).
char(*) This character string specifies the
function L1 (r,Q), for one r.
char(*) This character string specifies the
function L2(r,D), for one r.
integer This is the limit L3(r).
char(*) This is the identity of a principal.
char(*) This is the tree name of a segment.
integer This is the segment number of a seg-
ment capability.
The restriction administration primitives are defined as
follows:
1) create-r(directory,entry,f,d,Ll,L2,L3,principal);
A new restriction is created in the specified directory with
the specified entry name, provided that the domain where the
primitive was invoked is permitted to modify the directory,
and provided the restriction set of the process invoking the
primitive is empty. This last proviso prevents the encoding
of secret information as a pattern of created restrictions.
The remaining arguments of the primitive are input arguments
used to initialize the contents of the new restriction entry.
The acp of the new restriction entry is initialized to contain
a single term giving "rmpl" access to the domain where the
primitive was invoked.
2) delete-r(directory,entry);
The restriction specified by its entry name in the specified
directory is deleted, provided the domain where the primitive
was invoked is permitted to modify the directory and the re-
striction entry, and provided the restriction set of the pro-
cess which invoked the primitive is empty. This last proviso
prevents secret information from being encoded as a pattern of
deleted restrictions. After it is deleted, a restriction can
no longer strike or sound any alarm.
3) read-r(directory,entry,f,d,L1,L2,L3,principal);
The contents of the restriction entry, specified by its entry
name in the specified directory, are copied into the variables
named by the remaining arguments, provided the domain where the
primitive was invoked has "r" access to the restriction.
4) modify-r(directory,entry,f,d,L1,L2,L3,principal);
The contents of the restriction entry, specified by its entry
name in the specified directory, are discarded and replaced by
the contents of the variables named by the remaining arguments,
provided the domain where the primitive was invoked has "m"
access to the restriction, and provided the restriction set of
the process which invoked the primitive is empty. This last
proviso prevents secret information from being encoded as a
pattern of modified restrictions.
5) place-r(directory,entry,segname);
The restriction specified (by its entry name in the specified
directory) is added to the restriction set of the specified
segment, provided the domain where the primitive was invoked
has "p" access to the restriction, and provided the domain
where the primitive was invoked has authority to place restric-
tions on the segment. This latter authority is granted through
the use of a new mode in the access control packet of a seg-
ment. This new mode is called "p", so the rule for the place-r
primitive is that the domain where the primitive was invoked
must have "p" access to both the restriction and the segment.
6) lift-r(directory,entry,seg name);
The specified restriction is removed from the restriction set
of the specified segment, provided the domain where the primi-
tive was invoked has "1" access to the restriction.
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7) replace-r(dirl,entryl,dir2,entry 2 ,seg_name);
The first four arguments must specify two restrictions r1 and
r2. Provided the domain where the primitive was invoked has
"1" access to r and "p" access to r2 and "p" access to the
segment specified by seg_name, and provided r1 is a member of
the restriction set of the specified segment, r1 is removed
from and r2 is added to the restriction set of the segment in
an indivisible operation.
8) place-s(directory,entry,seg#);
The specified restriction is added to the restriction set of
the specified segment, provided the domain where the primitive
was invoked has "p" access to the restriction, and provided
that the specified segment is writable in the invoking domain,
and provided the invoking process is a writer process of the
segment.
9) lift-s (directory,entry,seg#);
The specified restriction is removed from the restriction set
of the specified segment, provided the domain where the primi-
tive was invoked has "1" access to the restriction, and provid-
ed that the specified segment is writable in the invoking dom-
ain, and provided the invoking process is a writer process of
the segment.
10) place-p(directory,entry);
The specified restriction is added to the restriction set of
the invoking process, provided the domain where the primitive
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was invoked has "p" access to the restriction.
11) lift-p(directory,entry);
The specified restriction is removed from the restriction set
of the invoking process, provided the domain where the primi-
tive was invoked has "1" access to the restriction.
6.10. Individual Privacy and the Computer of the Future
The privacy restriction mechanism can be used to give
individuals greater rights of privacy than ever before. Sup-
pose there were a public computer utility which implemented
the privacy restriction mechanism, and suppose that individ-
uals used the utility to prepare and submit income tax returns.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would use the utility to ac-
cept and process tax returns completely within the utility, in
the context of policies and procedures for destroying all hard
copies generated by the utility. Because of these policies
and procedures, individuals could be sure that their income tax
information was available only through the computer utility.
Individuals could then use the privacy restriction mechanism
to retain control over release of income tax information held
by the Internal Revenue Service.
An individual (call him K) who uses the utility to prepare
and submit income tax returns would keep several different
types of information in the utility. First, K would keep the
relevant records from which his tax return would be prepared;
and second, K would generate trial tax returns in an effort to
pay the lowest possible tax. These types of information would
2A24
not be released to anyone but K. The third type of informa-
tion in this example is the tax return that K actually submits
to IRS.
The first and second types of information would be kept
by K in segments under his control and having an access control
packet containing one term giving K's home domain "rwp" access,
with the copy flag on so that K's home domain can pass the
segment as an argument to a domain encapsulating an income tax
preparation service. In addition, the first and second types
of information would be protected by a restriction r1 owned by
K, such that f(rl) = fK), d(rl) = [home-domain(K), tax-service-
domain-working-for-K}, L(rl,Q) = 0, L2(rl,D) = 0, and L3(r 1)
1. Note that when we say, "f(rl) = Kj", we are using the
symbol "K" to stand for the principal with which the individ-
ual K associates himself. This should not cause any ambigui-
ties, since the meaning is clear from the context. The princi-
pal to be notified when r1 strikes is K.
To protect himself from his tax preparation service, K
must require that the service be encapsulated in a benign dom-
ain. This will prevent any hostile program in the service
from using any of the spying techniques described in section
6.4, because all the writable segments created by a benign
domain must be closeted segments, under the control of PSA.
K would place the restriction r1 in the restriction sets of
segments containing input to the tax preparation service, and
so r1 would be propagated to restriction sets of the service's
closeted segments, and to restriction sets of the service's
output argument segments. Thus the restriction r1 would pre-
vent K's tax records and his trial tax returns from being ac-
cessible in any domains other than K's home domain, and the
benign domain encapsulating his tax preparation service; and
the information restricted by r1 will be permitted to appear
only at K's terminal; and any attempt to steal K's informa-
tion in a sneaky way will set off an alarm because of the low
values of L(rl 1 Q), L2(rl,D), and L3(rl).
When K chooses a tax return to submit to IRS, he will re-
place the restriction r1 in the restriction set of the segment
containing the tax return information with a new restriction
r2, such that r2 is also owned by K, f(r2) = KJ UP(IRS), where
P(IRS) is a set of principals associated with the Internal
Revenue Service whose users might need to examine K's tax re-
turn, d(r2) = {home--domain(K} U D(IRS), where D(IRS) is a set
of domains working for the Internal Revenue Service, L(r2,Q)
= 0, L2 (r2,D) = 0, L3(r2) = 1, and the principal to notify if
r2 strikes is K. (The Internal Revenue Service will publish
specifications of the sets P(IRS) and D(IRS) for taxpayers us-
ing this method of submitting tax returns.) In addition, K
will give "1" access to r2 to some IRS data-aggregating dom-
ains. To insure that this requirement does not unreasonably
degrade K's privacy, these data-aggregating domains must be
maintained by the Restriction Removal Administration, and the
frozen programs in the data-aggregating domains must be avail-
able for auditing by any taxpayer or interested association
of citizens.
The restriction r2 will prevent K's tax return from being
made available to anyone but the authorized agents of the
Internal Revenue Service. K will submit his tax return by
commanding his process to call an IRS tax-return-accepting
domain, passing the tax return as an argument segment. That
domain will make a copy of the tax return, and the privacy re-
striction mechanism will propagate the restriction r2 to the
copy.
In this example we have not specified higher values of
L1, L2, and L3 for r2 than we specified for rl, because we are
assuming that K is both very concerned about possible release
of his tax return information and also affluent enough to af-
ford the services of investigators to respond to alarms which
his restriction sets off. We are assuming that the processing
performed by IRS is more complex than the processing required
to prepare a tax return, and therefore more likely to acci-
dentally cause the restriction r2 to strike. If K were not so
affluent, he would probably specify higher values for L(r2,Q),
L2(r2,D), and L3(r2), and obtain a reduced amount of protection
for his tax return.
In addition to the enhancement of personal privacy which
the privacy restriction mechanism makes possible, the mechan-
ism can be used to loosen restraints on the use of statistical
information which arise from the possibility of indirect dis-
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closure.
"Indirect as well as direct disclosures
must be considered, and these can be a major
source of difficulty. Thus, suppose a small
county has six hardware stores, and that a city
within the county has four of them. If retail
sales are published for the county, and also
for the city (we assume each would individual-
ly meet disclosure requirements) an indirect
disclosure occurs. Each of the two stores in
the balance of the county could directly de-
termine his competitor's sales by taking the
difference between the county statistics and
the city statistics. Thus, if disclosure is
to be avoided the data for the city can be made
available, and not the county, or for the
county and not the city. Indirect disclosures
should be avoided, at least in any sensitive
type of information.
"The consequences of indirect disclosures
are that priorities are necessary in determin-
ing which statistics will be made available
and which will not, in order to avoid making
available some relatively unimportant informa-
tion and thereby subsequently denying statistics
that have highly important uses.
... the priority problem means that the first
comer, who may have a limited use or need in
terms of public interest, may forclose the
possibility of later retrieval of other more
important information."
-- Morris H. Hansen [Hans71]
Two methods of applying the privacy restriction mechanism
to the loosening of indirect disclosure restraints can be sug-
gested. The first method is not very practical, because it de-
pends on not publishing any of the statistics, but making the
statistics available through the computer utility instead, to
disjoint sets of users. The lack of practicality is evident
when considering the problem of keeping these sets of users
disjoint. Suppose we call the two statistics A and B. We
associate restrictions rA and rB with A and B, respectively;
and we require that f(rA) f(rB) = 0 and d(rA) d(rB) = 0. So
the restrictions will insure that no principal has access to
both A and B, and no domain has access to both A and B. But
this elegant "solution" will be punctured by any principal in
f(rA ) (or f(rB)) who communicates A (B) to some principal in
fCrB) (f(rA)), perhaps communicating by means external to the
computer utility.
A more realistic solution to the problem can be suggested,
involving publishing one of the statistics, say A, and holding
B in the computer utility. B will not be released to any
principal, but it can be released to data-aggregating programs
that have been audited and certified to produce results from
which B cannot be reconstructed. If the restriction rB is
associated with B, as before, we will have f(rB) = , and d(rB)
defined to be a set of domains maintained by the Restriction
Removal Administration which encapsulate programs which have
been audited by the authority that controls the use of B.
Let SA (for Statistical Authority) denote the authority
responsible for the use of B. A would-be user of B will sub-
mit a program to RRA to be frozen and subsequently audited by
SA. If the program passes the audit, whose purpose is to in-
sure that B cannot be reconstructed from the result produced
by the program; then SA will permit the segment containing B
to be read by the domain D in which RRA installs the audited
program, and SA will include D in the definition of d(rB), and
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SA will give domain D "1" access to rB and "p" access to a new
restriction rD, so that the program in D can lift rB from its
result, replacing it with rD. The user will be allowed to call
D, and the answer produced by D will be protected by rD, which
will remain under the control of SA. The set f(rD) will in-
clude the principals for whom the program in D is working, so
that D's result can get to its would-be users.
In this way the statistic B can be put to some use, albeit
at some expense, despite the fact that statistic A was publish-
ed and the possibility of indirect disclosure requires that B
not be publicly known.
6.11. Proprietary Services Revisited
The user of a proprietary service can use privacy restric-
tions to help him win the hidden data game, and the lessor of
a proprietary service can use privacy restrictions to deny his
competitors the use of his service.
If a user of a proprietary service is concerned about the
threat of hidden data, he can associate a restriction r with
the argument data which will be input to the proprietary ser-
vice. Since the results produced by the service depend on the
input arguments provided to the service by its caller, the re-
striction r will be associated with the results, and also with
any hidden data generated by the service. Now, by appropriate-
ly defining f(r) and d(r), the user of the proprietary service
can limit the flow of hidden data to a set of domains d(r).
Furthermore, the set of principals f(r) who are permitted to
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see the results of the proprietary service will be the only
principals allowed to see any hidden data, if it is there. By
limiting f(r) and d(r) to principals and domains which he
trusts, the user of the proprietary service can reduce his
worries over the threat of hidden data. On the other hand, if
the user of the proprietary service doesn't trust anyone, he
can use f(r) and dr) to reduce the scope of his distrust, and
conserve thereby his suspicious energies.
The lessor of a proprietary service can deny his competi-
tors the use of his service by associating a restriction r with
the program segments which implement his service, and defining
f(r) and d(r) to include his customers (and their customers,
...) and their domains, but to exclude his competitors and
their domains. Whenever a process is using the proprietary
service, the restriction r will be propagated to the restric-
tion set of the process, and from there it will be propagated
to the restriction sets associated with the results produced
by the service. Since his competitors and their domains are
excluded from the sets f(r) and d(r), the lessor of the ser-
vice can be sure that his competitors will not get to use any
results produced by his service.
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Chapter Seven
Priva'cy Restriction Processor
7.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the hardware
components and system strategies of a multiprocessing computer
system which implements the privacy restriction mechanism
which was defined in the previous chapter. The major new com-
ponent of this hardware design is the Privacy Restriction
Processor (PRP). The other hardware components are Processing
Units (PUs) (which have been called "processors" in previous
chapters), memory, and a central communicator. Figure 7-1
shows how these modular components are interconnected to form
a multiprocessing computer system. The arrangement of PUs and
memory boxes is straightforward: each PU can access each mem-
ory. Also, each PU can communicate directly with all other
PUs in the system, through the central communicator. This com-
munication is required to efficiently manage the system's seg-
mented virtual memory. The function of the central communi-
cator could be performed by the memory boxes, but we show it
as a distinct hardware box to underscore its independence.
Each PU has an attached PRP. For the moment, we will re-
strict our attention to a single PU-PRP pair. Recall that the
PU is the active component of a process P. The purpose of the
attached PRP is to hold P's restriction set; to hold the re-
striction sets of segments being read and written by P; and to
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perform (set-theoretic) union operations on the restriction
sets it holds, in response to the actions (reading and writ-
ing of segments) of the attached PU. The PRP has a small high-
speed memory for holding restriction sets, backed up by re-
striction set storage in main memory. Therefore an additional
function of the PRP is to manage its restriction set memory,
reading and writing restriction sets from and into the main
memory. We will assume that the PRP uses its attached PU's
ports to memory for this.
Our description of the PRP will proceed from a consider-
ation of the important events which occur in a multiprocess-
ing computer system. The complete list of important events is
given in section 7.3. Of these, the most important events are
the reading and writing of segments by a PU. Therefore we be-
gin by describing how a PU goes about reading and writing seg-
ments. Our description is an abstraction from the state tran-
sition rule in Appendix 1. (*)
The PU contains programmable registers including general
registers, index registers, base registers, and a program
counter. The base registers and program counter contain seg-
mented addresses of the form (seg#,word#). This form, (seg#,
word#), is also the form of the effective addresses generated
by running processes. Segment numbers are meaningful in the
context of particular domains. Each process state contains
(*) The principal difference between the state transition rule
of Appendix 1 and the abstraction used here is the merging,
for the purposes of this description, of the instruction fetch
logic with the operand fetch logic.
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a binding to a domain's C-list, thus providing a context for
the interpretation of effective addresses. The PU interprets
an effective address (seg#,word#) by using seg# as an index in
the C-list to access the capability for the addressed segment.
From the capability the PU can determine if the intended ac-
cess is permitted in terms of mode (i.e., if reading, writing,
or executing the segment is permitted), and if word# length(
segment). Provided this is true, the PU will complete the
reference to the segment.
In order to speed up memory accesses, each PU contains an
associative memory to hold segment capabilities that were used
recently. This is similar to the associative memories in the
processors of Multics [Sc71]. Each word of the associative
memory has the form (seg#,mode3,length,pagetable_addr). The
PU, in interpreting an address (seg#,word#), first searches
the associative memory for a word whose seg# field is equal to
the seg# of the effective address. If such a word is found,
the PU uses the other information in that word instead of look-
ing up the capability in the C-list. Thus the system saves a
memory cycle. But if there is no match found in searching the
associative memory, the PU fetches the capability from the
C-list, loading the newly fetched capability into the associa-
tive memory. Thus subsequent accesses to the same segment
don't have to look up the capability. Since the associative
memory is finite, the least recently used word in it might be
deleted when a new capability is loaded.
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Recall from section 6.8 that segment capabilities have
the form (type,mode,proc_id,length,page table_addr), where
mode is a 2-bit string which tells whether the segment identi-
fied by the capability is readable, and whether the segment is
executable, by processes bound to the domain defined by the
C-list from which the capability came; and proc id identifies
the writer process of the segment, if it has one. When a seg-
ment capability is loaded into a PU's associative memory, the
information in these two components (mode,procid) is condens-
ed into a 3-bit mode string called mode3. The following three
functions define what each bit of mode3 will be whenever a new
capability is loaded into a PU's associative memory.
w(mode3) = (proc_id(capability) = proc_id());
r(mode3) = r(mode) (proc_id(capability) = 0 V
(procid(capability) = proc_id()));
e(mode3) = e(mode) (proc_id(capability) = 0 V
(proc_id(capability) = proc_id($)));
Recall that proc_id(9) is the identifier of the process being
evolved by the PU. The reader should compare these three func-
tions with the state transition rule fragments shown in figures
6-12 and 6-13 and note that figure 7-2 and figures 6-12 and
6-13 perform equivalent access validation tests.
Figure 7-2 is the fragment of the PU's state transition
rule which performs access validation tests and uses the asso-
ciative memory. In figure 7-2, "AM" means associative memory.
"P's intent" refers to whether the process P being evolved by
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the PU is reading a word as data, reading it as an instruction,
or writing data. "FAULT" means a trap to the operating system
due (in the cases in this flowchart) to an attempted access
violation. Figure 7-2 is an abstraction from the state transi-
tion rule in Appendix 1, modified to accomplish process synch-
ronization required by the privacy restriction mechanism.
7.2. Associative Memory' Control' Bits for the PRP
For the moment, assume that we have built a PRP to hold
restriction sets of processes and segments and do the appro-
priate union operations on these sets as the PU proceeds. The
PU must tell the PRP what to do, but it is necessary for the
PU to avoid telling the PRP to do too much. For example, sup-
pose a process P stores a word into segment A. The PRP will
perform the operation RA = RAU R. Now suppose P stores ano-
ther 99,999 words into A. It would be terribly wasteful to do
the union operation 100,000 times if Rp is unchanging and thus
the operation accomplishes nothing the last 99,999 times.
Of course it is possible to avoid this waste. The tech-
nique is to add two bits to each word of the PU associative
memory. If A is a segment whose capability is held in the
associative memory, we will call these bits Uread(A) and
U write(A). When U read(A) is 1, the meaning is "do a union
when reading from A"; and when U write(A) is 1, the meaning
is "do a union when writing into A". The Uread and U write
bits are set to 0 after a union is actually performed, so sub-
sequent unions will not be performed until the bits are reset
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to 1.
Whenever a union operation expands Rp (i.e., whenever an
operation of the form Rp = R u RA makes Rp a larger set), all
the U write bits in the associative memory are reset to 1.
Whenever the execution of the restriction administration prim-
itive lift-p reduces %, all the U_read bits are reset to 1.
This is accomplished by means of a special instruction. But
when Rp is expanded by a union operation, this is noticed by
the hardware and the U write bits are reset to 1 according to
the state transition rule fragment in figure 7-3. Figure 7-3
is an expansion of figure 7-2, and thus it shows how to modify
a PU to accomodate a PRP; and in particular, figure 7-3 shows
how the U read and U write bits are used.
7.3. Events
Many important events which occur in multi-processing
computer systems are affected by the introduction of the
Privacy Restriction Processor. The PRP responds to events oc-
curring in the associated PU, and it also responds to events
generated by the action of other PUs and communicated by one
of the system's central communicators. Among the events occur-
ring in the associated PU, in addition to the reading and writ-
ing of segments, the PRP responds to the execution of special
instructions by the PU. This instruction set is given in sec-
tion 7.6. The union operations performed by the PRP, together
with its responses to special instructions and the system's
central communicator, collectively are the PRP's tactics for
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implementing restriction sets. These tactics are derived from
a consideration of strategies for handling the important events
occurring in a multiprocessing computer system.
The use of the special instructions just introduced is
permitted only in authorized operating system domains. The
dom ids of authorized domains will be wired into or set in
switches in the PU, and the PU will fault whenever an unauthor-
ized domain issues one of the special instructions. Instruc-
tions which signal the central communicator, and input/output
instructions, are similarly protected from unauthorized use.
The following list of important events which occur in
multiprocessing computer systems was derived from contempla-
tion, from conversations with graduate students and faculty of
the Computer Systems Research Group of Project MAC, and from
our study of Multics. The list is as complete as this student
could make it.
In the list of events, P means any process being evolved
by a PU.
1) a) P reads from a segment.
b) P writes into a segment.
c) The PU evolving P picks up a segment capability.
d) The PU evolving P deletes a segment capability from its
associative memory.
2) P does a send to output information.
3) The PRP does a union operation that produces an oversize
restriction set. (Restriction overflow.)
4) a) P does an initiate--read.
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4) b) P does a terminate-read.
c) P does an initiate-execute.
d) P does a terminate-execute.
e) P does an initiate-write.
f) P does a terminate-write.
5) a) P does a calldomain.
b) P does a return-domain.
6) a) P does a create-r.
b) P does a delete-r.
c) P does a read-r.
d) P does a modify-r.
e) P does a place-r.
f) P does a lift-r.
g) P does a replace-r.
h) P does a place-s.
i) P does a lift-s.
j) P does a place-p.
k) P does a lift-p.
7) The operating system reassigns a PU to a new process.
8) A PU takes a fault. Especially interesting is the segment
fault which needs to make a segment inactive, since this
involves the central communicator.
9) A PU takes an interrupt.
10) a) The operating system starts up.
b) The operating system reconfigures a PU into the system,
or out of the system.
c) The operating system shuts down.
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11) a) Segments are backed up by a "daemon" process under the
control of the operating system.
b) Segments are retrieved from backup media by a "daemon"
process under the control of the operating system.
7.4. Formats
From a consideration of the strategies for handling the
events just introduced, a set of PU-dependent and PRP-depend-
ent storage formats emerges. In fact, the formats and the
strategies coalesce together in the mind of the designer.
Some of the formats were presented in previous sections, and
are repeated here for completeness.
7.4.1. Segment Capability
mode Two bits called "r" and "e" which control
whether processes may read or execute the
segment.
proc id The unique identifier of the process which
may write the segment, if it is writable.
(All zeroes means no writing allowed.)
page_table addr The absolute address of the segment's page
table, provided fault = 0.
fault A validity bit for page_table_addr. The PU
takes a segment fault when it picks up a
segment capability with fault = 1.
length The length of the page table.
has R set A bit which says whether this segment has a
restriction set. (*)
(*) All of the segments which contain operating system data
bases will not have restriction sets, and therefore the
has R set bit in segment capabilities in operating system dom-
ains will be 0. If operating system data base segments did
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7.4.2. PU Associative Memory Word
This is the associative memory introduced in section 7.1,
which holds segment capabilities for speedy reference by the
PU.
mode3 Three bits called "r", "e", and "w" to con-
trol reading, executing, and writing. These
bits are computed as specified in section 7.1.
U read A bit which says the PRP must do a union
when the PU reads from this segment.
U_write A bit which says the PRP must do a union
when the PU writes into this segment.
has R set A bit which says whether the segment has a
restriction set.
page_table addr The absolute address of the segment's page
table.
length The length of the page table.
seg# The segment number of the segment in the
domain to which the process being evolved by
the PU is bound.
7.4.3. Domain Entry Capability
dom_id The unique identifier of the domain which
can be called through the use of this
capability.
(seg#,word#) The address of a procedure entry point in
the called domain, where calling processes
which use this capability will begin
have restriction sets, those restriction sets would gradually
accumulate almost every restriction in the system, because all
the processes use the services of the operating system. Then
this large collection of restrictions would be propagated to
all the processes, and the system would stop working.
execution.
R check A bit which says whether to check that the
called domain is in rd(r) when a call is
made using this capability, and similarly
for the paired return. (*)
7.4.4. PRP Associative Memory Word
page_table addr The absolute address of the page table of a
segment for which a restriction set is held
in the PRP.
location The location of the restriction set in the
PRP's restriction set memory.
size The size of the restriction set.
modified A bit which says whether the restriction set
of the segment has been modified.
writable A bit which says whether the associated PU
is evolving a writer process of the segment.
7.4.5. Restriction Set Control Word
available A validity bit. If a PRP begins to pick up
a restriction set for which available = 0,
it will cause its attached PU to fault.
size The size of the restriction set.
7.4.6. Restriction
oversize A bit which says that this restriction stands
for a set of restrictions stored elsewhere.
(*) The check whether the target domain (the destination of the
call or return) is in [d(r) is necessary to erect walls
around sets of domains, as described in section 6.4. Recall
that d(r) is the set of domains that information restricted by
r is permitted to be in. The purpose of the R check bit, which
makes the test optional, is to speed up calls and returns be-
tween domains of the operating system.
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unique_id A unique identifier.
7.4.7. Restriction Set Storage
We are assuming that restriction sets are stored adjacent
to the bases of page tables. Thus, the address of the restric-
tion set control word of a segment's restriction set is
page_table_addr - 1. This assumes a paged segmented virtual
memory, but this is not essential. In an unpaged implementa-
tion, the restriction set would be located just before the
segment itself (from the point of view of the physical memory
allocation mechanism). In such an implementation, page table_
addr would be replaced by a segment_base_address, and length
would be the length of the segment.
Figure 7-4 shows the storage format of a page table and a
restriction set.
7.5. Strategies
In this section we present strategies for handling the
events presented in section 7.3. Recall that P means any pro-
cess being evolved by a PU.
la) P reads from a segment. (Let A be that segment.)
Provided the reading is permitted by the mode test and
the length test, and provided the segment has a restriction
set, and provided the segment's U read bit is on, the PU will
tell the PRP to do the union operation Rp = Rp RA, and the PU
waits to see if Rp was expanded. The PU identifies A to the
PRP by telling the PRP A's page table_addr. The PU also tells
the PRP the bit w(mode3) for the segment A, just in case the
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PRP is not holding RA when this event occurs. The reason why
the PRP needs to know the value of w(mode3) will be given in
the description of event lc.
Whenever the PU starts to tell the PRP to do Rp = RpU RA
or RA = RAURP, the P will wait for the PRP to finish its
previous operation, and if the PRP is signalling for a fault
(e.g. restriction overflow), the PU faults.
The PRP responds to the request to do the union operation
Rp = R U RA by first looking in its associative memory for a
word representing RA. If none is found, the PRP picks up the
restriction set RA from main memory, as described in event lc.
The PRP uses its Union Processor to compute RpU RA, and re-
places Rp with this result. The PRP tells the PU whether this
operation expanded %.
lb) P writes into a segment. (Let A be that segment.)
Provided the writing is permitted by the mode test, the
length test, the has R set bit test, and the U write bit test,
the PU will tell the PRP to do the union operation RA = RAU Rp.
The PU identifies A to the PRP by telling the PRP A's page_
tableaddr. The PU also tells the PRP the bit w(mode3), which
will be 1, just in case the PRP is not holding RA when this
event occurs.
The second paragraph under event la applies to this event
also.
The PRP responds to the request to do the union operation
RA = RAU Rp by first looking in its associative memory for a
word representing RA. If none is found, the PRP picks up the
restriction set RA from main memory, as described in event c.
The PRP uses its Union Processor to compute Rp URA, and re-
places RA with this result (this modifies only the PRP's cur-
rent copy of RA), and sets the modified bit in the associative
memory word representing RA to 1 if this operation modified
RARA .
lc) The PU evolving P picks up a segment capability.
The PU loads the segment capability into its associative
memory. If the has R set bit is 1, the PU tells the PRP the
page_tableaddr of the segment, and the value of w(mode3) for
the segment. The PRP examines its associative memory to see
if it is holding the restriction set for the segment. If the
PRP is holding the restriction set for the segment, it does
not need to do anything. (*) If the PRP is not holding the
restriction set for the segment, the PRP proceeds to pick up
the restriction set from main memory. This action, i.e. pick-
ing up the restriction set from main memory, might also be
taken in response to events la and lb, as just described. If
the available bit in the restriction set control word is 0,
the PRP signals the PU to fault. Otherwise, the PRP picks up
(*) If the PRP is holding the restriction set when this event
occurs, the PRP could compare the value of w(mode3) obtained
from the PU with the writable bit for the restriction set,
stored in the PRP associative memory word. If they differ, an
operating system error is indicated and the PRP should tell
the PU to fault. If w(mode3) = 0 and writable = 1, the writ-
able segment has somehow obtained a non-writer process. If
w(mode3) = 1 and writable = 0, the segment has somehow obtain-
ed a writer process without its restriction set, which must
have been used previously by a reader process, first being
flushed out of the PRP. 269
the restriction set from next to the page table and the PRP
loads a word into its associative memory to represent the fet-
ched restriction set. In that word, the modified bit is ini-
tialized to 0 and the writable bit is set to the value of w(
mode3).
The PRP maintains LRU information for its associative
memory, so when its restriction set storage is full and it has
to pick up another restriction set, it replaces the least re-
cently used restriction set in main memory, provided it is
marked modified.
ld) The PU evolving P deletes a segment capability from
its associative memory.
The PU tells the PRP the page_table_addr of the deleted
capability, provided the hasR_set bit is 1. The PRP will re-
place the restriction set for that segment in main memory,
provided it is marked modified. When the PU picks up a seg-
ment capability and has to delete a segment capability from
its associative memory to make room for the new one, the PU
first tells the PRP about the deletion, and then the PU tells
the PRP about the new segment capability.
2) P does a send to output information. (Let A be that
segment from which output is requested.)
There are three cases to consider, depending on whether
the process invoking the send is a reader or a writer of A.
Case I. P is a reader of A. Since A has a reader pro-
cess, it has no writer processes, and so RA is unchanging.
Using the copy of RA stored next to the page table, and the
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value of Rp stored in the PRP, the send primitive calculates
0 ;(f) and decides whether to permit or to strike down the
output. If there is any restriction r RAU R such that the
principal to whom output is directed is not in f(r), then the
restriction r strikes. (The calculation of n f(r) is de-
r rRA v p
tailed in the paragraph after the discussion of Case III.)
If no restriction strikes, send starts the output. Then, ei-
ther send returns to the calling procedure immediately or it
waits for the output to be finished. If the return is immed-
iate, the operating system will not allow A to have any writer
processes until the output is finished. We are assuming that
output occurs directly from A, without an intervening buffer.
Case II. P is a writer of A. So RA might be in the PRP
associated with the PU evolving P. The send primitive tells
the PRP to flush out RA, using a special instruction. The PRP
responds by replacing RA in main memory, if it is marked modi-
fied. Then send calculates n (r)and decides whether to do
r(ERAu KP
the send or initiate the striking of some restriction. (See
the paragraph on calculating A f (r).) If no restriction
strikes, send starts the output and makes P wait. When the
output process completes, it wakes up the process P, and send
directs P to return.
Case III. P is neither a reader nor a writer of A. Out-
put is not permitted in this case.
Now we describe the calculation of n (r). This com-
putation is complicated by the ssibility th res ric ions
putation is complicated by the possibility that restrictions
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in RA or stand for larger sets of restrictions, indicated
by the condition oversize = 1. These larger sets of restric-
tions will have been stored in the Oversize Restriction Table
(ORT), an operating system per-system data base, upon the oc-
currence of a restriction overflow. We will call a restriction
for which oversize = 0, an ordinary restriction. Each oversize
restriction is the root of a tree, defined by the ORT, whose
terminal branches are ordinary restrictions. So the first
step in calculating V +(g) is to represent RA URp as a set
of ordinary restrictions, by following out the trees in ORT
for the oversize restrictions. Then, for each of these ordin-
ary restrictions, its address in the naming hierarchy (a pair
(directory,entry)) is determined from the Master Restriction
Table (MRT), another per-system data base. Using these add-
resses, the value f(r) is obtained for each r in the (possibly
expanded) RA uRp. From these f(r)'s the intersection nf()
is calculated.
3) The PRP does a union operation that produces an over-
size restriction set. (Restriction overflow.)
The normal size for a restriction set is between 0 and 4
restrictions. When the PRP does a union operation, the result
could be as big as 8 restrictions. Whenever the result of a
union operation is larger than 4 restrictions, the PRP signals
the PU to fault. The PRP has a result register which will
hold 8 restrictions, so nothing is lost but time. The fault
takes the PU into the PRP domain of the operating system,
which tells the PRP to store the oversize restriction set it
generated in the ORT, using a special instruction. The PRP
domain associates a newly created restriction, for which
oversize = 1, with the oversize restriction set stored in the
ORT. Then the PRP domain replaces the oversize restriction set
in the PRP's result register with the newly created restriction
just introduced, using a special instruction. Finally, the
PRP domain returns from the fault.
4) The process synchronization primitives.
The strategies are designed to allow restriction sets to
remain in the PRP as long as possible, so that time spent by
the system loading restriction sets from main memory into the
PRP is minimized. Thus, restriction sets of segments with
reader processes are allowed to remain in the PRP upon the oc-
currence of the process exchange event (event 7) and the call-
domain and return-domain events (event class 5), and are only
flushed out when the last reader process does a terminate-read.
Restriction sets of segments with a writer process are marked
writable in the PRP associative memory word. Such restriction
sets are allowed to remain in the PRP upon call-domain and
return-domain events in order to speed access of processes
having write access to a segment in several domains. However,
they (the "writable" restriction sets) are flushed out of the
PRP by the process exchange event in order to guarantee that
at most one PRP holds a copy of the potentially modifiable
restriction set.
273
4a) P does an initiate-read.
No special action is required beyond that specified in
section 6.8.
4b) P does a terminate-read. (Let A be the segment be-
ing terminated.)
If P is the last remembered reader of A, the terminate-
read primitive uses the central communicator to tell every
PRP in the system to flush out RA. Since A has no writer pro-
cess, none of these copies of RA will be marked modified and
so the PRPs will simply delete them. This action is taken in
anticipation of A's getting a writer process: if such a pro-
cess writes A, expanding RA, and then gets rescheduled onto a
PU whose PRP holds the old RA, the restrictions newly added to
RA would not be properly propagated.
4c) P does an initiate-execute.
No special action is required beyond that specified in
section 6.8.
4d) P does a terminate-execute.
The same action as specified for event 4b is performed.
4e) P does an initiate-write.
No special action is required beyond that specified in
section 6.8.
4f) P does a terminate-write. (Let A be the segment
being terminated.)
The terminate-write primitive tells the PRP attached to
the PU evolving P to flush out its copy of RA, using a special
instruction. The PRP will replace RA in main memory, provided
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it is marked modified; and the PRP will delete its associa-
tive memory word representing RA . As in the case of event 4b,
this action is taken in anticipation of A getting a new writer
process. Only the PRP attached to the PU evolving P will be
holding a copy of RA because RA is marked writable, because
writable segments have exactly one writer process, and because
the process exchange event (event 7) causes the PRP to flush
all restriction sets marked writable.
5a) P does a call-domain.
If the R check bit of the specified domain entry capabil-
ity is 1, the PU takes a fault into the PRP domain. The PRP
domain computes n d(r), following out oversize restriction
r'Rp
trees as necessary, and decides whether P will be allowed to
proceed into the target domain, or whether to strike down the
call. The PRP domain obtains the current value of R from the
PRP, using a special instruction. If and when the PRP domain
returns from the fault, the PU allows P to become bound to the
target domain. The PU stores the value of the Rcheck bit
with the return address of the call in the sectioned stack.
The PU clears its associative memory whenever the process
it is evolving becomes bound to a new domain, because segment
numbers have different meanings in different domains.
The reason for allowing the computation of nd() to be
skipped is to provide speedy calls and returns between domains
of the operating system.
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5b) P does a return-domain.
If the Rcheck bit stored with the return address in the
sectioned stack is 1, the PU takes a fault into the PRP dom-
ain. As in event 5a, the PRP domain decides whether P will
be permitted to proceed into the target domain, or whether to
strike down the return; based on whether the target domain is
in nd(r) .
NB: It is ironic that the fast inter-domain call and re-
turn sought in chapter 4 must be slowed down by this necessary
check. But note that the cost of performing this check can be
paid by the owners of the restrictions in Rp. If this is done,
the restriction owners are paying for the protection of their
information, rather than the owner of P paying for that pro-
tection; but this would allow malicious users to pile up costs
for restriction owners. To alleviate this effect, the owner
of P and the restriction owners might share the costs.
6a) P does a create-r.
The create-r primitive makes an entry in the Master
Restriction Table for the newly created restriction. Note
that whenever a restriction entry is renamed or moved from one
directory to another, the MRT must be updated.
6b) P does a delete-r.
The restriction is marked deleted in the MRT. The unique_
id which represents the deleted restriction cannot be reused
unless it is garbage-collected out of every restriction set
in the computer system.
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6c) P does a read-r.
No special action is required beyond that specified in
section 6.9.
6d) P does a modify-r.
No special action is required beyond that specified in
section 6.9.
6e) P does a place-r. (Let A be the segment named by
seg_name.)
If the named segment is not active (i.e., does not have
a page table), the computer contains only one copy of its re-
striction set and the place-r primitive is easy to do. It's
more interesting when other processes are reading or writing
the segment. Typically P is neither a reader nor a writer of
the segment, but we give P priority over readers and writers
because doing a place-r is quick and so the disruption to read-
ers and writers is minimal. The place-r primitive turns off
the available bit in the restriction set control word for RA,
and then place-r uses the central communicator to flush out RA
from all PRPs. The PRPs respond by replacing RA in main memory
if they are holding it and it is marked modified, and in any
case by deleting their associative memory words for RA. After
receiving acknowledge from all the PRPs signalled by the cen-
tral communicator, place-r has access to the only copy of RA
in the computer. The place-r primitive then adds the restric-
tion named by its arguments (directory,entry) to RA, and does
oversize processing if RA overflows. Then place-r turns the
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RA available bit back on, and wakes up all the processes that
needed RA and faulted because of the available bit being off.
6f) P does a lift-r. (Let A be the segment named by
segname.)
This is similar to place-r, except that a restriction is
being removed from RA. The priority of P over readers and
writers of A is the same, as is the use of the available bit
and the central communicator. A slight complication arises
when RA includes oversize restriction sets and the restriction
to be removed is not in the topmost level of RA. Figure 7-5(a)
shows an RA which contains two ordinary restrictions r and r2
and the oversize restriction r. (The "*" simply means that
r3 is oversize.) Suppose that lift-r is told to lift r4 from
RA . It would not be correct to remove r4 from the definition
of r, because this would have the effect of removing r4 from
other restriction sets containing r, such as RB in figure
7-5(a). The lift-r primitive must make an isolated copy of RA,
and remove r4 from that. Figure 7-5(b) shows the isolated
copy of RA implemented as a new oversize restriction r*
6g) P does a replace-r.
This is simply a lift-r followed by a place-r, performed
without turning the restriction set available bit on between
the end of the lift-r and the beginning of the place-r.
The following two events, invocations of the primitives
place-s and lift-s, differ from invocations of the primitives
place-r and lift-r in the following ways: the invoking pro-
cess must be a writer process of the referenced segment, and
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that segment is specified with a segment number rather than a
tree name. For details, see section 6.9.
6h) P does a place-s. (Let A be the segment numbered
seg#.)
Since P must be a writer process of A, place-s uses a
special instruction to flush RA out of the PRP attached to the
PU evolving P, whereupon place-s has access to the only copy
of RA in the computer. The primitive place-s then adds the
restriction named by its arguments (directory,entry) to RA,
and does oversize processing if RA overflows.
6i) P does a lift-s. (Let A be the segment numbered
seg#.)
Since P must be a writer process of A, lift-s uses a
special instruction to flush RA out of the PRP, as above in
event 6h. The primitive lift-s then removes the restriction
named by its arguments from RA, taking account of oversize re-
striction sets as described above for event 6f.
6j) P does a place-p.
The primitive uses a special instruction to copy out Rp
from the PRP attached to the PU evolving P, adds the restric-
tion named by its arguments to Rp, does oversize processing if
Rp overflows, uses another special instruction to load Rp back
into the PRP, and uses a third special instruction to set all
the U write bits to 1 in the associative memory of the PU
evolving P.
6k) P does a lift-p.
This primitive is similar to place-p, except that a re-
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striction is removed from Rp, which requires taking account of
oversize restriction sets as described above for event 6f;
and the lift-p primitive finishes by using a special instruc-
tion to set all the Uread bits to 1 in the associative mem-
ory of the PU evolving P.
7) The operating system reassigns a PU to a new process.
This event begins with an interrupt which takes the PU to
be reassigned into the traffic controller domain of the operat-
ing system. None of the segments in the traffic controller do-
main have restriction sets, so the restriction sets stored in
the PRP attached to the PU are unchanging. The traffic con-
troller makes a copy in its data base of the process state of
the process being interrupted. The traffic controller uses a
special instruction to copy out Rp from the PRP attached to
the PU, and the traffic controller stores this Rp associated
with the process state of P. Then the traffic controller uses
a special instruction to tell the PRP to flush out all restric-
tion sets of writable segments. The PRP responds by replacing
in main memory all such restriction sets which are marked mod-
ified; and by deleting its copies of such restriction sets
whether marked modified or not. The traffic controller picks
another process to run, loads its Rp into the PRP with a spec-
ial instruction, loads its process state into the PU, and lets
it continue its work. The loading of the new process state
into the PU terminates this operation, and the new process
returns out of the traffic controller domain.
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8) A PU takes a fault.
Control of the PU passes to an operating system domain
where the fault is handled (except for user-domain faults,
which cause control to be passed to the program which signals
the condition associated with the fault (*)). We restrict our
attention here to the segment fault, because the response to a
segment fault is to make the segment involved active, which
may require that some other segment be made inactive. When a
segment, say segment A, must be made inactive, the following
things are done. First, every segment capability for A is
modified by setting its fault bit to 1. Then the central com-
municator is used to tell every PU to clear out of its assoc-
iative memory any word with the page_table_addr of A. The cen-
tral communicator also tells every PRP to flush out RA, if it
has a copy of it. The PRPs respond by replacing RA in main
memory if it is marked modified, and by deleting copies of RA
whether marked modified or not. After receiving acknowledge
from all the PRPs and PUs signalled by the central communicat-
or, A's restriction set and page table can be removed from the
Active Segment Table to make room for the page table and re-
striction set of the new segment.
9) A PU takes an interrupt.
The PU stores the process state of the process it was
(*) When there is no handler enabled for the signalled condi-
tion in the domain where the condition occurred, it is not
clear what should be done. This is one of the problems which
must be solved by the operating system's control structure,
which is outside the scope of this thesis.
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evolving someplace, and picks up the process state of an
interrupt-handler process, which has the effect of taking the
PU into the operating system domain that handles the interrupt,
and the PU clears its associative memory because it is moving
between domains. We are assuming that none of the segments in
the operating system domain that handles the interrupt will
have a restriction set. So while the PU is evolving the
interrupt-handler process, the PRP sits and does nothing.
When the interrupt handling is done, the PU picks up the pro-
cess state of the interrupted process, clears its associative
memory, and continues evolving the interrupted process.
10a) The operating system starts up.
While the operating system is starting up, one PU is do-
ing the work of startup while the other PUs wait. These other
PUs will be brought into the system by means of reconfiguration
events (event 10b). So we need only consider the PU doing the
startup. It begins its task using an absolute mode of address-
ing memory, and shifts over to a segmented addressing mode
only after initializing the mechanisms which support the sys-
tem's segmented virtual memory. While the PU is using the ab-
solute mode of addressing memory, the attached PRP sits and
does nothing. When the PU shifts over to the segmented
addressing mode, the attached PRP clears its associative mem-
ory and sets its register for holding Rp to . Subsequent use
by the PU of segments which have restriction sets, as indicat-
ed by the has R set bit of segment capabilities, will result
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in union operations being performed by the PRP.
10b) The operating system reconfigures a PU into, or out
of, the system.
The first process to run on a PU being configured in, and
the last process to run on a PU being configured out, is that
PU's idle process. Idle processes are usually bound to the
idle process domain of the operating system. (This is where
PUs being configured in have their security hardware tested
before being put to work.) The idle process domain uses a
special instruction to clear out the PRPs attached to PUs
being configured in and out. A PRP responds to this instruc-
tion by clearing its associative memory and its register hold-
ing Rp to .
10c) The operating system shuts down.
If we assume that shutdown is terminated by making the
last working PU evolve an idle process, we can be sure that
that idle process will clear that PU's PRP.
lla) Segments are backed up by a "daemon" process under
the control of the operating system.
The backup daemon is given a segment capability for the
segment to be backed up, and the has R set bit in the capabil-
ity is 0. In this way the daemon avoids acquiring all the re-
strictions associated with the segments on which it works.
When the backup daemon backs up a segment, it also copies the
restriction set of the segment onto the backup media. There-
fore the backup daemon has the privilege of obtaining copies
of segments' restriction sets.
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llb) Segments are retrieved from backup media.
The retrieval daemon deletes the on-line copy of the
damaged segment, and its restriction set; and replaces these
with the segment contents and restriction set retrieved from
the backup media.
7.6. Tactics
Here are the elementary operations which the PRP must per-
form to effectively support the strategies of the previous
section.
1) The PRP must accept information from the attached PU
about where restriction sets are located. The PU initiates
this when it picks up a segment capability.
2) The PRP must pick up restriction sets from main memory.
The PRP must request its attached PU to fault if a restriction
set's available bit is 0.
3) The PRP must replace restriction sets in main memory.
This must be done in response to:
a) deletion of a segment capability from the PU
associative memory.
b) need for space in the PRP restriction set memory.
The least recently used restriction set is select-
ed.
c) a special instruction, which specifies the seg-
ment's page_tableaddr.
d) a request from the central communicator. Two
kinds of requests will get this response:
dl) a request to flush a restriction set, spec-
ified by page_table_addr.
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d2) a request to flush a segment capability
from all PUs' associative memories, the
segment being specified as before by page_
table addr.
e) a special instruction which causes all writable
restriction sets to be flushed from the PRP.
4) The PRP must clear itself to null contents in response
to a special instruction.
5) The PRP must do union operations Rp = Rp U RA and
RA = RAU Rp in response to requests from the PU. The PRP must
request the PU to fault when the result of a union operation
is too big.
6) The PRP must put down Rp in, and pick up Rp from, main
memory in response to special instructions.
7) The PRP must put down its result register in, and pick
up a new result register contents from, main memory in response
to special instructions. (This is for handling restriction
overflow.)
[8) The PU must set all the Uread bits in its associative
memory to 1, or set all the U write bits to 1, in response to
special instructions. This tactic is mentioned here for
completeness.]
The elementary operations listed above are the only opera-
tions which the PRP is required to perform. It is obvious that
a digital electronic device which performs the given element-
ary operations can be constructed.
2?6
7.7. Summary
We have described the hardware Privacy Restriction Pro-
cessor, and the hardware and software strategies and tactics
which permit a multiprocessing computer system to implement
the system of privacy restrictions developed in chapter 6.
The PRP consists of an associative memory which records what
restriction sets the PRP is holding, a location-addressed re-
striction set memory, a Union Processor for forming unions of
restriction sets, memory for the restriction set of the pro-
cess being evolved by the PU the PRP is attached to, and
control logic which co-ordinates the parts just enumerated to
accomplish the actions (tactics) described in section 7.6.
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Chapter Eight
Authority Hierarchies
8.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe means by which
the administrators of a computer utility can be prevented from
having absolute power over all the information stored in and
processed by that utility. In chapter 2, we noted the re-
quirement that noone should have such great power over
society's information systems. But in chapter 4 we introduced
a hierarchically controlled naming hierarchy, similar to the
file hierarchy of Multics, whose hierarchical control mechan-
ism gives the administrators who control the Root the power to
extend their control to include every computing object named
by the naming hierarchy. A naming hierarchy with a built-in
monocratic authority structure is not adequate in social con-
texts where several independent authorities share a single com-
puter utility, because the several authorities would be risk-
ing loss of independence.
The monocratic authority structure of the naming hierarchy
introduced in chapter 4 arises from the nature of control over
directories. Control over directories is exercised by means
of operating system primitives which examine and modify direc-
tories; and control over directories is authorized by access
control packets (acps), which name the domains which may suc-
cessfully invoke the primitives which examine and modify the
directories. Because the naming hierarchy is a tree of direc-
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tories, every directory except the Root is an entry of a super-
ior directory, which provides a place for storage of director-
ies' access control packets. In other words, a given direct-
ory's acp is stored as a part of its entry in the superior
directory in the naming hierarchy, and the acp of the Root,
since the Root is the most-superior directory, is stored in
some unique place (but not in any directory).
The authority structure of the naming hierarchy is mono-
cratic because the right to modify a directory carries with it
the right to modify access control packets in that directory.
For example, figure 8-1 shows how users are organized into
projects and given directories to serve as "personal Roots"
from which to build naming sub-hierarchies. The directory
(users,MultLab,Rotenberg) is Rotenberg's personal Root, to be
used as the starting point in catalogueing the computing ob-
jects created by Rotenberg. The user Rotenberg's control over
this directory is authorized by the acp which gives the domain
(users,MultLab,Rotenberg,home) read ("r") and modify ("m") ac-
cess to the directory. But because of the monocratic author-
ity structure, Rotenberg cannot be sure that he will retain
exclusive control over his directory. The administrator of
the MultLab project, Clark, can obtain control of Rotenberg's
personal Root by simply requesting the operating system to
modify the acp of (users,MultLab,Rotenberg). This request will
be honored provided it comes from Clark's home domain, (users,
MultLab,Clark,home), because that domain has the right to mod-
hicrarcl (4t4 aL.lk ore .
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ify the directory (users,MultLab), which includes the right to
modify all the access control packets in (users,MultLab).
Similarly, the system administrator Jones can obtain control
of the directory (users,MultLab) because her home domain is
authorized to modify the directory (users), and having done
that, Jones can then obtain control of (users,MultLab,Roten-
berg). Figure 8-2 shows how the access control packets of fig-
ure 8-1 would be modified by the authoritarian actions just
described.
This chapter will formulate a solution to the problem of
monocratic authority in a computer utility, but it is import-
ant to recognize that the solution should not interfere with
the reasonable exercise of rational authority. We will not
propose that Jones' control over the directory (users) be elim-
inated, because such control is required to add new projects
to the utility, and to delete old ones. Similarly, Clark needs
control over the directory (users,MultLab) to add users to the
MultLab project, and to delete old ones. Our solution intro-
duces two new computing objects, offices and authority hier-
archies, for the purpose of controlling changes to access con-
trol packets.
8.2. Authority Hierarchies
In place of the monocratic authority structure of the
naming hierarchy just described, we propose that a computer
utility should contain independent authority-expressing mech-
anisms for independent authorities in society. Corporations
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and branches of governments are examples of independent auth-
orities in society. The structure in the computer utility
which represents and serves an independent authority in soc-
iety is the authority hierarchy. Each authority hierarchy
consists of a tree of offices. Each office contains a list of
entries (possibly an empty list), and each entry points to an-
other office of the authority hierarchy. Each entry of an of-
fice has an associated name (a character string) which serves
to uniquely identify the entry in the context of the contain-
ing office. One office of each authority hierarchy, called
the most-superior office, is not pointed to by any entry of
any office. Each authority hierarchy has a unique hierarchy
name (a character string) which serves to distinguish each
authority hierarchy from all other authority hierarchies in
the computer utility. (The name space of hierarchy names is
administered by the computer utility administrators, subject
to the constraint that they cannot rename an authority hier-
archy. The reason for this constraint will become evident pre-
sently.) Every office in an authority hierarchy can be named
by a hierarchy tree name, which is the sequence of office entry
names that defines a path through the tree of offices from the
most-superior office to the office being named. An arbitrary
office can be specified with an office name, which is an order-
ed pair consisting of a hierarchy name and a hierarchy tree
name.
The purpose of each office is to authorize changes to
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some collection of entries of directories. The changes auth-
orized by offices include modifications to access control
packets, renaming of directory entries, and deletion of direc-
tory entries. These three types of changes were previously
authorized by the "modify" mode of access to directories.
With the introduction of offices and authority hierarchies, we
are eliminating the mode "modify" and replacing it with the
mode "append", which gives the right to add new entries to
directories. This "append" right is all that remains of the
previously defined "modify" right.
In order to record which offices control which directory
entries, each entry of a directory contains the office name of
some office. Requests to modify directory entries are made by
processes invoking operating system primitives. Each office
contains an agent list which the operating system consults
when it receives requests to modify entries of directories.
The agent list is a list of domain names. A request to modify
an entry of a directory will be honored if the request is made
by a process calling from a domain D such that the name of D
is an element of the agent list of the office named by the
office name contained in the directory entry whose modifica-
tion was requested. Thus, when a domain D is an agent of an
office 0, requests that originate in D can exercise the powers
of office 0. In most of the examples in this chapter, the
domains named by agent lists are the home domains of users,
i.e. persons. Since users command processes bound to their
25L
home domains, users can exercise the powers of offices.
The effect of introducing authority hierarchies to our
model of a computer utility is to make control of directory
entries, and especially of access control packets, fundament-
ally different from control of all other computing objects
(which is the function of access control packets). Adding a
new mechanism makes the model more complex, but it allows the
model to express an important social relationship: the inter-
action between the exercise of power and the status quo. The
acps represent the status quo. They tell what access is per-
mitted by what domains to each computing object. To change an
acp is to exercise a right of control over the computing object
whose acp is changed, and this exercise of a right is the fun-
damental unit of power over the computer utility. Because com-
puters are becoming the nervous system of our society, it is
important to know who has power over computers. The authority
hierarchies provide would-be observers of the social scene with
a structured expression which tells who has power in the com-
puter utility.
Figure 8-3 illustrates how the naming hierarchy of figure
8-1 can be placed under the control of two authority hierarch-
ies, named SysAdmin and MAC, shown in part 2 of the figure.
(The reader should note that the names "SysAdmin" and "MAC"
are being used for two purposes in figure 8-3: to name auth-
ority hierarchies, and to name entries in the directory (users
). It is not difficult to tell from the context of each in-
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stance of these names which meaning is intended.) In figure
8-3, part 1, and in other figures in this chapter, the office
name which tells which office authorizes changes to an entry
of a directory is shown as part of the access control packet
associated with the entry. For example, the acp of the direc-
tory (users) in figure 8-3 names the office "SysAdmin,()".
The empty list in the office name denotes the most-superior
office of the SysAdmin authority hierarchy. Thus the office
(SysAdmin,()) controls the directory (users). When we say,
"controls the directory", we mean that the given office con-
trols changes to the directory entry which points to the given
directory. This includes control over changes to the acp of
the given directory, plus control over renaming and deleting
the entry which points to the given directory.
Figure 8-3, part 2, shows the two authority hierarchies
SysAdmin and MAC. The MAC authority hierarchy consists of
many offices, of which four are shown in detail. The office
(MAC, (CSR,stdnt,Rotenberg)) controls the directory (users,
MultLab,Rotenberg); while the office (MAC,(CSR,stdnt)) con-
trols the directory (users,MultLab). In the MAC authority
hierarchy, we are using abbreviations for the names of entries
in offices. "CSR" is an abbreviation for "ComputerSystems_
Research" and "stdnt" is an abbreviation for "student_projects".
Figure 8-3 is an example of a non-monocratic authority
structure. To see this, consider what would happen if the
user Smith, a member of the SysAdmin project, attempted to
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gain control of the directory (users,MultLab). To do this,
she would have to modify the acp of that directory, but she
cannot modify it because she is not named by the agent list of
the office (MAC,(CSR,stdnt)). To be more precise, she does
not have control of a domain named by the agent list. Further-
more, she cannot modify any agent list of the MAC authority
hierarchy unless she happens also to be one of the authority
system's locksmiths. We will describe the locksmithing func-
tion in section 8.4.
In the situation just described, in which persons assoc-
iated with one authority hierarchy are trying to access an ob-
ject which is under the control of another authority hierarchy,
it is easy to say what the desired outcome is: access should
not be permitted unless authorized by the appropriate office
of the controlling authority hierarchy. This answer is easy
to see because it springs immediately from the underlying
philosophy that authority hierarchies represent independent
authorities. It is more difficult to say what should happen
when a person's domain is named by the agent list of an office
of a given authority hierarchy, and that person wants to access
a computing object which is under the control of another office
of the same authority hierarchy. For example, suppose Clark
wanted to obtain control of the directory (users,MultLab,
Rotenberg). We will describe protocols for the exercising of
"higher" authority in section 8.3.
To complete the description of our example, we must say
how the acps shown in figure 8-3 were initialized. We will
assume that the Root and the directory (users) already exist
as this description begins. The first action of interest oc-
curs as the system administrator Jones creates the MultLab
directory. Because the acp of the directory (users) contains
one term giving "read" and "append" access to Jones' home dom-
ain (whose name is (users, SysAdmin,Jones,home)), the request
to create the directory (users,MultLab) must have come from
(users,SysAdmin,Jones,home). The system's rule is that the
domain which creates a computing object is given access to that
object. Therefore the acp of the directory (users,MultLab) is
initialized to contain a single term giving "read" and "append"
access to (users,SysAdmin,Jones,home). But who should have
the authority to modify this newly created acp? To provide
an answer to this question, we introduce a new concept: the
authority of a domain. The authority of a domain is specified
by an office name, and it is this office name which is placed
in newly created acps to control their subsequent modification.
The authority of a domain is recorded in the acp of the domain,
and for our example we will assume that the authority of
(users,SysAdmin,Jones,home) is (SysAdmin,(administrator_l1)).
(When a domain is created, its authority is initialized to be
identical to the authority of the creating domain.)
Figure 8-4 shows the naming hierarchy just after the dir-
ectory (users,MultLab) is created. The system administrator
Jones would continue by creating the directory (users,MultLab,
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Clark) and the domain (users,MultLab,Clark,home). We will
assume that the user Clark has been registered with the utili-
ty's accounting subsystem, so that he can log in and command
a process bound to the domain (users,MultLab,Clark,home), and
we will assume that Saltzer has created the office (MAC, (CSR,
stdnt)) and initialized its agent list to name the domain
(users,MultLab,Clark,home).
The next action of interest occurs as the system admini-
strator Jones passes control of the directory (users,MultLab)
over to the office (MAC,(CSR,stdnt)). Jones accomplishes this
by commanding her process to invoke an operating system pri-
mitive which will change the office name recorded in the acp.
Like any other request to modify an acp, the request will be
honored if the request is made from a domain named by the
agent list of the office named by the office name contained in
the acp whose modification is requested. In this case, the
request is made by Jones' process calling from Jones' home
domain, and so it is honored. Figure 8-5 shows the naming
hierarchy just after the acp of (users,MultLab) is modified.
The next action of interest occurs as Clark, whose home
domain is the agent of (MAC, (CSR,stdnt)), causes the deletion
of the term "(users,SysAdmin,Jones,home): ra", from the acp of
(users,MultLab). Once this is done, the directory (users,
MultLab) cannot be accessed in any way by the system administ-
rator Jones, or any other system administrator. Then Clark
would command his process to add, to the acp of (users,MultLab
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), the term "(users,MultLab,Clark,home): ra". Thus Clark es-
tablishes his control over the "MultLab directory".
Now the process just described for the directory (users,
MultLab) is repeated for the directory (users,MultLab,Clark)
and Clark's home domain, (users,MultLab,Clark,home). After
Clark has control of the acp of (users,MultLab,Clark,home),
he would change the authority of (users,MultLab,Clark,home) to
(MAC, (CSR,stdnt)) .
Finally, Clark would request an independent audit of the
acps of (users,MultLab), (users,MultLab,Clark), and (users,
MultLab,Clark,home); and an audit of the collection of seg-
ments, especially program segments, for which the domain
(users,MultLab,Clark,home) contained capabilities. If Clark
were to request this information from his own process bound to
his home domain (users,MultLab,Clark,home), he could be fooled
by a naming hierarchy simulator program placed in his home
domain by the system administrator Jones (who created the home
domain). Such a simulator program could pretend, for example,
that (users,MultLab) was under the control of (MAC,(CSR,stdnt))
when it was really still under the control of (SysAdmin,
(administrator 1)). Therefore an independent audit is necess-
ary.
8.3. Higher Authority and Protocols
It is a common occurrence in organizations for officials
to issue directions to, or make requests of, their subordin-
ates. It might happen that a subordinate is requested to ex-
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ercise some right of control over a computing object, e.g.
to change an access control packet. For example, figure 8-6
shows an object whose acp can be modified by commands issued
by person B, because B commands a process bound to a domain
named by the agent list of the office (Auth,(sub)), which is
the office named by the acp. Similarly, person A commands a
process bound to a domain named by the agent list of the office
(Auth,()). We say that A is an agent of (Auth,()). B is an
agent of (Auth,(sub)). Now suppose that A is B's superior in
the organization represented by Auth. A could ask B to change
the acp of the object, and B could object and refuse to comply
until the side effects of the change, which B ought to be ex-
pert about because he is an agent of (Auth,(sub)), are under-
stood. If A had the power to change the acp himself, he might
go ahead and do it with insufficient thought to the side eff-
ects. Yet in some organizations, superiors will require this
power. The problem for a computer utility is to implement an
authority hierarchy mechanism which will serve organizations
having disparate traditional behavior patterns in their super-
ior-subordinate relationships.
A protocol is a rule which the computer follows in re-
sponding to the request of a higher authority. We are assum-
ing that the computer will infer the authority relationships
between people by noting who is an agent of what office. For
example, the computer would infer that A is B's superior be-
cause A is an agent of an office which is superior to the off-
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ice that B is an agent of. Each organization will choose its
own protocols. Each protocol will apply to requests of some
particular kind which originate from agents of some particular
set of offices. In other words, each protocol will have a
definite scope, which is the set of requests to which the pro-
tocol applies. The people who are agents of offices of auth-
ority hierarchies ought to know and understand the protocols
associated with their authority hierarchies, so that they will
know what to expect in dealing with other members of their or-
ganizations. In a real sense, the protocols associated with
an authority hierarchy are a statement of "the rules of the
game" of the organization represented by the authority hier-
archy, at least as regards exercising rights of control over
computing objects. When protocols are changed, affected people
will want to be notified or consulted in advance, because pro-
tocols have the power to protect agents of offices in import-
ant ways.
Protocols are composed of the following five types of
activities:
1. Notification. Agents of offices, or particular per-
sons specified by the protocol, are notified when the protocol
is invoked. In the example of figure 8-6, a protocol is in-
voked when A commands his process to modify the acp of the ob-
ject, because the operating system discovers that A's domain
is not named by the agent list of the office specified in the
acp of the object, but it is named by the agent list of an
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office superior to that office. The protocol might notify all
agents of the office (Auth, (sub)).
2. Delay. The protocol can specify a time delay of a
specific length, or until messages are received from persons
notified, before any action (activity of type 5) will take
place. In our example, B's opportunity to explain to A the
side effects of A's requested modification can be built into
the protocol, as a delay. Also, a delay might be used to re-
solve conflicts of privacy.
3. Polling. The protocol can poll a group of people and
use their votes to decide whether to perform the action whose
request caused the invocation of the protocol. In our example,
all the agents of (Auth,()) and (Auth, (sub)) might vote on A's
requested change to the acp of the object.
4. Auditing. A journal of invocations of the protocol
is kept or published. This might be used to inform members
of the organization how other members voted on polls conducted
by the protocol.
5. Action. The action whose request caused the invoca-
tion of the protocol is performed. This might be immediately
preceeded by additional notifications.
Protocols will be specified (in a formal language) by the
organizations for which they will work. Protocols will be
implemented by programs (compiled from the protocol specifica-
tions) encapsulated in domains which are under the control of
an independent group of administrators, the Protocol Adminis-
tration. The Protocol Administration will have its own auth-
ority hierarchy, and the offices of that authority hierarchy
will have control of that part of the naming hierarchy where
domains encapsulating protocols are catalogued. When the Pro-
tocol Administration finds that its work requires the use of a
protocol, such protocols will be under the control of the auth-
ority system's locksmiths.
An organization changing a protocol will communicate to
the Protocol Administration the new protocol together with its
intended scope and a list of persons to be notified when the
protocol is installed. In addition to the notifications re-
quested by the organization, the Protocol Administration will
send notifications of the installation of the new protocol to
all the members of the organization who were receiving notifi-
cations from any protocol(s) replaced by the new protocol. In
this way, members of organizations are kept informed when their
organization's "rules of the game" are changing.
The Protocol Administration will keep records of protocols
installed and notifications sent, and these records will be
subject to subpoena. This is intended to deter members of or-
ganizations authorized to transmit new protocols to the Proto-
col Administration from using this power in any improper way.
The following types of requests will be honored by the
computer utility according to a protocol:
1. Requests by a higher authority (agent of a superior
office) to change an access control packet which is controlled
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by an inferior office.
2. Requests by a higher authority to change the agent
list of an inferior office.
3. Requests by a higher authority to activate surveill-
ance over actions of agents of inferior offices.
4. Requests by any agent of any office to change the
agent list of that office.
8.4. Locksmithing
The locksmiths in our design of a computer utility auth-
orization system have the following two functions:
1. To control the agent lists of all the most-superior
offices.
2. To install and maintain protocols for the Protocol
Administration's authority hierarchy.
The reason for placing control of agent lists of most-superior
offices in the locksmithing function is that some catastrophe
might kill all the agents of the most-superior office of an
organization's authority hierarchy, and the computer utility
must provide a way for that organization to install new most-
superior agents. The reason for placing control of the Proto-
col Administration's protocols in the locksmithing function is
to avoid the recursion problem which would be encountered if
the Protocol Administration controlled the protocols of its own
authority hierarchy. The locksmiths would send notifications
concerning changes to such protocols, just as described in
section 8.3 for other protocols. The locksmiths would keep
records of all their actions, and such records would be subject
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to subpoena.
The locksmithing functions are implemented by primitives
of the operating system, and the use of these primitives is
authorized by a special office, called the locksmiths' office,
which has an agent list that names the locksmiths' home dom-
ains. While this mechanism succeeds in telling the computer
utility who the locksmiths are, it introduces the problem of
authorizing changes to the agent list of the locksmiths' off-
ice. An infinite tower of superior offices could be introduced
to solve the problem of authorizing locksmiths, but this is
akin to mathematical fantasy and is not practical. A finite
tower of superior offices leaves untouched and still trouble-
some the problem of responding to a catastrophe that kills all
the agents of the most-superior office. Roughly speaking, the
problem of authorizing the locksmiths is a recursion with no
fixpoint, like the conundrum "Who watches the watchers?".
The simplest way to authorize the locksmiths while avoid-
ing the recursion problem introduced above is to record the
agent list of the locksmiths' office on a loop of paper tape,
or a mini-disk, mounted on a peripheral device of the computer
utility (*), conceivably associated with a security officer's
console. In this way the secure authorizing of locksmiths de-
pends on physical locks and keys on the device where the agent
(*) Every request by a process to use a locksmithing primitive
will cause a scan of the agent list. The agent list could be
read into the computer utility every time a locksmith uses a
locksmithing primitive, or it could be read in only occasion-
ally.
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list is mounted, and on the secure operation of input from
that device. Although the secure operation of input/output
functions of a computer utility is outside the scope of this
thesis, we do not doubt that hardware and software mechanisms
can be devised to protect input and output operations. Thus
the problem of authorizing locksmiths is reduced to the pro-
blem of controlling the key that opens the physical device
where the agent list is mounted. This key might be locked in
a safe deposit box in a bank, so that an independent authority
(the bank) will have some control over, and keep records of,
the use of this key.
8.5. Sharing Computing Objects
Whenever two officials, neither of whom is a subordinate
of the other, have a substantial interest or expertise in con-
trolling a computing object, they might agree to share control
of that object. We are restricting our attention to the case
where neither official is the other's subordinate because when
the pair is a superior-subordinate pair, the superior can tell
the subordinate what to do, or the superior's rights of control
are established by a protocol as described in section 8.3, or
both. The computer utility must have a mechanism to allow con-
trol of computing objects to be shared by officials or offices
which are not directly or transitively related by the superior-
subordinate relationship.
One way of modifying the authority hierarchy mechanism to
accomodate the new relationship between officials just de-
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scribed is to allow acps to contain two, or perhaps more,
office names. This achieves an encoding of the information
that the named offices share the acp in question, but no in-
formation is provided about which rights of control are to be
exercised by which office. The mechanism must include means
for offices to share rights of control over acps, and for that
purpose we introduce a new kind of node, the protocol block,
which may be used in constructing authority hierarchies.
Recall that each office contains a list of entries (possibly
an empty list), such that each entry points to an immediately
inferior office. To include protocol blocks in authority hier-
archies, we expand this definition and allow an entry of an
office to point to either another office, or to a protocol
block. As before, each entry has an associated name, and each
office of every authority hierarchy except the most-superior
office is pointed to by exactly one entry. Protocol blocks,
however, may be pointed to by more than one entry. Figure 8-7
shows a protocol block which is pointed to by an entry named
"sharel" in the office (Auth,(sub,officel)) and an entry named
"share2" in the office (Auth,(office2)). We say that the off-
ices (sub,officel) and (office2) share the protocol block
shown in figure 8-7. The purpose of the protocol block is to
contain bindings to protocols which will determine how the
computer utility will respond to requests that relate to shar-
ed computing objects, or to the protocol block itself. Figure
8-7 shows two protocols bound to the protocol block (sub,
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officel,sharel).
Protocol blocks establish the sharing of control over
acps that name the protocol block instead of some office.
Figure 8-7 shows a computing object whose acp contains one of
the names of the protocol block in the figure; thus the pro-
tocols associated with the protocol block effectively deter-
mine how the two offices (Auth,(sub,officel)) and (Auth,(off-
ice2)) share control of the computing object.
Each protocol block must have at least two associated pro-
tocols. The first of these must contain the algorithm for de-
ciding whether to honor requests to change acps which point to
the protocol block, when such requests come from agents of the
offices that share the protocol block. For example, the pro-
tocol which decides whether to honor a request to change the
acp shown in figure 8-7 might poll all the agents of the off-
ices that share the protocol block, and use the agents' votes
as the basis for its decision. But when a higher authority
requests a change to an acp controlled by a protocol block, a
protocol associated with the authority hierarchy containing
the office of the higher authority will be used to decide
whether to honor the request.
The second protocol which must be associated with each
protocol block must contain the algorithm for deciding whether
to honor requests to revoke the participation of one of the
offices that share the protocol block. If one office can re-
voke the participation of the other offices that share the
?iS
protocol block, that one office has more power than the other
offices. If no office can revoke the participation of any
other sharing office, a state of trust must exist between the
sharing offices. What each trusts is the wisdom of the agents
of the other sharing offices, and the propriety of the first
protocol (defined in the previous paragraph).
8.6. Programmed Decision Making
It is very likely that the basic access control mechan-
isms described in this thesis will be unable to meet special-
ized requirements of users. This is because no provision has
been made to allow access control decisions to depend on com-
plex, user-specified considerations.
This limitation of the users' freedom to specify access
can be eliminated by introducing a variant form of the access
control packet, called a call packet. The call packet con-
tains a domain entry capability which effectively points to an
entry point of a domain which takes the place of detailed
access information recorded in the access control packet. The
call packet also contains an argument list which describes the
arguments expected by the entry point specified by the domain
entry capability. Whenever the operating system needs to make
an access control decision based on the contents of an access
control packet, and the acp is a call packet, the operating
system will construct the specified argument list and call the
specified domain with the specified arguments; and the called
domain will return its decision to the operating system; and
2L4
the operating system will enforce that decision.
When the user can write a program to make access deci-
sions, whether it is a program that is called because it is
named in a call packet or a caretaker program for a data base
encapsulated in a domain, the user can modularize the program,
if it is large and complex, along the lines defined by the
user's organizational delegation of authority. For example,
figure 8-8 shows a Venn diagram of a set of requests A which P
is responsible for granting or refusing, and a subset B of A
which Q is responsible for granting or refusing. We are as-
suming that P has delegated to Q the authority and responsibil-
ity for deciding requests in B. If P and Q carry out this de-
cision-making function by writing programs to make the deci-
sions, those programs would be joined together as shown in
figure 8-9. P's program would examine the incoming requests,
and for requests in B, P's program calls Q's program. B must
be a recursive set, and P's authority for defining B is exer-
cised by writing the program fragment that tests whether re-
quests are in B.
It is very likely that P will require Q's program to be
encapsulated in a domain other than the one in which P's pro-
gram is encapsulated, to prevent Q's program from usurping P's
authority. Figure 8-10 shows how an authority hierarchy which
expresses the fact that Q is P's subordinate is used to protect
the authority of P's program. The authority hierarchy, at the
upper left of figure 8-10, is named AP; and we assume that
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the person P is an agent of the office (AP,()) and the person
Q is an agent of the office (AP, (AQ)). The set of requests A
is generated by requests for access to the computing object at
the upper right of figure 8-10, which has a call packet that
invokes P's program progP in the domain domP, both of which
are under control of the office (AP, ()). When progP gets a re-
quest in B, it calls progQ in the domain domQ, both of which
are under the control of the office (AP,(AQ)). P could have
even more control over progQ if domQ were under the control of
(AP, (0)).
8'.'6.1. Sharing Delegated, Authority
If a superior official P with two subordinates Q and R
has the authority and responsibility for granting or refusing
a set of requests A, P might delegate authority over overlap-
ping subsets of A to the subordinates Q and R. Figure 8-11,
part 1, top right, shows a Venn diagram of two subsets B and C
of A such that B C 0. We are assuming that A has delegated
authority over B to Q, and authority over C to R. When a
request in B C, the shaded part of the Venn diagram, must be
acted on, Q and R might consult together and reach a joint de-
cision. The remainder of figure 8-11, and figure 8-12, toge-
ther show one way for P, Q, and R to automate a process by
which they might reach a joint decision.
We are assuming that each of P, Q, and R will write de-
cision-making programs which will be joined together as shown
in figure 8-11, part 1, center. P's program progP
AP
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in domain domP is called by processes which need responses to
requests in A. The program progP is shown in figure 8-12.
progP will call Q's program progQ in domain domQ if the request
it is working on is in B, and progP will call R's program
progR in domR if the request is in C. For simplicity, we
assume that the needed decision is a one-bit, yes-or-no ans-
wer. The line "if is b & is c then return(ok b & ok c);" in
P's program gives both Q and R effective authority to veto
the request. If the request is in A - (BU C), progP uses its
internal procedure decide here to make the decision.
P's authority over Q and R is represented in the computer
utility by the authority hierarchy shown in figure 8-11, part
1, top left. We are assuming that P is an agent of (AP,()),
Q is an agent of (AP, (AQ)), and R is an agent of (AP, (AR)).
P's authority over the set of requests A is exercised by P's
program progP, and P's delegation of authority to Q and R is
expressed by the calls in progP to progQ and progR. These lat-
ter two programs are prevented from usurping the authority of
progP because they are encapsulated in isolated domains domQ
and domR, respectively, and because domains domQ and domR are
under the control of P. Figure 8-11, part 1, bottom, shows
that these two domains encapsulating the subordinate programs,
in addition to the domain domP and the program progP, are under
the control of the office (AP,()) of which P is an agent.
When a request to be decided is in B C, a joint decision
must be reached. progP will call both progQ and progR, and
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procedure(request) returns(bit(l));
declare (is b,is c,okb,ok c) bit(l) initial("0"b);
declare (progQ,progR) external entry returns(bit(l));
is b = belongs to B();
is c = belongsto C();
if is b then ok b = progQ(request,is c);
if is c then ok c = progR(request,is b);
if is b & is c then return(ok b
if isb then return(okb);
if isc then return(ok c);
return(decide here());
& ok c);
belongs to B: procedure returns(bit(1));
end belongs_toB;
belongsto C: procedure returns(bit(l));
end belongs_to_C;
decide here: procedure returns(bit(l));
end decide here;
end progP;
Figure 8-12. P's program.
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progP:
the latter two programs will have the information that the re-
quest is in B AC because of the arguments is_c and is_b passed
to progQ and progR, respectively, by progP. We are assuming,
in this simple example, that progQ is aware of special con-
siderations which apply to requests in R's bailiwick by means
of information in the segment R_to_Q. Thus, when progQ is
called with parameter isc equal to 1, progQ will use informa-
tion in R to Q in making its decision. Similarly, when progR
is called with parameter isb equal to 1, progR will use in-
formation in the segment Q_ to R in making its decision. Fig-
ure 8-11, part 2 shows how the data segments R_to_Q and Q_to_
R are kept under the control of R and Q, respectively. The
acp of R to Q names the office (AP,(AR)), of which R is an
agent; and the acp of Q_to_R names the office (AP,(AQ)), of
which Q is an agent.
A more complex model of consultation between the two sub-
ordinates can be programmed if progP will create a second pro-
cess, and make one process call progQ while the other process
calls progR. These two processes, controlled by progQ and
progR, could send each other messages about the request to be
decided; and thus the decision-making computation could be
interactive and flexible, up to the limit of the programmer's
art.
8.6.2. Graft
The purpose of this section is to point out that graft
can be programmed in the context of the interactive message-
based decision-making computation suggested above. (*) The
programs progQ and progR might sell favorable decisions for
promises of payments to be made to Q and R, respectively,
which promises might be received through messages.
Graft can be prevented by insuring that progQ and progR
communicate only with each other, or by letting concerned
persons audit progQ and progR.
(*) This distressing thought due to Stephen N. Zilles.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1. On the Nature of Protection Systems
Protection systems are composed of walls and watchers.
For example, banks have vaults with extremely tough walls,
and guards at every door, and also automated watchers in the
form of electronic or photographic cameras which can be
activated in the event of a robbery. In the computer protec-
tion system presented in this thesis, the walls are provided
by domains, as described in section 3.5; and the privacy
restriction mechanism is a watcher. The privacy restriction
mechanism effectively watches the copying and combining of
information as directed by programs in the computer, by
propagating restrictions among restriction sets. The propa-
gated restrictions are then used to define new walls which
have the effect of striking down output to users or input to
domains. Having a watcher in our protection system in addi-
tion to walls is the crucial ingredient which allows the
system to prevent accidental unauthorized releases of infor-
mation.
Protection systems depend on non-forgeable objects. In
the computer described in this thesis, some of the non-forge-
able objects are the process state components which bind
processes to domains, the names of domains, the agent lists
of offices, and privacy restrictions. The operations in the
computer which modify any of these non-forgeable objects all
require some form of authorization. For example, the domain
entry capability effectively authorizes modifications to the
binding of a process to a domain.
An interesting taxonomy of protection systems, due to
Wilkes [Wi68], distinguishes list oriented systems from
ticket oriented systems, but both types require non-forgeable
objects. In a list system, control of access to the protected
object is specified by a list of authorized accessors. When-
ever an access is attempted, the list is searched for the
name of the would-be accessor; thus protection depends on
non-forgeability of such names. In our design, an example
of a list system may be observed in the access control packets
of segments, which contain lists of domains which are allowed
to access the segments.
In a ticket system, access to the protected object is
granted to any accessor who can present the proper ticket;
thus protection depends on non-forgeability of the tickets.
In our design, segment capabilities are tickets presented by
domains to the processor hardware to validate requests, made
by processes bound to the domains, to read, write, or execute
(as instructions) segments.
9.2. Survey of the Sources of Complexity
A computer that keeps secrets is necessarily part of a
larger information system, embedded in society, that keeps
secrets. The design of such a computer is an interdisciplinary
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task; that is, such a computer is a system which must operate
correctly in terms of criteria established in several appli-
cable bodies of knowledge, particularly social and technical
knowledge. It is appropriate to think of a body of knowledge
as a mountain range, with students climbing all over it, and
hopefully up it, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of deeper
results. Research makes the mountains grow, as results pile
up, and individual specialized disciplines seem to grow their
own mountains. In the context of this metaphor, interdis-
ciplinary work produces a bridge between mountains. Founda-
tions for interdisciplinary work are laid in the mountains of
the relevant disciplines, and we have found that complexities
introduced in such foundations are likely to become manifest
in unexpected ways.
We have observed three sources of complexity in our
design: (1) the tension between future good and future evil
that might transpire as a result of use of a computer utility,
(2) the social conventions by which American capitalist
society is organized, and (3) the logical limitations intro-
duced by the theory of recursive functions.
The computer is a tool that people will use to further
their individual and group purposes, both good and evil. The
goods and evils created by the technology described in this
thesis are consequences of the tradeoffs that must be built
into a computer utility that serves the conflicting interests
of individuals and groups that want privacy, a society that
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requires some disclosures, and computer users who want to
share information. Probably no technologist will ever invent
any technology that has only good effects. Technologists
with moral sensibilities will direct their energies into
projects whose social outcomes they will value, but decisions
about how to apply available technology will be influenced
by a wide range of considerations and interests that reflect
values apart from those that motivate the seminal tech-
nologists. Those values which are most widely accepted will
be codified as laws to require and outlaw good and evil
technology, respectively.
The social conventions of our society's capitalist
economic life have contributed considerably to the complexity
of our design, most notably to the design of the Proprietary
Services Administration, described in chapter 5, and the
design of access control packets for domains, described in
chapters 4 and 5. Other social conventions have contributed
still other complexities; e.g., man's willingness to trust
others finds expression in the system of warrants described
in section 4.7, which allows users of segments to be assured
by others that particular program segments are not Trojan
Horses.
Finally, the cold, hard realities of recursive function
theory impose limitations on our design. In chapter 6, we
noted that when two restrictions strike at the same time and
both set off alarms, the computation whose activity is thus
interrupted must be checkpointed and examined later by an
"appropriate authority" to determine whether the purpose of
each striking restriction is to protect privacy, or to leak
information. We conjecture that this problem is unsolvable,
in the recursive function theoretic sense. That is, we con-
jecture it is impossible to write a program to make this
decision. If the problem were solvable, then the notifica-
tion to the restriction owner whose striking restriction is
trying to leak information could be suppressed, and the
computer system would be more secure.
Our conjecture is based on the idea that programs can
have hidden purposes. In a formal logical system for proving
theorems about programs, sentences in a formal language are
associated with paths through which control flows between
statements of the program. The validity of the sentences
associated with the program can be established by proving
that if the sentences associated with the entry points are
true when control reaches the entry points, then whenever con-
trol reaches any other path (the entry point is a special
path), the sentence associated with that path will be true.
In this context, the purpose of a program is to make true
the sentence associated with the path through which control
leaves the program. Now suppose this computer system is
programmed with a programming system which requires programmers
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to supply these sentences which, in effect, tell what their
program does; and suppose that the programming system checks
for itself that the sentences are valid, as defined above. A
programmer might write a program whose purpose is to leak
information and supply a valid set of sentences which hide
this purpose. For example, if the programmer wrote the
sentence "true" for every path in his program, then the
sentences say nothing about what the program does, and yet
whenever control is in any path, the sentence associated
with the path is true. In this example, all the purposes of
the program are hidden.
There is only one straightforward way to find the hidden
purposes of a program, and that is to enumerate all the
sentences which are provably true when control leaves the
program. This will be a recursively enumerable set of
sentences, but probably not a recursive set (this is the
heart of our conjecture), analogous to the fact that the set
of sentences provable from most interesting sets of axioms
will be a recursively enumerable, not recursive,set. So, if
we were trying to find an effective procedure to deal with
the situation of two restrictions striking at the same time
and sounding two alarms, we would arrive at the problem of
determining the hidden purposes of programs; and when the
set of hidden purposes is not recursive, this straightforward
way peters out.
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We are not sure whether to despair or be gleeful in the
face of this seemingly unsolvable problem. But since it
appears that the computer cannot muddle through the situation
of two restrictions striking simultaneously sounding two
alarms, the mechanism in chapter 6 checkpoints the computa-
tion and calls in an "appropriate authority," a human, who
must proceed to solve the particular case at hand of the
problem that is probably unsolvable in general. We expect
the human to solve the particular case because the human will
bring additional specialized information to bear on the
problem, and because human problem-solving is aided by flashes
of insight.
Our design of a computer that keeps secrets has included
a relatively large number of different, intricate mechanisms.
The complexities of our design grew out of the complexities
of the design's foundations. If there were an abstraction
that encompassed all the sources of complexity, perhaps in
the form of a theory that was simple and internally coherent
and that explained both society and computers, then the
mechanisms of our design would be simple when explained in
terms of that theory. But we have found no such theory.
Computers are defined and limited by natural and logical laws,
while protection mechanisms are developed and maintained to
protect the interests of concerned communities or individuals.
A simple theory that explained computer protection mechanisms
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would have to encompass concepts ranging from the sensitivi-
ties and selfishness of humans to the non-recursiveness of
certain sets. Probably no such theory exists, or can exist.
9.3. on Robotic Watchers
"It all depends on whose ox is gored."
-- (folk wisdom)
The ultimate important questions which must be asked
about protection systems are, "Who benefits?", and "Is it
fair?" Such questions are relatively easy to ask and answer
with respect to the walls of protection systems, because the
walls are visible to everyone and any thinking person can
observe the walls, ask the questions, and decide as an
individual whether the walls are fair. This is slightly
more true with respect to physical walls such as those of
banks and international borders, which are visible to the
eye, than with respect to walls erected inside computer
systems, because some technical expertise is required to
understand the walling-out function provided by domains.
But the utlimate questions, "Who benefits?" and "Is it
fair?", are much harder to answer with respect to watchers.
The watchers we have in mind are the police forces, especially
the free-wheeling type of investigators like James Bond(*) or
those of the C.I.A., who carry on such "important" work as
(*) James Bond is a fictional superhero created by Ian Fleming.
spying, overthrowing governments, and other "dirty tricks."
The basic problem with the free-wheeling investigators
is that they operate in secret, and therefore citizens have
no way of deciding for themselves if the actions of these
watchers are fair unless the secrecy is removed. But the
investigators have argued, quite successfully, that secrecy
is essential to their functioning. One way we see to solve
this problem is to replace the free-wheeling investigators
with a fleet of robots controlled by computers, and to open
to public scrutiny the programs that control those robots,
which we call robotic watchers. Note that we are not pro-
posing to make public the investigative files compiled by
robotic watchers; such files about specific cases being
worked on would remain secret. But the procedures by which
the robotic watchers operated would be available for public
examination, and individuals could answer the questions "Who
benefits?" and "Is it fair?" for themselves by reading the
procedures. The processes of public scrutiny, criticism and
debate would shape the robotic watchers, and make them more
fair. Eventually, robotic watchers might become more highly
trusted than politicians.
An example of a simple robotic watcher should help to
clarify this conception: imagine an electronic device with
radar "eyes" mounted on a police car, observing all the cars
on the road (including those in the opposite lanes) for the
purpose of estimating the drunkenness of the drivers. Such a
machine, if it worked, would help save many innocent lives.
It is known that drunk drivers make many mistakes, so it seems
reasonable to expect that such behavior could be detected by
a robot.
However, two factors make the emergence of sophisticated
robotic watchers unlikely. First, there is the risk of in-
stant totalitarianism at some time in the future, which might
occur if the power of the robotic watchers were to be seized
in a coup. Second is the high probability of encountering
unsolvable problems (in the recursive function theoretic
sense) which tend to make a proposed robotic watcher impossible
to implement adequately. These factors will probably limit
the applications to which robotic watchers will be applied
to simple watching operations that assist human investigators.
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Appendix 1
Process State and State Transition Rule
The purpose of this appendix is to define the process
state and state transition rule of our process which jumps
between domains and has a sectioned stack. This definition
of a process is different from those of Lampson [La69] and
Schroeder [Sc72b] because domains are not a part of our
process; rather the domains exist in the environment of all
the processes.
The process state, denoted 9, is a tuple whose com-
ponents are listed in figure Al-l. The first three components
of 9 effectively bind the process to a domain; these com-
ponents are called dom id, vb, and dom pt addr. The com-
ponent vb is a validity bit which signifies, when it is 1,
that the value of dom_ptaddr is the absolute address of the
page table of the C-list of the domain whose unique identifier
is domid. The component domid is logically adequate by
itself to bind the process to the identified domain. But for
reasons of efficiency, the component dom pt addr is included
also. Our design aims to minimize the cost of letting
processes jump between domains, to the extent that it can be
minimized when the domains are not a part of the process
state. The fourth component, pc, is the program counter; and
it has the form (seg#,word#), as in the Multics process.
The registers of the process include accumulators, base
registers, index registers, and perhaps also floating point
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component
to identify the domain to which the
process is bound
validity bit for dom pt_addr
dom pt addr
pc
to locate the C-list of the domain
identified by dom id
program counter of process
registers
stack pt addr
Min}
Max
general computation
to locate the sectioned stack of the
process
to define the accessible portion of the
sectioned stack
proc id to identify the process
fault# to identify the causes of faults
Figure Al-l. The components of the process state .
dom id
vb
purpose
registers. The component stack_pt_addr is the absolute
address of the page table of the process' sectioned stack.
The components Min and Max define the accessible portion of
the sectioned stack. The component proc_id is a unique
identifier of the process. It is not modified by the state
transition rule at all. Finally, the component fault# is
used to record the reasons why when the process takes a fault.
Our state transition rule does not ever show this component
being modified explicitly, but in fact it is set by the
activity of every box labelled "FAULT". These boxes all
transfer control of the processor to the box labelled "all
FAULTs" at the top of part 9 of figure A-2, whereupon the
fault# is examined.
Figure A1-2 is the state transition rule of our process.
This state transition rule completely defines all protection-
related activity of the processor dwhich evolves our process
(except for the privacy restriction mechanism and processor
defined in chapters 6 and 7).
Figure A1-2, part 1 shows the processor logic for valid-
ating the process' binding to a domain, followed by instruc-
tion fetch logic. If the validity bit vb is 0, the processor
searches a system data base called the Active Domain Table
(ADT) trying to find dom_pt_addr(dom_id). This is the
absolute address of the page table of the C-list of the domain
identified by dom id. If the identified domain is active, the
search is successful and the processor can proceed. Otherwise
the processor generates a fault, jumping thereby into the
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operating system program which will activate the domain. We
describe the search of ADT in detail in Appendix 2.
The instruction fetch logic begins by examining a cap-
ability from the array C-list(dom_pt_addr). By "C-list
(dom_pt_addr)", we mean the C-list stored in the segment whose
page table address is dom_ptaddr. For the purposes of notat-
ing the state transition rule, we define a C-list to be a set
of ordered pairs {(cap#,capability)} which is a function in
the set-theoretic sense. A capability is a 4-tuple or a
triple, depending on its type. Segment capabilities are
4-tuples, having the form (type, mode, length, addr), subject
to the constraint that the first component, i.e., type(cap-
ability), must have the value 0. The other components of a
segment capability are referred to as mode(capability),
length(capability), and addr(capability). The component
mode is a 3-bit string whose bits are referred to as e(mode),
r(mode), and w(mode). The component length tells the length
of the segment. The component addr is the absolute address
of the base of the page table of the segment. We refer to
the segment as Seg(addr(capability)), and for the purposes
of notating the state transition rule we define Seg(addr
(capability)) to be a set of pairs {(word#,bitstring)}
which is a function in the set-theoretic sense.
The instruction fetch logic checks that the capability
selected by seg#(pc) is a segment capability, that its e(mode)
bit is on, and that the segment is long enough to contain a
2 7
word#(pc)-th word. The fetch logic then reads that word
from the segment, indexes the program counter, and analyses
the fetched instruction. The state transition rule imple-
ments six different classes of instructions. These are
register-to-register functional operation instructions
(e.g., "ADD"), memory reference instructions (e.g., "LOAD"
and "STORE), a conditional transfer instruction (which can
be made to transfer unconditionally), stack growing and
shrinking instructions, the call-domain instruction, and the
return-domain instruction. These last two are the only
members of singular instruction classes.
Figure A1-2, part 2 shows the state transition rule for
register-to-register operations. Our model does not have
much detail in this area because the realm in which these
operations operate, to wit the registers of the process state,
is a uniformly protected collection of information. There
can be little argument against the assertion that a process
has the right to read and write its own registers, and that
is all these operations require.
Figure A1-2, parts 3 and 4 show the state transition
rule for references to memory. All such references begin
with the formation of an operand address, a two-part address
(t,x). If t is equal to the constant STACK#, the address
refers to the sectioned stack. (If t is to be represented by
a 15-bit field, we would choose 215-1 as the value of STACK#.)
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The tests in fgure A1-2, part 3 which determine what reading
and writing operations are allowed; are similar to the tests
shown in figure 3-4, part 2, our model of Multics. Figure
A1-2, part 4 shows that a reference to the sectioned stack
is allowed only if Min < x < Max. Thus, the sectioned stack
has no accessible words when Min = Max. The state transition
rule will keep Min less than or equal to Max, as will be
seen.
Figure A1-2, part 5 shows the state transition rule for
transfers of control. We are assuming that the conditional
transfer instruction is used for unconditional transfers, as
in the IBM System/360 [IBM64]. The transfer target address
is validated before the transfer is effected, so that when
the target address is invalid the programmer trying to fix
the bug will know exactly which instruction attempted the
transfer. This feature is adopted from Multics [Sc72a].
Figure A1-2, part 6 shows the state transition rule for
growing and shrinking the accessible portion of the sectioned
stack. A process may grow its accessible portion at any
time and by any (positive) amount; and it may shrink its
accessible portion all the way down to zero length. Note
that words of the stack are zeroed as Max is reduced.
Figure A-2, part 7 shows the state transition rule for
the call-domain instruction. The instruction specifies an
argument window size and a domain entry capability. Domain
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entry capabilities are triples of the form (type,dom id,
startaddr), subject to the constraint that the first com-
ponent, i.e., type(capability), must have the value 1. The
other components of a domain entry capability are referred
to as dom id(capability) and start addr(capability). The
component dom id is the unique identifier of the called
domain. The component start addr is a two-part address of
the form (seg#,word#) which is interpreted to be an address
in the address space of the called domain.
The call-domain instruction uses four words of the sec-
tioned stack to save the values of dom id, pc, Min, and Max
from the process state. These are used to effect a subse-
quent return-domain. By convention, the calling program
allocates four words just before the argument window for this
purpose. (In a real implementation, Min and Max might fit
into one word; but that isn't too important.)
Figure A1-2, part 8 shows the state transition rule for
the return-domain instruction. The saved values of domid,
pc, Min, and Max are recovered from the stack; stack words
are zeroed if Max is to be reduced; and the process state
components dom id, pc, Min, and Max are replaced.
The reader should note that in figure A1-2, parts 7 and
8, whenever dom id is modified the validity bit vb is set to
0. Thus, when the next domain binding test is performed
(figure A1-2, part 1), the ADT will be searched to find the
absolute address of the base of the page table of the C-list
of the new domain. 3 g
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Figure A1-2, part 9 shows the state transition rule
which governs the processor's responses to FAULTs. The
process state, including the reason for the fault, is stored
in the sectioned stack, and control is transferred to an
appropriate program. The state transition rule recognizes
two classes of faults: system faults (e.g., DOMAIN FAULT)
and ordinary faults (e.g., fixedoverflow). In cases of
ordinary faults, control of the processor is transferred to
the constant address ADDR2 where, in every domain, there is
a program (called the fault interceptor module in Multics)
that knows how to respond to the fault -- typically by
searching for an enabled fault handler, i.e., a program in
the domain which has previously declared it should be noti-
fied of certain faults, should they occur.
In cases of system faults, the state transition rule
moves the process into a new domain. The new domain is
selected by the functions SYS_DOM(fault#) and SYS_DOM_PT
(fault#); and control is transferred to the location selected
by the function ADDRl(fault#). These functions are wired
into the processor, or their values are set in switches in
the processor.
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Appendix 2
ADT Reference and Management
The purpose of the Active Domain Table is to allow
processors to find quickly the base address of the page table
of the C-list of a given domain, identified by that domain's
unique identifier. A processor making such a reference to
the ADT will hash the unique identifer, obtaining thereby
an index into a table of pointers at the base of the ADT.
We are assuming that every processor knows where the ADT is
located in memory (this information could be set in switches
wired into the processor, or taken from a register set by
the operating system), and we are assuming that the ADT is
an unpaged segment. Each pointer from the table of pointers
leads to a list of blocks in the ADT, each of which contains
the unique identifier of an active domain, and its corres-
ponding dom pt addr. The processor searches this list look-
ing for a block containing the unique identifier it's in-
terested in, and either finds it and proceeds, or doesn't
and faults. Figure A2-1 shows one list of blocks in the ADT.
If the desired block is not found, the processor takes
a fault into an operating system domain responsible for main-
taining the ADT. Figure A2-2 shows this domain, and one
other operating system domain. The fact that fault events
are occurring is notated with the arrow on the left pointing
at the ADT domain. Names of domains are written inside the
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circular figures that represent the domains. The AST domain
maintains the Active 'Segment'Table (AST), which contains page
tables and file maps of active segments. We can associate a
valid page table address with a segment just when it is
active, so the strategy for handling the domain fault is to
activate the C-list segment of the selected domain, and load
a block into the ADT holding that domain's dom id and
dom_pt_addr.
From information recorded by the processor in the stack
at the time of the fault, the program in the ADT domain re-
trieves the dom id of the domain that wasn't active. The
ADT domain uses the Master Domain Table (MDT) to look up the
unique identifier of the C-list segment of the desired domain.
(The MDT is a large, paged segment.) The ADT domain calls
the AST domain to make active the C-list segment, specified
by its unique identifier.
The AST domain determines whether the specified segment
is active, and if not it is made active, and in any event the
AST domain returns the C-list segment's page table address.
The strategies by which the AST domain operates are described
in Appendix 3.
After the return from the AST domain, the ADT domain
searches for a free block in the ADT, frees one if necessary,
loads the new dom id and dompt addr into the block in the
ADT, threads the block onto the appropriate list, and re-
turns from the fault. After the return from the fault, the
process once again searches in the ADT, finds what it's look-
ing for, and thus can continue.
The task of freeing blocks in the ADT to make room for
new information is the price that must be paid to share the
ADT's services among all the processes in the system. A
global lock on the ADT is required to properly synchronize
ADT reference events and ADT management events, and successful
searches in the ADT must set a bit to inform the program in
the ADT domain that an ADT block has been used.
The global lock on the ADT can be explained most easily
in terms of a read-alter-rewrite memory cycle. This is a
service performed by a memory controller for a processor,
wherein a processor receiving the service is guaranteed that
no other processor is accessing the addressed word at the same
time. The service consists of reading the addressed word and
delivering it to the processor, waiting for the processor to
alter the word, and re-writing the altered word in the address
from which it was first read. We will assume that the first
word of the ADT segment is devoted to this global lock, and
we will call it ADT_lock. When ADT_lock is greater than zero,
a number of processors are searching in the ADT. When ADT_
lock equals zero, the ADT is not in use. When ADT lock = -1,
the ADT is being modified. Only one process is allowed to
modify the ADT at a time. Processors searching in the ADT
are given priority over a processor which wants to modify the
ADT.
36
Figure A2-3 shows the state transition rule of our
processor which locks the ADT by adding 1 to ADTlock, pro-
vided ADT lock > 0. This figure is an expansion of part of
figure A1-2, part 1, where the search of the ADT was intro-
duced. Figure A2-4 shows the state transition rule for two
new instructions, Lock ADT and Unlock ADT, which a process
will issue when it needs to modify the ADT and is finished
modifying the ADT, respectively.
Figure A2-5 shows a PL/I-like declaration for a block
of the ADT. The component block.next is the offset in the
ADT of the next block to be searched if this block does not
contain the desired dom id. When block.next = 0, there is
no next block. A backward pointer block.back allows quick
removal of a block from a search list. When a searching
processor finds the dom id it needs in a block, the block.-
used bit is set to 1. The pointer block.c next defines a
cycle through all the blocks that can be removed from the
ADT -- a cycle which is followed by a process trying to free
a block, according to the algorithm shown in figure A2-6.
The algorithm considers in turn each of the blocks which
are threaded together by the component block.cnext. The
algorithm selects for removal blocks which have their "almost"
bit on and their "used" bit off. The algorithm turns a block's
"almost" bit on when the C-list associated with the block no
longer has any pages in the fast memory device. The ADT must
be big enough so that processes won't hang up for long
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. .
declare 1 block based(p),
2 dom id integer,
2 domptaddr integer,
2 next integer, /* next in search list */
2 used bit(l), /* 1 = recently found by search */
2 almost bit(l), /* 1 = ready to go */
2 back integer, /* previous in search list */
2 c next integer; /* next in review cycle */
Figure A2-5. Declaration of ADT block.
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declare s semaphore init(l), (p,q) pointer;
P(s);
do while ("l"b);
if p -> block.used then do;
p -> block.used = "O"b;
p -> block.almost = "O"b;
end;
else if p - block.almost then do;
Lock ADT;
if -- p -> block.used then do;
call free block(p);
Unlock ADT;
q = p;
p = ptr(seg#(ADT),p -> block.c next);
go to found one;
end;
else do;
Unlock ADT;
p -> block.almost = "O"b;
end;
end;
else if pages in core(p -> block.dompt addr) = 0
then p -> block.almost = "l"b;
p = ptr(seg#(ADT),p -> block.cnext);
end;
found one: V(s);
call unfreeze activation(q -> block.dom_pt_addr);
Figure A2-6, part 1. Algorithm to find an old domain in ADT.
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Notes.
(1) free block(p) disentangles the block at p from the ADT
search list it's in.
(2) seg#(ADT) is a constant, the permanent segment number of
the ADT in the ADT domain.
(3) pages_in core is a call to the AST domain to be told the
number of pages of the specified segment which occupy fast
memory devices.
(4) unfreeze activation is a call off to the AST domain to
permit the specified page table to be removed from the AST.
(5) P(s) and V(s) are semaphore operators which provide
mutual exclusion of processes modifying the ADT.
Figure A2-6, part 2. Algorithm to find an old domain in ADT.
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searching for blocks associated with recently unused C-lists,
but this should not be an irksome constraint.
The program that begins at the label foundone will
place new values of dom id and domptaddr into the found
block, and then thread that block onto the appropriate search
list in the ADT. If the block is threaded onto the end of
the search list, the ADT need not be locked during the
threading.
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Appendix 3
Memory Multiplexing
We are assuming that the technique of paging [Ki62] is
used to multiplex the high speed memory device among all the
segments in the system. Every segment which can have a page
in the high-speed memory must have a page table in the AST,
and such segments are called active. In this respect, the
system here being described is very similar to Multics [Ben72].
The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the multiplexing
of the AST among all segments to which references are being
generated by running processes.
Every segment capability in every C-list has a fault bit
in addition to the four components (type,mode,length,addr)
introduced in Appendix 1. This fault bit is a validity bit
for the addr component: when the bit is .0, addr is valid:
i.e., addr is the address of the page table of the segment.
But when the fault bit is 1, the segment might not be active--
that is, it might not have a page table and so the addr
component is regarded to be invalid and so the processor
faults if it should need to use this capability. The fault
is called a segment fault and the system's response to the
segment fault is to make the referenced segment active,
store the correct page table address in the addr component
of the capability that caused the fault, and turn off that
capability's fault bit. Thus part of the job of the fire-
wall domain is helping the system respond to a segment fault.
29 
Figure A3-1 shows the domains of the operating system
which are involved in responding to a segment fault. The
domain to which the process goes when the fault occurs is
the Table of Contents (ToC) domain. From information recorded
by the processor in the stack at the time of the fault, the
program in the ToC domain retrieves the dom id of the domain
where the process was executing and the seg# of the segment
being referenced. From the Master Domain Table, the program
in the ToC domain looks up the segment number of the C-list
in the firewall domain, which by convention is also the
segment number of the table of contents segment for that
C-list in the ToC domain. The Master Domain Table can be
regarded as a function {(domid,(!_id,seg#))} which maps
domain unique identifiers to pairs whose first component,
!_id, is the unique identifier of the C-list segment, and
whose second component, seg#, is the segment number of the
C-list in the firewall domain. We are assuming that every
C-list has a segment number in the firewall domain which does
not change as long as the C-list exists. This assumption is
not essential--we could arrange to multiplex the name-space
of segment numbers in the firewall domain over a larger col-
lection of C-lists--but the assumption makes our description
simpler.
Armed with the segment number of the table of contents
segment, the program in the ToC domain looks up, in the
appropriate table of contents, the unique identifier of the
275
gepw
f4lt9g1 I
~fad1
ihvolve i h
376
A3- 1. Oreratihi 9syrtev-, do~hahs
Slevnnet faqlt.
Fi j 4 re-
~OLKdihj 6L
segment to which a reference caused the fault. Then the
ToC domain calls the AST domain to activate the segment,
specifying the unique identifier of the segment, and the
C-list segment number and seg# of the segment, so the AST
domain can remember in its AST trailers segment the locations
of all active capabilities (i.e., with fault bits off) for
active segments. The AST domain returns the page table
address of the segment, now guaranteed to be active (though
it could have been active before). The ToC domain calls the
firewall domain to turn off the fault bit in the segment
capability and replace the addr component of the capability
with the new true page table address supplied by the AST
domain. After the firewall domain returns, the ToC domain
returns from the fault, and the process will reference the
segment thereafter without generating a segment fault, as
long as the segment remains active.
While the services of the AST are multiplexed among all
the segments in the system, some segments are active all the
time. For example, operating system domains' C-lists are
always active, as are the MDT and the table of contents
segments of operating system domains. After a segment fault,
the ToC domain will cheerfully generate another segment fault
referencing an inactive table of contents segment for the
domain in which the first fault occurred; because the table
of contents segment of the ToC domain, which is used to re-
spond to the second segment fault, is always active.
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The C-lists of active domains are also required to be
active segments, so that the domptaddr's stored in the
ADT will remain valid.
When the AST domain needs space in the AST for a new
page table, it will de-activate a segment (not, of course,
any segment marked "always-active"). C-list segments are
handled differently from other segments in this regard,
because the addr components of segment capabilities are
pointers into the AST. Because of this, C-list segments
are de-activated when the domains they define are de-acti-
vated (i.e., no longer represented in the ADT). We will
return to C-list segments shortly. When the AST domain
needs space in the AST, it chooses for de-activation a non-
C-list segment with the smallest number of pages in core.
After initiating the removal of the segment's remaining pages
from core (if any), the program in the AST domain reads the
"trailers" associated with the page table to determine which
C-lists hold segment capabilities pointing to the page table.
The AST domain calls the firewall domain to get the fault
bits in these segment capabilities turned on. If the system's
central processors have associative memories for holding
segment capabilities, the AST domain broadcasts a request
that they be cleared (or, to be economic, that any capability
in an associative memory pointing to the given page table be
cleared). After following this procedure, the page table is
available for re-use.
In the above procedure for de-activating a segment, it
is necessary to turn on fault bits in segment capabilities
which contain the page table address of the segment. The page
of the C-list containing the segment capability must be paged
in for the firewall domain to turn the fault bit on. But this
use of the C-list page must not affect the C-list page usage
reported by the pages in core entry point of the AST domain
called from the algorithm of figure A2-6, because that usage
figure is intended to reflect activity of running processes
bound to the domain defined by the C-list. So the pages in
core entry point will not tell the true number of pages in
core, but rather the number of pages used as C-lists, as
opposed to used as data. The implication for the processor
design is that every page table word has two usage bits
(rather than one, as in Multics). One usage bit is set for
any usage (as in Multics); the other is set for usage to
retrieve capabilities from C-lists. These latter usage bits
provide the basis for the number returned by pages_in_core.
When a domain is de-activated, the AST domain is informed
by a call from the algorithm of figure A2-6. The AST domain
will de-activate the C-list segment, but only after setting
all the fault bits in its segment capabilities back on and
removing all references to the C-list segment from the AST
trailers. This requires a call to the firewall domain.
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This completes our description of memory multiplexing,
except we have not yet described the special status of sectioned
stack segments in the memory multiplexing scheme. This special
status is required because of the involvement of sectioned
stacks in processor multiplexing, to which we now turn.
The operating system includes a domain dedicated to
multiplexing the system's processors among the processes
which are eligible to run. This is the traffic controller
domain, and it is entered by two major methods: either
through a call to its entry point named wait, or through a
timer runout fault. The process that is directed to call
this entry point or takes this fault is giving away its
processor. The program in the traffic controller domain
selects a new process to give the processor to, and prepares
for the process switch by insuring that the new process'
sectioned stack segment is -active. This is trivial if the
process is one from a pool of so-called loaded processes:
loaded processes have active stacks by definition. If the
selected process is not loaded, the traffic controller calls
the AST domain to activate the selected process' stack seg-
ment, and adds the selected process to the pool of loaded
processes.
Then the traffic controller issues its process-exchange
instruction and the processor stores in memory some of the
components of the process state, and reads from different
words of memory new values for these same components. The
locations stored into and read from are specified by
registers of the process chosen by convention. The com-
ponents of the process state which are stored and modified
are registers, stack pt addr, Min, Max, and proc id. Since
the first four components of the process state, i.e., dom id,
vb, dom_ptaddr, and pc; are not modified, the processor
continues to execute the program in the traffic controller
domain. The fact that the processor is running a new process
will not be manifest until the process leaves the traffic
controller domain, which is done by a return. This is a
return from the wait entry point of the traffic controller or
a return from a timer runout fault--whichever is indicated by
the contents of the sectioned stack of the new process.
Before the new process leaves the traffic controller, it
examines a per-processor data base to see if the old process
should be unloaded, and if so it calls the AST domain to
accomplish this. (The process can find out what processor
it's running on by examining a fixed field of the state com-
ponent fault#.)
The AST domain will keep sectioned stacks active until a
notification through a call from the traffic controller domain
to de-activate them.
There is a small, but crucial protection issue here,
which is the privileged hardware instruction process-exchange.
The processor must refuse to execute this instruction unless
the executing process is bound to the traffic controller
domain, which the processor can detect by examining the
process state component dom_id. The value of dom_id for
the traffic controller domain can be wired into the
processor.
Appendix 4
Argument Segment Primitives
The purpose of this appendix is to define precisely the
operating system primitives which allow domains to share argu-
ment segments.
The primitive which is used to create a capability for
the argument segment in the domain to be called is pass-
segment(seg#,dom#,mode,copy_flag,new_seg#,code). The first
argument, seg#, is the segment number of the argument segment
in the calling domain. The argument dom# is the capability
number of a domain entry capability, which defines the domain
to be called. The argument mode is a 3-bit string which
defines the mode component of the capability to be created in
the called domain, except that this mode of usage to be given
to the called domain may not authorize greater access privileges
than are available in the calling domain. In other words, the
pass-segment primitive will not create new access privileges;
it only extends privileges which existed previously. The
fourth argument, copy-flag, is a bit which will be remembered
in the table of contents segment of the called domain and used
to authorize or deny any further passing of the argument
segment to domains called by the called domain. In short,
copy-flag is a bit which authorizes additional capabilities
for the argument segment. The fifth argument, new-seg#, is
an output argument which will be the segment number of the
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argument segment in the called domain. The last argument,
code, is an output which signals success.
The pass-segment primitive is implemented mainly in the
Table of Contents domain. The program there accesses the
table of contents of the calling domain to see that the copy
flag of the selected segment is on for the calling domain,
and that the mode of access to be given is contained in the
mode of access posessed by the calling domain. Provided
this is so, the program obtains the dom_id of the called
domain from the table of contents entry for dom#, and uses
the Master Domain Table to obtain the segment number of the
C-list and table of contents of the called domain. In the
table of contents of the called domain, the program obtains
a new segment number and records the unique identifier of
the segment being passed (obtained from the table of con-
tents of the calling domain), the mode being allowed, and
the copy flag specified; all associated with the new segment
number. The ToC domain calls the firewall domain to create
the capability in the called domain. Finally, the ToC domain
returns the new segment number to the caller of pass-segment.
To facilitate the reclaiming of passed segments, the
pass-segment primitive records, in the entry for the passed
segment in the calling domain's table of contents, the identity
of the called domain and the segment number of the segment
there. In other words, the pass-segment primitive grants
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access to the segment by creating a new capability, but
"with a string attached." The grantor can "pull on the
string" at any time and take the new capability back. The
philosophy behind attaching a string to capabilities is
simply the realization that a capability might be used un-
expectedly to gore the grantor's ox; coupled with the judge-
ment that the computer system should serve the purposes of
the user whose ox is being gored through the use of the new
capability, rather than the purposes of the capability-
borrowing ox-gorer. Clearly, this is not a technical judge-
ment, but a social one: whose purposes shall be served
first? Different workers have made different judgements on
this question, see for example Vanderbilt [Va69] and Fabry[Fa68],
where are described systems in which it is not possible to
take back capabilities once they have been granted.
The primitive which reclaims a passed segment capability
is reclaim-segment(seg#,dom#,code). The argument seg# is
the segment number of the argument segment in the calling
domain. The argument dom# is the capability number of a
domain entry capability, which defines the domain from which
a capability for the passed segment is to be removed. The
argument code is an output which signals success.
The reclaim-segment primitive is also implemented mostly
in the Table of Contents domain. The program there accesses
the table of contents of the calling domain to verify that
seg# is a segment number, that dom# is the capability number
of a domain entry capability for calling a domain which we
will refer to as "the called domain," and that the specified
segment was in fact passed to the called domain. Provided all
this is so, the program will proceed to reclaim the capability
from the called domain, and from all domains to which the
capability was passed by the called domain (if the original
call to pass-segment specified a copy-flag of 1), and from
all domains to which the capability was passed by those
domains, and so on. The program in the Table of Contents
domain can find all these domains because of the "strings"
recorded in tables of contents by the pass-segment primitive.
These "strings" define a tree whose nodes are capability
slots in domains' C-lists where are found passed capabilities
to be reclaimed. A simple recursive program can follow the
tree to its ends. At each node of the tree, a call to the
firewall domain is made to remove the capability associated
with the node from its C-list.
There is an interesting process synchronization problem
here, closely associated with the social question mentioned
previously: should the purposes of the capability-reclaimer,
or the purposes of a would-be passer of the capability, be
served first? Our answer to this question is expressed as a
priority given to reclaiming processes over passing processes.
This priority is implemented with a list of segment unique
identifiers of segments whose capabilities are being reclaimed,
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maintained by the ToC domain. The pass-segment primitive
will consult this list and make the executing process wait,
if it has been asked to pass a capability for a segment on
the list. For each segment on the list, there will be a
process executing the reclaim-segment primitive, reclaiming
a tree of capabilities for the segment. When that process
has finished, it will remove the entry it placed in the list,
and wake up any processes which the pass-segment primitive
directed to wait because of the entry on the list. The
awakened process might find that the capability specified by
the seg# argument to pass-segment has been removed by the
reclaiming process.
Finally, the primitive which validates the segment number
of an argument segment is is-arg-seg(seg#,code). The argu-
ment seg# is allegedly the segment number of an argument
segment passed from the calling domain. The argument code is
an output whose value signals whether the seg# is valid, in
the above sense. The is-arg-seg primitive is implemented
mainly in the Table of Contents domain. The program there
verifies that seg# is the segment number of an argument seg-
ment by examining the table of contents segment of the called
domain. (Recall that the "called domain" is the one which
calls is-arg-seg.) The table of contents segment also records
the identifier of the domain from which the segment was passed.
It is necessary to check that this is the calling domain, i.e.,
the domain that directed the process to call the domain that
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called is-arg-seg. To do this, it is necessary to examine
a protected word of the sectioned stack. To allow this, there
is a privileged domain of the operating system in which every
sectioned stack is accessible as an ordinary segment. This
domain is called the stacks domain. The program there, when
called by the is-arg-seg primitive, will return the unique
identifier of the domain which caused the second inter-domain
call before the call to the stacks domain. (The second call
before the call to the stacks domain is the call into the
called domain, since the called domain called the ToC domain, and
the ToC domain called the stacks domain.)
In fact, the stacks domain is used by the pass-segment
and reclaim-segment primitives also, to find out the identifier
of the domain from which they were called. The call to the
stacks domain is required because the stored identifier of
the calling domain is made inaccessible by the sectioned stack.
Appendix 5
Taxonomy of Responsibilities of Programs
The purpose of this appendix is to define the responsi-
bilities of programs. We assume that the institutions or
persons who own the programs will be required by society to
shoulder the responsibilities incurred by the programs. The
events which generate responsibilities for programs are
simply the events defined by the state transition rule (the
reading and writing of information in segments, and the call-
into to and returning from programs), and the events defined
by calls to the primitives of the operating system.
In defining the responsibilities, we use some words and
phrases which require prior explanation. We refer to control
of processes, which is exercised by programs, because the
state transition rule requires processes to take instructions
from the program designated by the program counter pc until
some instruction causes a transfer of control to another
program. We refer to the release of information, which
includes sending information out of the computer to a user,
making a copy of information in the computer (e.g., in an
argument window or an argument segment), and passing an
argument segment to a called domain. We mean the term
release to include also actions whose side effects will lead
to future movement of information, such as calls on
operating system primitives to add a term to a segment's
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access control packet, or to add a term to the seg-limit com-
ponent of a domain's access control packet, or to redefine
f(r) or d(r) in a restriction's access control packet, or to
modify the restriction set of a segment or a process. We
refer also to the distribution of information, by which we
mean a set of releases (possibly empty) of that information.
By use of information we mean the undertaking of any compu-
tation with the given information as input.
By maintenance of information we mean the avoidance of
any modifications to the information that leave it in an
incorrect or inconsistent state. When a block of data has a
lock bit associated with it, one possible rule for examining
or manipulating the block is to set the lock bit first, and
reset it when done; and to wait for it to be reset whenever
an attempt is made to set it when it's already set. This
convention is an example of proper maintenance. "Proper" is
a somewhat fuzzy word (like "reasonable"); whenever we use it
we open an area of discourse for lawyers.
Now we turn to enumerating the responsibilities of pro-
grams.
A program that directs a process to read words from
segments (or the process' stack) and compute results from
them, is responsible for so directing the process. Similarly,
a program that directs a process to write words in segments
(or in its stack) is responsible for so directing the process.
In other words, the program is responsible for what it makes
a process do.
A program that calls another program is responsible for
releasing control of the executing process, and it is respon-
sible for the release of the arguments of the call to the
called program. It is responsible for the content of the
arguments only to the extent that it computed them. The
called program becomes responsible for the proper distribu-
tion, use, and maintenance of the arguments it received, and
for the proper control of the executing process. If the
called program is in another domain, all the programs in the
called domain become responsible for the proper distribution,
use, and maintenance of the arguments. This includes the
contents of the argument window, and all argument segments
passed to the called domain.
A program that calls an operating system primitive is
responsible for the effects and the side effects of the call.
For example, a program that exercises the authority of an
office is responsible for proper use of that authority.
A program that returns to its caller is responsible for
releasing control of the executing process, and it is respon-
sible for the release of results to the calling program. It
is responsible for the content of the results only to the
extent that it computed them. The program to which control
is returned becomes responsible for the proper distribution,
use, and maintenance of the results it receives, and for the
proper control of the executing process. If the program
returned to is in another domain, all the programs in that
domain become responsible for the proper distribution, use,
and maintenance of the results.
This enumeration of responsibilities is included here
because it is necessary to be able to say who is responsible
for potentially harmful events (see section 2.7). But the
reader should not jump to the conclusion that this enumera-
tion makes possible the analysis of all harmful events.
System crashes, for example, are difficult to analyze because
of the complex patterns in which the simple events described
above are combined.
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